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Chapter 1
 
Introduction
 
It has become overwhelmingl apparent that a shift in terrorism organization has 
occurred. While terrorism has plagued countrie around the world for ears, the 
evolution of terrorism has resulted in the transformation of organizations into stronger 
more adaptive, "super-terrorist" groups (Emerson, 1998). Tb increased resiliency of 
terrorist organizations is a troubling factor to the anti-terrorism community. Al Qaeda is a 
case in point of an effective network organizational structure that has pro ed adaptive 
and difficult to destroy. For more than ten years Al Qaeda built an invisible network that 
spans across all continents. However the attacks of 9/11 exist as a unique point in time, 
for the events exposed group factors such as its operational tactics linkages between 
members, and associations to the radical Islamic belief system that A1 Qaeda is founded 
upon. It is around the e ents of 9/11 that a conceptual framework for this research is 
constructed. Within this analysis the evaluation of two parts-the cau e and th effect­
are synthesized to understand how they interact within th mod I. First a clear r 
understanding of the A1 Qaeda network is unfolded a well as, an understanding of the 
more daunting questions of how Al Qaeda accompli hed the attacks. econd th 
research conducted extends to how these attacks affected a ociety and how attacks of 
such magnitude are being deterred now. 
How rapid have been ne threat developments? How much ha e the anti-terrorist 
tactics changed? ignificantl. In Perspective on Terrori 'm Vetter and Perl tein 
(1991) argued that the continental United States would remain r latively unaffected by 
much of the violence that seems indigenous in other aJ;eas of the world. Unfortunately, 
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the attack of9111 ga e the nited tate, as ell a oth r We tern democracies no 
choice but to take the enero seriousI . Military strategi ts ha e labeled the ne\: threat 
'fourth generation warfare'. Fourth generation warfare is characterized b the decreased 
emphasis ofmilitary action in times of conflict, and the lack of at least one side having a 
nationally controlled military force. One of the first papers written on th subject came 
from within the military community. The authors vi idly de~rib fourth generation 
warfare by stating "The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the 
vanishing point. It will be nonlinear possibly to the point of having no defmable 
battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear 
(Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt. Sutton, and Wilson, 1989 p.25). The description offourth 
generation warfare, although it is not limited in scope to terrorism significantly 
resembles the war on terrorism. 
After the attacks of9/11, opposing forces to terrorism found themselves grappling 
with how to deal with Al Qaeda and other terrori t groups evolving in the same pattem. 
The strategies of the past do little to guarantee future success. Modem government and 
military methods had to initiate change and must continue to change if the "war on 
terrorism" is going to be won. High-tech intelligence equipment will have some success 
yet it cannot be the main method of attack. New tactics used by students of terrorism are 
harder to combat becau e they are able to produce activ terror with a wide variety of 
readily available and less sophisticated weapons (Kushner, 1998). It is crucial that the 
U.S. is on the same playing field as Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. They must 
innovate just as the terrorist organizations do in order to be successful. This effort begin 
with understanding the complex organization of Al Qaeda. 
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Organizational etwork of AI Qaeda 
Al Qaeda' s organization represents a n twork hybrid that lie on a spectrum 
between that oftraditional military hierarch and a full-fledged autonomous cell network 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). Hierarchies are most commonl associated with 
governments in which there is a central command that holds the decision-making power 
over all of the procedures and missions. On the other end of the spectrum is the concept 
of completely autonomous cells that work together for a goal. Th idea of networked 
organizations is not a recent development. In the 1960's Bums and Stalker sugge ted 
that organic networks displayed structure of control authority and communication along 
horizontal lines. However, in the 1970's William Potter Gale and the Posse Comitatus 
initiated the "leaderless resistance" in which bands of resistance armies would cooperate 
on anti-tax demonstrations. The leaderless resistance structure depicts small groups of 
independent cells that carry out their own acts of violence with no central leader 
(Garfinkel 2003). 
Al Qaeda learned from th structural mistakes of other terrorist groups in order to 
create a resilient network. Cutting off the head of central command could destroy 
terrorist groups that adhered to a military hierarchy while autonomous cell in the 
leaderless resistance lacked leadership, which could result in in fighting and a los of 
focus on the objectives sought. Innovation and the will to survive fostered the formation 
ofa networked organization that governments find difficult to destroy. Al Qaeda's 
adherence to some structure is evident in it establishment of different committees that 
head up the fmances military, and other areas. Yet there are also autonomous cells each 
carrYing out its own mission with no knowledge of other members or their assignments. 
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TIllS is a pictur of Al Qaeda s complex organization that until 9/11 was not full 
understood or acknowledged. 
Force Field Analysis 
This study is a two-step process. The first step of analysis is to use Lewin's 
(1936) force field theoretical model to analyze the AI Qaeda organization and explain the 
social settings prior to 9/11. Next, using Lewin's model analysis of the effects caused by 
9/11 and the resulting actions taken is conducted. The particular change model comes 
from the work of Kurt Lewin who wanted to show how groups make decisions and how 
events unfold as forces of change. In developing his model he assumed that broad social 
trends and biographical data influence people s attitudes and beliefs about expressions of 
social change. Lewin used the term "forces" to label the influencing elements of social 
change, and described the forces as occurring in two directions--those that propel change 
and those that restrain change. 
Although the model appears simple enough it ha great theoretical import. It 
explains, on the one hand, what propels events and, on the other hand what prevents 
them. These form the equilibrium of opposing forces that move along a line of action or 
inaction. Often the change model allows practitioner to decide both a coW"se of action 
and its implementation. In this case, though, the researcher takes a macro analysis of 
broad historical patterns that balance the extent to which decisions are fully implemented 
and the opinions people have about them. This analysi involves elaboration on that 
model from a broader, historical perspective one that attempts to look at the 
transformation of the organizational structure and the social impact of these events. 
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The protocol of a pre and post design allo s for comparisons between the 
propelling and restraining forces surrounding 9111. Figur 1 pr ides a simple example 
of the dynamic relationship between propelling and restraining force in Lewin s model. 
Propelling and restraining forces like those found in a severe hurricane create chaos 
because certain extreme climatic conditions exist simultaneousL . ill this example, the 
propelhng forces are those social factors that would prompt action ofUN involvement in 
the world process, and restraining forces indicate action that would deter such action. 
Between the two forces there is what is referred to as a "threshold" or "critical incident" 
point. This point acts as a monitor between propelling and restraining forces. Certain 
social conditions are necessary for creating action before this threshold is met. The equal 
size of the arrows in Figure 1 indicates a steady balance between the forces. If for 
instance, the arrows representing the propelling forces were greater than the restraining 
forces, it would indicate that the propelling forces had passed the threshold point and 
actions being taken by the UN would clearly favor more involvement in the world 
process. To bring it back to a more equal balance, the restraining forces-social 
conditions enacted to restrain the UN's involvement in the world process-wouLd have to 
become more influentiaL. 
Additionally, this study uses an historical framework one that synthesizes the 
propelling and restraining forces as they apply to the organizational network of Al Qaeda. 
In other words the researcher is looking at the AI Qaeda network through the window of 
opportunity that 9/11 prompted. From that point, it is necessary to look back in time to 
first understand how and why AJ Qaeda came into being, and then detennine the factor 
that affected the networks continued path all of the wa up to the events of 9/11. 
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Figure 1.1 
Example of LewlD's Force Field Analysis 
What Forces Affect UN Involvement in 
Improving the World Process? 
Propelling Forces Restrainin2 Forces 
Need for international law Nations do not want 
framework :+--; to surrender sovereignty
... 
International conflicts can Nations may not agree
.. .... 
require international solutions ~----1.... i4t-------1 on prescriptive mea ures 
Civil wars rna)' make UN The poorer nations will favor 
intervention desirable for while the wealthier nations will 
... 
!<IIl_t--., have to payhumanitarian reasons 
Then, the researcher takes the analysis one step further to evaluate the effects of 9/]] as 
they pertain to the U.S. public that the attacks affected and how these effects evolved into 
restraining forces to deter terrorism. The foll0 ing section i a review of literatur 
intended to assist in the discussion of the propelling and restraining forces. The 
researcher has included an introduction of Muslim culture ideologies and religion a 
well as the AI Qaeda organization. This information provides a foundation for 
understanding and sets the stage for subsequent research in this study. 
Review of Literature 
Muslim Culture 
Contrasting Ideologies from those of Western Thought 
The thought of Muslims brings the Middle East to most people s minds. While 
ninety percent ofthe Arabs in the Middle East are Muslims, they make up only onerfifth 
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of the total Muslim population Brown, 2000). et, th Middl East i the birthplac of 
Islam, the religion of the uslims and the hub of e erything important to th Muslim 
people. When discussing differences among cultures it i important to note that the 
majority of Middle Eastern Arabs identify with collectivity and the Muslim culture more 
so than individual state cultures. The institution of state was placed upon the Middle East 
by French and English colonialism rather than being adopted through choice. For this 
reason, Muslim identity has remained stronger than secular identity. The opposite is 
true for the U.S., in which a high sense of nationality outweighs other identification. In 
the U.S., emphasis on individuality has given way to a wide di ersity of religious chace 
which makes it easier to disjoin the facet of "American culture from that of religion in a 
general perspective. For Muslims, the daily way of life like gender roles, cuisine, and 
child rearing, are all wrapped up in the teachings ofIslam (Kramer 1996). 
Samuel Huntington (1996), in his book Clash ofCivilizations, believes that this is 
one reason why the Western societies and the Islamic Muslim continu to clash. 
Huntington suggests that these antithetical civilizations will only continue their historical 
struggle as globalization allows the expansion. of Western ideologies to continue and 
Muslims fight against it. A the centerpiece of Muslim life, religion is to b treated a 
sacred, not as an obstacle to overcome. Muslim tension has been generated in the belief 
that the West sees religion as an obstacle that must be dealt with in order for 
modernization to occur (Ajami, 1992). This, however i not the only culprit of the 
tension between the Muslim ideologies and th West. 
Many factors have helped to further the divide and str ngthen the resolute. of 
Muslim people. The idea of secular nationalism brought on b the Europeans ill stified 
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the Arabs and transformed the idea of the Muslim community into state pitted against 
one another (Schneider & Sil erst in 2000). orne rulers hungry for power became 
servants of the European rulers or corrupt dictators, and weaken d lslamic La by adding 
components ofEuropean legal systems (Coole , 2002 . Some Muslims blame the 
intrusion of Europe and its ability to keep the Islamic belie rs parated as th reason 
why Muslims have been unable to rise up and recreate the Middle East as the center for 
civilization and progress they once had (Aj ami, 1981). 
Another reason is the creation of the state ofIsrael and its support from the West. 
Not only did the Jewish invaders push Palestinians from their homes, the defeat of Egypt 
by the Israeli anny was a humiliating blow for all Muslims. In addition, Wallerstein 
(1999) suggests the sentiments ofmany Arab Muslims when he states that Israel is 
merely an outpost of the United States. The intrusion ofthe West and especially the 
United States, in the Middle East is a very resented fact. The West has also made oiL 
which some say is being stolen from its rightful owners, another priority and reason to 
stay in the Middle East. Muslims fmd the occupation of everything from Western 
ideologies to U.S. military troops an everlasting sign of the imperialistic attitudes being 
prescribed on their beliefs and way of life (Hubbell 1998). Muhanunad .Talal Kishk sums 
it up by saying 
"What we are witnessing now is the third crusade against the Arab people. The 
first crusade, using the sword and the cross, realized some victories but was 
eventually overwhelmed. The second crusade-the Age of Imperialism-began 
with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and succeeded in destroying the self-
confidence of the Muslim world. ow the third crusade picks up where the 
second left off: It accommodates itself to political independence instead ofusing 
armies, it seeks to penetTate the mind of the Muslim and to rearrange it" (Kishk, 
1965· as cited in Amaji, 1992 pAL). 
9 Al Qaeda 
Throughout tbe changes and troubles in the twentieth century affecting the 
Muslim people, the Mu lim Brotherhood has attempted to b a watchdog and leader in 
keeping outside influence away. According to the Deputy General Guide of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (2000), the brotherhood has two primary goals. The first is to institute an 
Islamic Shari a (law) to control the all Middle Eastern states. The second goal is to help 
liberate Muslim countries from foreign imperialism and achieve unity among them. The 
Muslim Brotherhood ha.s used terrorism--such as the assas ination ofjudges in 1949, 
attempted to assassinate President Nasser in 1954, and assassinated President Sadat in 
1981--to promote such liberation (Williams 2002). In its footsteps many other 'Islamic 
fundamentalist" groups have sprouted up and in the 1970's all Muslim societies had an 
Islamist wing (Ansari 1996). 
Muslims everywhere have focused on purifying their communities ofthe taint of 
westernization and encouraged a nizam, or Islamic system against the materially based 
systems of the West since the 1970's (Ansari 1996). But Western influence has still 
been able the seep through. In countries like Egypt th re are American movie posters, 
Barbie dolls, an Arabic language version ofSesame Street, high-rises and McDonald s 
(Schneider & Silverstein, 2000). While some have given in to the idea of a. western way 
of life, others hold their beliefs and hatred of the West even stronger. Many Muslims 
looking for an alternative are fmding it with lslamist movements. Islam is a powerful 
religion that can feed those feelings ofhatred if translated to look as such. This 
combination has been a strategic tool that has allowed many Islamist movements, 
including Al Qaeda, to recruit, instill strong beliefs, and even use terror in the pursuit of 
keeping the Muslim culture safe from outside predators. 
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Isla 
Splintering of thought and belief into different sect of the Islamic religion 
Islam is the religion of Muslims. It is based on the life ofth prophet Muhammad 
and the teaching of the Koran. There are seven basic tenets of Islam: monotheism, 
angels and demons, Allah s holy books prophet, accountability resurr ction and 
judgment (Farah, 1994). These tenets are the basic outline of the beliefs in which every 
Islamist adheres. In addition, there ar five pillars that Muslims must p rform everyday. 
The Shahadah is a creed that Muslim recite everyda to profess their faith as well as a 
prayer called the Safar is carefully orchestrated several times a day (Farah). Almsgiving 
which is a holy tax, fasting and a pilgrimage to Mecca are the other three pillars in which 
Muslim followers ofIslam submit to throughout their lives (Armstrong, 2001). 
The translations of the Koran vary widely, which is somewhat responsible for the 
ideological extremes and creation of different sects within the Islamic faith. The Sufis 
are dedicated to the preaching of pacifism and asceticism and reside in mona teries. On 
the other end ofthe extreme is Al Qaeda, a group of terrorists that believe in militant 
action and bloodshed as a way ofpurifying the world (Williams 2002). Th word islam 
means to 'submit" or ' surrender" to Allah. The Muslim world can be divided up into 
those who do submit and those who do not (Cragg & Speight, 1980). There are also 
divisions that have survived thousand~ of years. After Muhammad died battles ov r the 
neX'1leader, or Caliph, ofth people caused deep rifts that continue to this day. The most 
prominent of those divisions are the Sunnis, Shi'as, and Sufis. 
The majority of the Muslim peop! are members of the Sunni branch, which 
maintain that leadership should be contained within the Quraish, Muhammad s tribe 
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(Armstrong, 2001 . About twenty p rcent of Muslims are Shi as who believe that 
leadership should reside in a direct descendant ofMuhammad s son-in-Ia (Annstrong). 
Finally, the Sufis make up one percent of the Mu lim population and do not join in on the 
political arguments that drive the other two groups. Rather, Sufis see the Koran as a 
mystical book that praises withdrawal from the world (Williams, 2002). The internal 
conflicts that were created between the Sunnis and Shi'as some 1,300 years ago have 
caused great bloodshed on both sides. However for all of the turmoil on the inside, both 
groups do have some similar goals held towards the external world. 
There is resentment in the Arab world against Israel, which occupied Palestine 
and took control ofthe Al Aqsa mosque one of the holiest shrines of Islam (Yusuf, 
1998). And there is a deep hatred towards Western powers, especially the United States. 
They harbor such grievances as U.S. support for Israel being an imperialist government 
of selfishness and greed in the attempt of controlling the world, and for the stationing 
troops in the Middle East that defile the holy shrines and guard the oil that doe not 
rightfully belong to them (Hubbell, 1998). Islamic extremists are driven by these hatreds 
and adopt radical views of the teachings of Islam in their plight to change the current 
world. 
Al Qaeda members mainly fall into the Sunni branch of Islam. They have been 
deeply opposed to Shi'as and their beliefs. Still, they have found commitment to one 
common goal. Both bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini preach unbridled hatred towards 
the U.S., Jews, and a modem secular state and have embraced and mastered the 
necessary functions to pursue their goals (Ledeen, 2002). Within the Sunnis branch, bin 
Laden falls into another splinter of the religion called Wahhabism. Abdul Wabhab 
AJ Qaeda 12 
founded thi Islamic movement during the American Re olution in Saudi Arabia 
(Williams 2002). During the Revolution, the I larnic faith fell into a deep crisis due to 
its isolation with the outsid world. This crisis further accentuated the divisions in the 
Islamic world. There were those who argued for an Islamic Enlightenment that would 
refonn and modernize the values of Islam. And there were those that believed Islamic 
Fundamentalism and the traditional views must be upheld to stay true to the word of 
Allah (Saghiyeh, 2001; as cited in Beaumont, 2001). Wahhabism opposed Islamic 
Reformation. Wahhabists adhere to a purist lifestyle that prohibits any other name in 
prayer except Allah, any other object of worship except Allah, smoking of tobacco, 
abusive language, and ornamentation in mosques (Farah, 1994). The movement had 
tapered off, but gained momentum again in 1947 following the United Nations mandate 
to allow the creation of a Jewish Palestinian state (Wiliams 2002). Bin Laden has used 
much ofWahhabism in his leadership. 
The training manual for Al Qaeda member uses exees iv quotes from the Koran 
to express the mission of holy warriors against infidels. AI Qaeda u es its own 
interpretations of the Islamic faith to make the arguments for these missions and 
maintains that following the Koran and doing the work of Allah will lead believers to 
Paradise (WiUiams, 2002). Al Qaeda's mission is to create on truly holy Islamic state 
through the rejoining of all Muslims.. Once the Islamic state is recreated the Arab world 
can rise and conquer the infidels of the Western world and reclaim the power bestowed 
upon it by Allah (Williams). Osama Bin Laden and the rest of the Al Qaeda members 
believe this goal must be achieved in any fashion necessary; they will stop at nothing to 
see this mission successful. 
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AI Qaeda 
The Reach of the Terrorist Group 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, ther i no doubt in anyone's mind that 
Al Qaeda is a global operation. Terrorist cell have been located in numerous countries' 
some have been successfull broken up, yet others remain hidden throughout the world 
amongst everyone (Gunaratne, 2003). How a terrorist group could span the globe and 
create a stable organizational networking structure is still trying to be understood. In late 
2001 George Tenet, Director of the CIA and the rest of the organization argued that Al 
Qaeda did not constitute a well-organized terrorist network. Instead it was believed that 
various groups, with the help of some national intelligence services made up a ery loose 
organization that cooperated on some operations (Ledeen. 2002). 
Today, that tone is starting to change as more and more information and networks 
are uncovered. The intelligence and leadership abilities of Osama bin Laden are evident 
when one looks at the way he has expanded this terrori t group to what it is today. He 
methodically chose Kohmeini as a spiritual model and the Hizbollah group as an 
organizational model (Ledeen, 2002). Similarities include organization along 
paramilitary lines, a governing Shura (council), and a supreme leader (Ledeen). The 
group acts as an umbrella organization of numerou terrorist groups just like Hizbollah 
(Ranstorp 1994). Yet with changing times there i evidence that Al Qaeda is till 
transforming. There are suggestions that the organization i becoming more 
decentralized with decision making being delegated to well trained autonomous cell that 
are fmanced by private sources that fonn the web of the international terrorist networ 
(Ledeen. 2002). With large amounts of funding going to radical mosques AI Qaeda is 
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able to recruit Muslim throughout the world that stretch from the Middl Ea t, numerous 
countries in Europe, acros the Atlantic to ew York Detroit and California, 0 er the 
Pacific to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore and e en China and Central Asia. A 
much more specific list will be presented in the subsequent chapters. Such places serve 
as both recruitment areas as well as cell locations (Kushner 1998). 
Bin Laden s goal was to produce surrogates' all over the world that can carry out 
numerous missions of their own (al-Qa'ida(The Base), 2001). The recruitment process is 
meticulous as well. Al Qaeda recruiters that travel to mosques and universities all over 
the world spotted potential recruits. Recruiters look mainly for young men with an 
intense interest in Islam. Then once interest has been established, they are indoctrinated 
basicaIJy creating a new personality. Bin Laden effectively created an Islarnist 
fundamentalist mass movement by feeding Muslim rage of vulnerable young men and 
emphasizing hatred for the West (Ledeen, 2002). 
Egypt 
A clear example of this is through the examination of the role conflict of young 
Egyptian men. Egypt as a whole is struggling with many con:fl.icts today. The Islamic 
faith is central to most Egyptians lives. Yet one of the problems is how to define the 
attitudes toward western culture. Influences of western culture are evident in the cities of 
Egypt. Most Egyptians are caught between choosing a culture of Islam or an imported 
secular culture (Schneider & Silverstein, 2000). What makes it even worse is that 
Egyptians feel humiliated both personally and nationally because of the defeat 
experienced by Israel in the Six-Da. War and the dependence ofD.. foreign aid (Ajami, 
1992).
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Globalization and the American culture have had other effects on Egyptians. 
Foreign corporations have moved into the area and effected the economy of Egypt which 
has been hurt by the global economic downturn in 2000 and 2001 (Coole 2002). This 
has made it increasingly hard for young Egyptian men to find jobs and have money, 
which is needed before they get married. Many have had to migrate into the cities where 
their lives have been transfonned. No longer are the men united together as in rural 
settings, nor are they the sale providers and protector of their families (Schneider & 
Silverstein, 2000). Women are now working in cities in jobs that were once designated 
for men only. These young men have essentially lost an sense of what they have been 
taught growing up. This is deeply embarrassing for them, they see themselves as failures. 
All Egyptians, feeling the confusion of how to deal with an ever-present 
American culture and the stress of economic stagnation, are becoming more and more 
attracted to the Islamic movement. Islamists give Egyptians a picture ofthe glory days 
when Islam dominated the world and illustrate how it can one day return if all Mu lims 
unite under Islamic rule. The middle clas and the poor of Egypt are the biggest 
sympathizers of the Islamist movement, which gives them hope that equality may one 
day return (Weaver, 1993; 1995; as cited in Schneider & Silverstein, 2000). The Islamist 
movement also points out that many of Egypt's bardships corne from the American 
economic domination. They paint a picture of America as being the enemy since it 
continuously supports Israel holds military bases in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf state 
(Barber, 1998). 
The situation in Egypt gives Al Qaeda the perfect ground in which to recruit 
disgruntled young men who are confused have no where to turn, and ready to release 
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their anger and humiliation. umerous Egyptian men ha e be n linked to Al Qaeda such 
as Mohammed Atta, a lead terrorist on September 11 Muhammed Atef who was thought 
to be next in line to Bin Laden until he was kiIJed in No ember 2001 and Ayman al~ 
Zawahiri, leader of Egypt s Islamic Jihad terrorist group and bin Laden s number two 
man (Williams, 2002). Even more Egyptians joined under the umbrella of the a1 Qaeda 
organization when the Egyptian Islamic Jihad created a partnership with Al Qaeda that 
was completed in 1998 (Ledeen, 2002). 
The example of Egypt is only one ofmany Middle Eastern countries in which 
men are unable to adjust to the changing environment brought on by globalization and 
American influence. Al Qaeda has already expanded its reach to all comers of the world. 
Yet, this is only one step in the ultimate goal for Al Qaeda. In order for the world to 
become once again a land ruled by Islam, AJ Qaeda needs all Muslims to rise up and help 
destroy those that defy the word ofAllah and reject Islamic rule (al-Qa'ida (The Base). 
2001). Al Qaeda's mission will not be over until this transformation of the world is 
complete, no matter how long it talCes and how many live are lost. However, this war 
has only just begun, for those who see a world of democracy like the United tates and 
the rest of the Western world will not sit idly by while this terrorist network wrecks 
havoc on the world. 
Propelling Forces 
Using the Lewin Model identified the propelling forces that led up to the events of 
9/11. As discussed earlier, the propelling forces were the conditions that affected the 
organization and served as a means to successfully execute the 9/11 terrori 1 mission. 
Discussion of the propelling forces must also include the ,importance of necessary and 
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sufficient conditions. Within this construct both nee ssaT) and sufficient conditions are 
essential for action to occur. In other words, the necessary conditions are the components 
of a stick of dynamite whereas the sufficient condition is the fuse. It is the fuse that 
ignites the other components. The propelling forces include: 1) rapid globalization of the 
world; 2) financial stability of the terrorist organization· 3) strategic leadership' 4) new 
support for Islamic Law; and the sufficient condition of 5) "true believer status. 
Globalization 
The term globalization is utilized in two distinct ways in the discussion of 
propelling forces. The first operational definition of globalization stems from its social 
effects. Globalization is the result of the mobility of goods, services and labor driven by 
the economic market. which affect the monetary, environmental and social conditions of 
people within different countries. In other words how it affects First World countries 
versus Third World countries. The second definition of globalization is characterized by 
the widespread use of infonnation technology that span the world. Operationally 
defined, globalization constitutes the world s connectivity and interdependence of 
communication and information technology advances. It was necessary that the 
distinction be made for both represent aspects of globalization yet are used in two 
separate ways for understanding the propelling forces of Al Qaeda. 
What do 9/11, the Middle East terrorists audi Arabia, and the Pentagon have in 
common? A linking condition from a global system. Said (1984) has stated that like 
peoples and institutions, ideas and theories travel from one person to another through the 
course of situation to situation, and from a specific time period to another. Translocality 
theory suggests that politics can be situated not within boundaries of territorial space but 
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rather flo across spaces (Mandaville, 2001). This idea of translocality overlaps with the 
idea of globalization. Globalization has paradoxically contributed both to the pulling 
together and separating of these factors. Globalization has been agitating a rift between 
the Western and Eastern culture as it increases. Zerubavel s (1997) dynamic theory on 
cognitive sociology describes three sectors of the mind: an individual mind; a human 
mind; and a social mind. Cognitive sociologists remind us that we think not only as 
individuals and human beings but also as social creatures. The social environment affects 
people more than they realize. These tensions of culture are increased by the flow of 
ideas through boundaries that grabs onto the environment and hence, affects the thoughts 
of a society. 
Globalization has two faces. One is seen from above one from below. Richard 
Faulk in Predatory Globalization (1999) sees that globalization represents those forces 
where decisions are made from the top by bureaucratic organizations such as the World 
Trade Organization. By contrast those made from below repr sent people with an 
alternative ideology and political movement. The protests in Seattle in 1999 highlighted 
these two distinct groups where protestors opposed environmental degradation the 
economic gap, and wanted greater participation. Those looking from below are focused 
less on market drive issues and give attention to environmental and social concerns. 
The concepts of Edward Luttwak and Benjamin Barber, like puzzle box tops, 
show the connection between the two faces of globalization conceptually. Luttwak 
(1999) defined "turbo-capitalism" as a description of current global economics where 
some countries gain and others either stay the same or get worse. Turbo-capitalism 
defines economies that are somewhat free of government control, unrestricted by unions, 
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AI Qaeda can be seen a reacting with "other' protestors from below but in a 
more violent fashion. The i.ncrease in globalization has caused a majorit ofthe MiddJe 
East, including Al Qaeda to take measures to defend the survival oftheir wa of life. 
However in the fight against globalization the increase in globalization has allowed for 
the Al Qaeda organization to recruit, communicate, and thrive around the world with 
greater ease. Globalization, through the use of connective infomlation technology brings 
down the barriers between countries, which promotes movement of the members at a 
high speed and a low rate of detection. Anonymity, mobility, and communication are all 
technological aspect of globalization that Al Qaeda effectively utilized. Al Qaeda 
exploited both the negative and positive effects of globalization to build its network and 
make it strong and resilient. 
Financial Assets 
Another crucial element to the success of Al Qaeda is the financial stability 
accrued from severa] sources. In addition to the personal fortune of Bin Laden mosques 
other individual contributions, front operations, and illegal trafficking operations have 
built up the monetary strength that has been applied to chemical, biological and possibly 
nuclear endeavors, training sites rogue state cooperation, and to support cells and their 
missions around the world (Williams, 2002). 
Strategic Leadership 
The increase of contact with people around the world led Bin Laden and the rest 
of the Al Qaeda leadership to strategically exploit negative effects of globalization. Bin 
Laden emphasized a disconnect between the West and the rest by feeding the emotions of 
marginalized people. Bin Laden used actions of the U.S. to gain followers as well. In his 
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1998 fatwa, Bin Laden stated ''For more than seven ears the nited tate has been 
occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places the Arabian Peninsula pi undering 
its riches, dictating to its rulers humiliating its people terrorizing its neighbors and 
turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring 
Muslim peoples" (An Interview with Osama bin Laden 1998). Al Qaeda depicted the 
U.S. in unflattering ways to mobilize and propel the members of the organization fuel 
hatred towards the U.S., and subsequently carry out terrorist attacks (Wallerstein 1999). 
Al Qaeda leadership also used new organizational strategies not employed in traditional 
terrorist activity. 
After creating a following, bin Laden and his former partner Azzam sought to 
define the Al Qaeda organization from other groups by creating a structure that would be 
resilient to destruction by powerful armies and able to reach the population at large. 
Al Qeada represents an organizational network of individual cells whose members are 
encouraged to create their own missions and look to leaders ofAl Qaeda for logistical 
support. The cellular structure allow many missions to be planned for and carried out 
simultaneously. This strays from the traditional structure in which all missions are 
created at the top levels and lower members take orders. The organizational network is 
difficult to effectively interrupt and halt becau e eliminating one cell only stops one 
mission and other missions are still able to occur (Arquilla Ronfeldt, & Zanini 1999). 
Re-emen:ence of Islam 
The final necessary condition needed to propel the terrorist actions was tbe 
increasing attraction among Muslims in the Arab world to revert back to an Islamic la 
Many Muslims, especiall· men, are increasingly disgruntled b the lack of options 
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afforded to them in society toda . A deep sens of humiliation amon Muslim men has 
allowed Islamists to successfull persuade and illustrate ho a land guided by Islamic 
rule would produce prosperous citizens (Schneider & Silverstein 2003). Human rights 
activists argue that re-opening the gate to Islamic Law in some ways impede a societies 
growth. An example is the recently overturned Islamic Law ruling of Amina LawaI, the 
Nigerian woman sentenced to be stoned to death for having a child out of wedlock. 
Activists argue that some Islamic laws are outdated and the punishment barbaric (Soulas, 
2003). Still others such as Christoph Luxenberg a scholar of ancient Semitic languages 
in Germany. argue that mi.sinterpretations of the Koran may easily indoctrinate ideas of 
anti-democracy, and coerce citizens under Islamic Law into taking up anus against 
democracies (Stille, 2002). Before the attacks of9/11, the re-emergence ofMuslims in 
favor of returning to Islamic Law was a propelling force that indirectly supported the 
anti-U.S. message Al Qaeda was sending by widening the rift between U.S. and Middle 
Eastern ideologies. 
True Believer Status 
The sufficient driving condition is the "true believer" status. Hoffer (1951) coined 
the term "true believer' to describe those members of a group whose belief in the 
founding concept of the organization is so profound that they are able to look beyond the 
present situation to the future and are ready to take all actions to see that ending goal 
through. The true believer status was not an element unique only to AI Qaeda. True 
believers were present among Hitler's Nazis and plague many terrorist groups throughout 
the world. True believer status in the case of Al Qaeda was generated from the roots of 
Islamic fundamentalism and it is the goal of these true believers to create a world ruled 
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by the Islamic Ia as interpreted by A1 Qaeda. Laqueur (1996 ams that reEoiousl ­
motivated terrorists such as AI Qaeda, are connected to "postmodem" terrorism in which 
the driving force is sustained b visions of a coming apocalypse or ne world order. 
There were two types of true believers in A1 Qaeda: leaders and followers. True believer 
leaders and followers play important and distinctive roles from creating the ideology and 
having the skills to draw followers to holding the success of the mission over one s own 
life. True believer status was the key element that maintained the Al Qaeda organization 
and drove some to successfully execute attacks regardless of danger and death. 
Restrainin2 Forces 
On the other hand necessary restraining forces become the interdependent 
conditions that halt those propelling forces that have gained momentum. Such restraining 
forces push the former propelling forces back across the critical threshold into inaction. 
Visually, one may think of a pendulum swing in that a certain force must be involved to 
push the pendulum one direction and an opposite force must be created to push back in 
the original direction. As long as one force is greater than the other, the pendulum would 
hypothetically stay in the position with the greatest amount of force pushing it. The 
restraining forces include: 1) homeland security; 2) use ofmilitary force; 3) the freezing 
of assets; 4) popular opinion; and the sufficient restraining condition, 5) strong alliances 
with other countries. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, millions of dollars and 
manpower has been unanimously accepted in the plight to rid the world of terrorism. 
There is a "War on Terrorism" currently underway in an effort to deter further terrorist 
actions that would bring about the destruction and casualty volume that was experienced 
on 9111 in the U.S. 
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Protecting the Homeland 
The attacks of9111 displayed the vulnerabilities and weakn sses ithin the U.S. 
government s investigative and security agencies. An investigation into the agencies 
revealed systemic and physical weaknesses that plagued the FBI CIA and NSA. 
Investigatory oversights and a lack of cooperation between agencies were found only 
after the attacks occurred and questions were raised as to whether or not these attacks 
could have been prevented. Yet, the overarching component was the disbelief in an 
attack occurring on U.S. soil. Illusions of invulnerability ended with the attacks. Since 
9111, investigatory agencies have been reorganized; communication and cooperation 
increased~ and outdated technology upgraded. The Department of Homeland Security 
was established to ensure all weaknesses are caught so attacks as catastrophic as 9/1 I will 
never again occur on U.S. soil. 
Militarv Operations 
Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001. Objectives included 
liberating Afghans from the Taliban regime destroying Al Qaeda training camps and 
rooting out Al Qaeda members (President George W. Bush, 2001). The use of military 
operations forcibly removed Al Qaeda's central hub which took the control away from 
Al Qaeda officials to plan and prepare operations as they had in the past. AI Qaeda 
members lost technical equipment chemical and biological weapons data facilities, 
training camps, and could no longer use Afghanistan as a safe haven. Military operations 
in the War on Terrorism, although destructive can only be used selectively. Al Qaeda 
organized itself in a network that spans the globe to be resilient and unable to be 
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destroyed b military might alone. till. th military option will continue bud as 
one of fiv fronts because of its de tructi e power. 
Freezing Financial Asset 
Freezing terrorist fmances and enacting tougher anti-mone laundering 
regulations is the third front the U. S. government is using to restrain terrorist action. 
Modem terrorist do not live on enthusiasm alon (Laqueur 1977). Bin Laden s terrorist 
organization has similarities to legitimate corporations. Al Qaeda ha a business and 
finance committee with the responsibility of diversifying investments, obtaining mone 
from charities and supporters. and tracking operational financing to and from cells 
(Gunaratna 2003). Financial stability is a critical component to Al Qaeda's capabilities. 
By establishing tools and task forces dedicated to finding and freezing the assets of both 
terrorists and their supporters, Al Qaeda's ability to orchestrate highly destructive 
terrorist plots will be crippled. 
Cooperation Among Countries 
Cooperation among countTies sends a strong m ssage to terrori ts everywhere. 
The attacks of 9/11 did not isolate the .S. from the rest ofthe world; it was embraced by 
a world not willing to be imprisoned b fear of terrorism. ot only were established 
alliances reinforced, but also new alliances were created by the numerous countries ready 
to support actions taken to rid the world of terrorism. The message is strong and clear 
and the actions are similar. Flow of intelligence, militaristic contributions freezing 
assets, and denying safe housing of terrorist members create the most crucial force to 
combating terrorism. A coalition of countries can do so much more than one country 
alone. 
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Popular Opinion 
Since the attacks of 9/11, citizens allover the world ha e spoken out against 
terrorism. The terrorists find it more difficult to legitimize their goals gain. sympathizers 
and hide as a result of the backlash that ensued after the attacks. Insecurity and fear over 
the attacks against a superpower were met with a resounding denouncement of terrorism. 
Al Qaeda succeeded in its goal of immediate fear' however it was unsuccessful in 
bringing its illusion of the U.S. as a "paper tiger' to reality. Rather as a collective 
society, emotional response.s translated into support for rapid and swift action. It was this 
undercurrent of collective emotional response that was the sufficient condition to creating 
a force of change, one that would deter future acts of terrorism. The attacks reinforced the 
resolve of U.S. citizens to support aggressive actions against Al Qaeda and build a united 
front against terrorism. 
Research Hypotheses 
Based on this background information, the researcher formulated these 
hypotheses: 
1) Prior to September 11.2001 driving/Ol'ces exceeded reslrainingforces. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions listed above which are categorized as driving 
forces, were more compelling leading up to the attacks. The momentum behind such 
driving forces was so strong that the ability to carry out the attack of September 11 
2001 was possible. 
2) Ajier September 11, 2001 reslrainingforces exceeded ddvingforces. 
Responding to the most destructive international terrorist attacks on U.S. soil caused the 
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necessary and sufficient restraining conditions to emerg with such force to push back the 
driving forces in an attempt to keep such attacks from occurring again. 
3) Both neceSSGlY and ufficient condition were critical for a terrorist act to have 
occurred. The combination of certain critical factors had to be at an optimal level. These 
conditions acting alone could not have produced a successful attack. For instance, 
although AI Qaeda had staggering financial stability, money could not be the only factor 
relied upon. Likewise, the strategic thinking and organization of the Al Qaeda group 
could only take tbe mission so far. Money had to be part of the equation. Globalization 
and "true believer" status were both glue in holding all the elements together. Because of 
the danger and difficulty involved in such acts, there was very little room for anything 
less than the perfect mobiizing factors presented here. 
Methodology 
The methodology for this study will use many techniques to fonn what is known 
as triangulation. Triangulation takes up multiple methodologies in order to create a thre 
dimensional study with a thorough and well-rounded examination of the topic. A multi­
faceted triangular approach can be both from a research and researcher standpoint. The 
assumption is that more people and approaches one takes to a social phenomenon the 
better the approximation and three-dimensional understanding will be created. Here the 
methods of historical narrative analysis and ethnomethodology are combined to analyze 
the Al Qaeda terrorist organizati.on. With such methods an in depth understanding ofAl 
Qaeda can be understood. This analysis is conducted through data sources in the form of 
academic literature from expert on the subjects ofterrorism and AI Qaeda, governmental 
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infonnation both before and after 9/11, and from media output on cun-ent situations 
regarding terrorism. 
Current media is defined as newspapers, television, and Internet sources. As for 
the newspaper sources, purposive sampling will be conducted. That is, the researcher 
will sample sources that are more likely to display the information pertaining to Al 
Qaeda. The selection of such sources is set by three criteria: 1) pragmatically the U.S. 
media is more accessible, 2) since the events occurred in the U.S., it is intentional to filter 
the information through the eyes and public policy views ofAmericans to gain the 
perspective ofwhere the events took place, 3) only large, elite papers carry international 
news daily. Under these criteria the researcher chose to draw material from USA Today, 
Time Magazine, Los Angeles Times, The Economist Washington Post, Washington 
Times and the New York Times. This will be a compilation of any and all information 
concerning the topic in order to paint a detailed picture. 
The final component of triangulation comes from secondary quantitative data 
analysis, which will be used to examine how American viewed the attacks of 9/11. ABC 
News and the Washington Post conducted a telephone survey in the U.S. to determine 
feelings of U.S. citizens. With select raw data from the telephone survey, the researcher 
will conduct independent chi-square tests. 
Limitations to Study 
With each study there will be limitations of the research. The first limitation of 
this study is that an ex-post facto study is being conducted, which is common for case 
study events. Here the attacks of September I 1, 2001 were the occurrences that spurred 
research on the Al Qaeda terrorist network. It is possible to stud first hand what has 
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happened since the attacks, however, in studying the events leading up to the attacks one 
must reI on the historical point of view. Assumptions have to be made when fiUing in 
gaps where data from the past does not exist. Al Qaeda was onl a new phenomenon to 
United States public--not to governrnents--when the attacks occurred. The Central 
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation and other intelligence services 
around the world were aware of Bin Laden and AI Qaeda. In fact, Osama Bin Laden was 
one on Americas Ten Most Wanted list for attacks against the .S. abroad he allegedly 
masterminded. However, the amount of damage Al Qaeda could do was unpredictable. 
Therefore, part of the research conducted here is to go back and try to identify what 
enabled the terrorist group to successfully pull off the attacks. 
A second limitation to the research is the recency of the event. The attacks of 
September 11 occurred only two years ago. Governmental agencies, experts and 
researchers are still in the midst of gathering data and putting it together. Therefore, data 
accumulation for this study came from any and all possible sources. Academic ources, 
governmental documents and journalistic pieces were all used in an attempt to present a 
well-rounded and thorough study of AI Qaeda. 
Third, while some quantitative data has obviously been gathered it is very 
limited. Because the data used in this study will be secondary, there was no way to 
control for any confounding variables. Again the recency of this event makes it very 
hard to present quantitative data. Future research should include more quantitative data 
once more research becomes available. In addition. the war on terrorism is still very new. 
There is no doubt that as this battle continues more and more information will be 
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revealed. With thi in mind futur research hould updat the tudies that are no 
considered the most current. 
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Chapter 2 
Precipitants for the Creation of a Terrori t Oroanizati.on 
The rise of Al Qaeda did not happen over night. It has actuall been building 0 er 
the past few decades. Eckstein (1965) created a framework useful for analyzing the 
creation of terrorism. In this framework Eckstein u ed the term precipitant to de cribe 
those factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run. Precipitants ar the direct 
actions that motivate and produce a terror campaign. Precipitants are not the same as 
preconditions which make up the propelling conditions of Lewin s Force Field Analysis. 
The propelling conditions are labeled preconditions for they were conditions in place to 
propel the attacks prior to 9/11. Rather, the precipitants are the underlying historical 
changes and events over long periods oftime that resulted in the manifestation of the Ai 
Qaeda network. The precipitants explain why AI Qaeda formed; knowledge that 
facilitates an understanding of the groups motivations and goals. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the precipitants that led to th inception of Al Qaeda. 
Contrasting ways of life
 
Culture and Modernization
 
The general conflicts that underlie the tensions between Westem and Muslim 
civilizations can be expressed through an imaginary two-by-two matrix. The first tn ion 
concerns culture and modernization, or more specifically it i the Western domination of 
the world. Of the tensions this is the most recent, yet i still considered a precondition 
because it has been building for nearly a century. According to Kishk (as cited in 
Ajami,1992), the Third Crusade is currently upon the world. nder the false pretense of 
globalization, Westernization is subjugating other civilizations. Kishk also suggests there 
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is a "Darwinian" understanding by the West that a culture must survive and have 
preeminence. American hegemony in the twentieth century expanded stem culture to 
the farthest reaches of the world. Power and culture go hand in hand. The flowering of a 
culture has usually involved power to bestow its values, practices, and institutions to 
other societies (Huntington, 1996). When th culture has grabbed hold of a society it 
furthers the power of the dominant. ye (1990) agrees that when the" oft power' of 
culture and ideology becomes attractive others are more willing to follow. The culture 
spreads the message into a society that "to be successful you must be like us' our way is 
the only way" p. 47 (Pfaff, 1978). This suggests European languages and Western 
educational systems cannot be avoided by Muslims. Only when the Western model is 
accepted will Muslim societies be in a position to develop (Pipes, 1983). 
Mus1im'8 have met this cultural assimilation in different ways. Esposito (1992) 
points out three ways in which Muslim countries have chosen to deal with this: reject 
both, accept both, or accept modernization and reject (at least in part) Westernization. 
This rejection has become exceedingly apparent in recent decade. As modernization 
increases, indigenous cultures have gone through a revival in response to Westernization. 
Hence, an alteration of the civilizational balance of power between the West and Muslim 
societies is occurring as well as, an increased strength in commitment to the indigenous 
culture (Huntington, 1996). 
Reli2'ion and Modernization 
One major reason that the Western culture has not been able to push through 
Muslim societies is the religion factor. Relations between Islam and Christianity have 
been volatile throughout history. Both religions are monotheistic universalistic and 
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missionary in nature (Huntington, 1996). In addition, the tenns jihad" and crusade' are 
parallel concepts that distinguish these religions from others in the world (Huntington 
1996). Such similarities have caused conflict because they lead to important questions of 
power and culture. Who will rule and who will be ruled? Who is right and who is 
wrong? This fourteen-century conflict will remain as tensions heat up. 
Differences in the institution ofreligioD exist as well. In the West, religion is 
valued as an individual concept that is somewhat disconnected from daily life issues, 
political engagement, and cultural traits .. The Western Christian concept was born out of 
separate realms of "God and Caesar" (Huntington, 1996). On the other hand, in Muslim 
societies Islam is not only a religion but it is a way of life (Lapidus 1988). The level of 
violence between Islam and Christianity has continued due to elements ofmodernization 
such as demographic growth and decline, economic developments, technological change 
and intensity of religious commitment (Ahmed, 1999). 
The Western version ofmodernization points to religion as an obstacl to social 
change. The message sent is that people must discard their faith if they are to make any 
progress (Ajami, 1992). The suggestion is that Islam does not offer an alternative way to 
modernize. Modern science and technology requires an adaptation of Western 
institutions and secularism (Pipes, 1983). Muslims reject this idea. After what K.i hk. 
called a "mysticism" with secularism, Muslims have aimed at no longer modernizing 
Islam, but Islamizing modernity (Ajami, 1992; Huntington, 1996). Jealousy of Western 
power and comparisons between the accomplishments of Islamic and Western 
civilizations in the last two centuries remains a very tender point for many Muslims in the 
Middle East. (Lewis 1990). 
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Culture and Political Structure 
The structure of political loyalty among Muslims ha been the opposite of the 
West. Westerners are unlike many other societies in that indi idualism and nationalism 
are highly valued. This is not the case with Muslims. Community bas historically been 
the most important element besides religion. Secular nationalism has been a very 
disruptive consequence. Ottoman Turks were the first to be convinced of the power of 
nationalism, and set out to pursue a nationalist dream. The concept of nationality 
shattered the basis of community (Ajami, 1992). Where once there stood a vast empire in 
which Muslims ruled non-Muslims, there now exists a patchwork of separate states trying 
to eliminate the confusion of what has happened. 
Religion and Politics 
Finally, there is a tension that exists in which religion and politics play important 
roles. Nationalism and socialism have not prospered within the I lamic world because 
religion is the motor of development. Just as the Protestant religion helped the West rise 
so too will Islam play that role in the contemporary era (Al-Turabi, 1992). Historically 
the fundamental structure has been family, clan, and tribe on the one hand' and culture, 
religion, and empire on the other (Lapidus, 1988). Throughout Islam the small group 
and the big faith have been the foci of loyalty and commitment, and not the nation state. 
(Huntington, 1996). Western loyalties have tended to be much more nationalist. As the 
revolutionary fundamentalist movement grows Islamists have rejected the nation state in 
favor ofthe unity of Islam. This seems similar to Marx' rejection of the nation state in 
favor of the unity of the international proletariat (Huntington, 1996). These differences 
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have contributed to the build up of tensions et cannot b singled out as the on! 
precipitants. The following precipitant concerns the . . policy in the Middle East. 
U.S. Presence in the' Middle East 
U.S.-Saudi Oil Relationship 
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have had a constant, yet precariou relationship since 
its inception. In the early 1930~s hydrocarbon wealth was discovered and dominated by 
European oil companies. Saudi Arabia, however, had suspicions about the forming 
relationships of the European companies and other Middle East countries due to the 
history of colonialism in the area. For this reason Saudi Arabia sought a different buyer 
for its oil. Similarly t.he U.S. was looking to establish itself within the oil sector of the 
Middle East. In 1943, the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was forged, 
and the two countries have since had a long-standing and informal alliance (Bahgat 
2003). This seemed to be a perfect match for both sides. Saudi Arabia needed a large 
consumer base, which the U.S. provided; and with mo t of the world s spare production 
located in Saudi Arabia the U.S. benefited from being practically the only country to 
carry out exploration and development in Saudi Arabia (Baghat, 2003). 
The beginning of the relationship started rather well Aram.co (Arabian-American 
Oil Company) and the Saudi government agreed to a 50-50 profit sharing program 
between the host country and the concessionaire in ]950 (Baghat, 2003). As the years 
have progressed the relationship has been met with pressures all the way up the attack m 
the U.S. For instance, the situation concerning Israel was a challenge in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. After the Six Day war, Henry Kissinger fonner U.S. secretary of state 
stated that the U.S. would use military force if needed in order to secure its oil supplies 
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from the Persian Gulf region (Baghat, 2003 . Again in 1973 the . was kicked out of 
Saudi Arabia during the 1973 oil embargo (Banerjee 2001). either sid could afford to 
cut off the relations with the other. The U.S. is the highest consumer of oil, and has 
continually been angling for influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia is 
dependent upon the revenues of oil and has made the U.S. its top consumer. Each side 
reconciled rather quickly, yet the threat ofmilitary force did leave a bad taste in some 
Saudi's mouths (Williams, 2002). 
Foreign policY in the Middle East 
U.S. foreign policy continued to cause problems on many fronts in the Middle 
East. Disagreements between the countries in the Middle East have been complex in 
nature and founded upon historical events. European colonialism added to the struggles 
of the area by dividing it up into a patchwork of separate states. Wh.en the U.S. came into 
the region the problems had already begun. It was in the nature of the U.S. to try and 
settle disputes and create a stable, peaceful Middle East especially after the conflict with 
Israel began. This proved to be mor idealist than first thought and American 
policymakers did not heed the warnings of experts on the region. John Badeau (1968) 
former ambassador to Egypt, stated that foreign-inspired political and military systems 
would fail in the Arab world. Likewise, Malcolm Kerr (1969), suggested that the 
dynamics of local instability were beyond the great powers control. 
The Cold War was responsible for some of the policy created towards the Middl 
East. Each side was essentially using the Middle East as its middle man in the broader 
war. For that reason, the superpowers perceived peace and stability in the Middle East 
through a prism of global concerns rather than in the context of the region (Gerges 
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1991). The lack of specificity was the problem. The U.S. policy did not take into account 
the hopes and fears of the regional Arab actors. The policies were based on foreign 
requirements created outside of the region (polk, 1986). The simple fact was, and still is 
Arab states-- despite the conflicts-- want the final say in their own destinies and internal 
affairs (Cremeans, 1963). 
Despite the voices of many the U.S. policy has made its own path concerning 
policy in the Middle East. It has been the goal, as mentioned above, to establish a system 
from the outside to try to superimpose in the area. The U.S. has also specialized in 
establishing strategic alliances with individual countries. In the 1970s, a security system 
in the Middle East was thought to be needed by the U.S. in response to the Soviet Union. 
Iran was the country of choice for the U.S. According to Kissinger, the Shah ofIran and 
his country were the best qualified to serve as "policeman" and protector of American 
friends and interests in the Gulf (Lenczowski, 1990). Kissinger himself claimed that Iran 
was one of the U.S.'s "most loyal friends in the world' (Kissinger, 1979). Yet in 1979. 
the overthrow of the Shah came as a big shock to the Carter Administration. The 
'·policeman" had turned revolutionary with the abdication from the Shah to Ayatollah 
Khomeini and the Mullahs (Gerges, 1991). The Carter Doctrine of January 1980 stated 
that force, attempting to gain control of the Gulf region, brought on by an outsider would 
be regarded as an assault on the interests of the U.S. (Lenczowski, 1990). 
Iran became a laboratory and breeding ground for testing Islamic revolutionary 
ideas into the Arab world (Ledeen, 2002). Bin Laden himself, stated that the overthrow 
of the Shah of Iran proved to be a critical event influencing his ideologies (Corbin 2002). 
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Also going on at this time as the in asion of the oviet nion in Afghanistan which 
subsequently had an effect on bin Laden as well. 
The Gulf War 
By the time the Gulf War erupted in 1990 the Iraq-Iran war had come and gone-­
which some dubbed a clash between secular nationalism and religious fundamentalism 
(Gerges, 1990)-- Islamist ideology had been stirring within the region. As Islamists had 
gained more power, the consequences after the Gulf War contributed to even more 
tension in the region. The Gulf War was a product ofIraq's invasion on Kuwait. It was 
thought, as the Deputy Prime Minster of Iraq stated, that Iraq's debt would be paid off in 
less than five years; oil production and income would increase; private sector would 
expand; and development projects would be started again (Alnasrawi, 1992). This 
turned out not to be the case. After a swift military campaign from the U.S. and allies, 
Iraq was devastated. Saddam, however, was not taken out of power. The invasion on 
Kuwait raised fears both in the U.S. and in the Middle East. 
The American policymakers decided once again that a regional security structure 
needed to be established in order to stabilize the Middle East protect the Gulf allies and 
to secure the oil supplies. The vision the U.S. had imagined was to play the leading role 
in both sponsoring and defending a "network of alliances", which would be made up of 
bilateral security treaties with individual Arab countries rather than one single structure 
(Gerges, 1991). Again this was t.o be a system created by outsiders to the region that 
would be imposed upon the people. The Gulf War was also a unique situation because it 
was the first time in which superpowers were on the same side. 
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The Islam.ists had grown stronger and did not sit idly by when this security 
system was brought to the table. Instead of successfulL doing what the security structure 
was meant to do, it created a difficult position for pro-Western regimes such as Saudi 
Arabia. Close alliances with external powers exacerbated the radicalization of the Arab 
people (Gerges). Nevertheless the U.S. installed military troops in Saudi Arabia. Islamic 
fundamentalists which included the Al Qaeda organization, distrusted the West. Islamic 
militants joined with Arab nationalists to denounce the «Great Satan" and demand the 
withdrawal of "infidel" military troops from the holy lands in Saudi Arabia (Gerges). 
This situation proved to be another challenge to the U.S.- Saudi relationship. Under 
pressure from the people, Saudi rulers began to question the U.S. policies in the region 
and asked that the troops be removed. Bin Laden, a fonner citizen of Saudi Arabia, 
enjoyed the spoils ofwealth that came from the relationship between the oil rich Saudi 
Arabia and the oil consuming U.S., however, bin Laden's approval of both the Saudi 
rulers and the U.S. began to change dramatically for, an10ng other reasons the 
installment ofmilitary troops in Saudi Arabia after the GuJfWar. 
Bin Laden turned violently anti-American in 1990 after King Fahd invited the 
U.S. and its allies to station troops in Saudi Arabia to help d.efend the oil-producing 
kingdom against the invasion by Iraq. The presence of American soldiers in Saudi 
Arabia, the birthplace of the prophet Muhammad and the home of the two holiest Muslim 
shrines, enraged bin Laden (Miller. 2001). To the Islamists and pan-Arabists, the actors 
might have changed, the situation was still the same. Imperialism and the "Zionist 
entity' were still working together to exploit inter-Arab disputes to divide up the land and 
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resources of the Arab world. The sa it as a ne era of Western colonization (Gerges 
1991). 
The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia concerning oil policies 
exhibited towards the Middle East by the U.S. and the Gulf War display more 
preconditions that have led to the attacks of 9/11. It is important to point out the 
relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia presently. Fifteen of the nineteen 
hijackers on 9111 have been identified as Saudi citizens. While the Saudi regime has 
shared its condolences about the attacks it has been very passive in its cooperation with 
the war on terrorism. The U.S. has made no secret about its intentions to find oil in other 
areas of the world like Russia. Despite these two facts the relationship between U.S. and 
Saudi remains. Western oil companies have no intensions of veering away from the 
Middle East, and Saudi officials have stated that because most of the oil and gas in the 
world is in the Middle East they feel confident that the U.S. will continue to do business 
with Saudi Arabia (Banerjee, 2002). The U.S. burns approximately twenty-five percent 
of the world's global daily consumption, while audi Arabia is still about ninety percent 
reliant on oil revenues (Baghat, 2003). The match still seems to be a reflexive and 
complementary one, if only on the issue of oil. 
The Saudi regime does consider itself to be an ally of the U.S. but the kingdom is 
predominately characterized as by Wahhabi Islam, a very pure form of the religion 
(Banerjee, 2001). Therefore the ruling family must be very careful about its decision 10 
order to appease its citizens and not have to live in fear of being overthrown. The 
resilience of this alliance could prove to aggravate Al Qaeda forces even more in the 
coming future. 
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u.s. Support of Israel 
Arab-Israeli Conflict 
"Defeat goes deeper into the human soul than victory.' 
--Albert Hourani, 1991, p.300 
One of the theories created as to why the attacks of 9/11 occurred suggests it was 
because of an Israeli-connection (Gelemter, 2001). Under this theory, the U.S. was hit 
because it is Israel's only friend. The United States' role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has 
been a very sore issue among Arabs. The conflict that originally began between Israel 
and Palestine grew into what today is a source ofheavy tunnoil and tension within the 
Middle East. Israel and Palestine are the major players, but the Arabs and the United 
States have vested interests on their respective sides. The accuracy of this theory will not 
be discussed here, but, to what extent the Arab-Israeli conflict has played as a 
precipitating role does need further discussion. 
The Jewish people dreamed of a new Zion which led to the "invasion" of 
Palestine. Palestine was the target because thi is considered the ancient Jewish 
homeland (Williams, 2002). The first wave of Jewish immigrants, known as the AJiyah, 
to this land was in 1880. Since then, there ha been three more Aliyah which lasted up 
to the World War II. In 1948, Israel fought and defeated the countries of Egypt Syria, 
Transjordan, Lebanon, and Iraq in order to establish its own state (Williams, 2002). This 
state went beyond the boundaries of the partition plan set up by the United Nations. It 
was this event which triggered the transfonnation to that between the Arabs and Israel 
(Bruzonsky, 1986). 
During the fIrst two decades, the United States did not intercede into the matter 
because it felt that a close military alliance would alienate i\rab regimes and jeopardize 
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control of Middle Ea tern oil ( tork 1982). Even in the 1950s Egypt howed sign of 
wanting to make peace as long as a reasonable settlement could be agreed upon for the 
Palestinians (Jackson, 1983). This did not happen and another war broke out in 1956. 
With the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 more 
tension was created and some scholars say that it was at this time that the Palestinian 
occupation became not just an Arab cause, but a Muslim cause (Williams 2002). The 
Israeli feared a Palestinian nation state even more because the nation state would fall 
under the sway of the PLO causing a situation just like that of the Nazi Era 
(Tillman,1979). 
The June War in 1967 (also known as the Six Day War), was an important war for 
many reasons. The civil war of Palestine became a war under the larger heading of pan­
Arabism (Bruzonsky, 1986). The quick defeat by Israel was deeply humiliating to the 
Arab world. A small foreign state that so swiftly beat Egypt's large power was 
devastating to the Palestinians, who believed they would be returned to their homeland 
(Bruzonsk)', 1986). After the 1967 war. a change was made in Arab thinking. The Arabs 
had to come to terms with the reality that Israel was going to be permanent state and that 
at very best they may get only a part ofPalestine back (Mahmood 1985). 
Another very significant point in this war was the interest that the United States 
began to take in Israel. This war gave the first sight of evidence to the United States 
participation (Bruzonsky. 1984). The alignment of radical Arab nationalists with the 
Soviet Union during the 1950's had pushed the relationship between the United States 
and Israel closer (Stork, 1982). yet it was not until 1967 that it became overtly 
acknowledged. The United States shifted from an evenhandedness policy between Israel 
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and the Arab world to an openly supportive ally to Israel (Green, 1983 . Israel s decisive 
defeat ofEgypt, Syria, and Jordan restructured the military and political balance in the 
region (Stork, 1982). The Israeli anny was combat read and experienced in the Middle 
East which the United States saw as a strategic asset. If Israel would not have been there, 
the United States would have had to provide its own (Stork, 1982). The Israeli- United 
States relationship was seen as the key to combating the Soviet influence within the 
Middle Eastern region (Quandt, 1977). In a study conducted by the RAND corporation, 
it was concluded that Israel's geographic location was worth $] 0 billion to the United 
States in any race to the Gulf It would save over two months and a mechanized division. 
This was a reasonable answer to America's strategic problem (Stork, 1982). 
During this time, the Gulf States became influential in the Arab world. Their 
concerns about the Israeli situation were conflicted. On the one hand, Israel's force 
against Egypt's military served the oil rich states well (Quandt 1971). Yet on the other 
hand, there was a measure of responsibility to Palestine that nations such a audi Arabia 
and Kuwait confronted (Halliday, 1980). The inability of these countries to coerce the 
United States or Israel of an acceptable settlement led to the subsequent war in October 
1973 (Stork,1978). This also brought about the oil embargo. After both of these events. 
the United States shifted its policy towards alliance building between both sides (Stork 
1982). 
In 1978, the Camp David accords were created in which Egypt and Israel were to 
acknowledge a peaceful relationship (Tillman, 1979). According to the agreement 
reached by the United States Israel, and Egypt, a seLfgoveming authority would be set 
lip in the West Bank and Gaza to replace the Israeli military government in those areas 
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(Sayegh 1979). This agreement wa not the cure-all solution. According to tork 
(1982), while Tzipori was calling on a strategi cooperation between all parties Haig and 
Allen were encouraging the Israelis to destro the Palestinian military in Lebanon. This 
was partly due to the Iranian Revolution going on at the same time which took the 
United States administration by surprise. This again shifted the United States policy 
away from settlement of the Palestinian question and back to "rapid deployment» as a 
way of securing the Persian Gulf region (Stork, 1982). Israel was given a free reign to 
suppress the Palestinian movement as long as it did not compromise the political and 
military ties with important Arab regimes (Stork, 1982). This led again to the invasion of 
Lebanon by Israel in 1982 (Mahmood, ] 985). 
It is important to note that the Arab states have stood in oppos~tion to a truly 
independent Palestine. In the eyes of those who hold power in the Arab world, 
Palestinian nationalism is looked upon as a cancerous problem to be both used and 
controlled (Bruzonsky, 1986). Yet within the p yches of Arabs lies the belief that the 
occupiers of Palestine would go the way of the Crusaders in a matter of time (Bruzonsky, 
1986). With the relationship between Israel and the United States, this belief was 
solidified even more, therefore, under the idea of pan-Arabism Palestin had to be 
protected from the invader. 
Today the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to be a point to arouse 
dissension against both Israel and the United States. Al Qaeda most likely does not 
particularly care about the Palestinians per se, but does realize the production of anger the 
idea carries with it. 
"My Muslim Brothers of the World:
 
, Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two
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HoI Places are calling upon our help and asking ou to 
Take part in flghting against the enem -your enem 
And their enem -the Americans and the Israelis. The 
Are asking you to do whatever you can with your own 
Means and ability to expel the enemy, humiliated and 
defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam ...." 
-Excerpt from fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden August 23 1996 
The Afghan War 
During bin Laden's last year of college two events occurred that changed his life 
forever: the Shah of Iran was overthrown during the Islamic Revolution, and the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan (Corbin, 2002). Bin Laden had become fascinated with the 
teachings ofSayyid Qutb, who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and the so-
called "father of modem Islamic fundamentalism' (Williams 2002). When the invasion 
occurred bin Laden was recruited by another member of the Brotherhood, Abdullah 
Azzam (Williams, 2002). According to Abdullah Arlas, an Algerian scholar who was 
recruited with bin Laden, 
He was one of the guys who came to the jihad in Mghanistan. But 
unlike the others, what he had was lots of money. He's not very 
sophisticated politically and organizationally. But he's an 
activist with a greater imagination. ' 
--Engelberg & Risen, 200 I 
Bin laden helped raise money for the effort as well as recruited many Muslims for the 
training camps. Within a year, thousands of volunteers came form Saudi Arabia Egypt, 
Algeria, Yemen, Pakistan, and Sudan to train for the war (Williams 2002). Ironically, at 
the beginning of this war the United States and the Mujahedeen had the same goals and 
worked alongside each other to tackle the Soviet Union in what would be the last stand­
off of the Cold War (Miller, 2001). The CIA provided millions of dollars weapons and 
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training to the guerrilla army for the purpose of dri ing out the Russian (Williams 
2002). 
Bin Laden fell under the influence of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization in 
the mid-1980s (Miller, 2001). Specifically, it was al-Zawahiri ("The Doctor" as he 
became known) that courted bin Laden in hopes of securing financial support from him 
(Williams, 2002). Soon the friendship between Azzaro and bin Laden dissolved because 
of differing opinions in the next step after the soviet invasion. Azzam was opposed to 
terrorism against the United States while bin Laden and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad were 
not (Williams, 2002). The euphoria experienced due to the coming defeat of the oviets 
led bin Laden and his allies to believe that no secular state could defeat holy warriors 
(Miller, 2001). In 1988, Al Qaeda ("The Base") was established by bin Laden and the 
Egyptian terrorists (Williams, 2002). Bin Laden set up his new camps called AI Masaha 
("The Lion's Den") to train terrorists that would be sent back to their countries to set up 
new cells (Williams, 2002). From the start Al Qaeda had money, training weapons and 
belief. After Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to station troops in the holy land for 
the invasion of the Gulf War, Al Qaeda turned violently against America and came to 
blame all ofMuslims woes on the United States (Miller, 2001). 
The AJ Qaeda Network 
History of Attacks 
In Al Qaeda's fifteen year history, it has grown into the world s largest most 
infamous terrorist group. The successful terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda have killed 
thousands of people despite the fact that many plots have been foiled by the intelligence 
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community before the wer e er carried out. Th followin is a list of terrorist attacks 
attributable to AI Qaeda before 9/11: 
1992: conducted three bombings that targeted .. troops in Aden, Yem n. 
1993: shot down helicopters and killed .S. servicemen in Somalia. 
1998: simultaneous bombings of U.S. embassies in airobi Kenya and Dar es 
Salaam Tanzania. Killed 301 and injured more than 5 000. 
2000: attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden. Yemen. Killed 17 and 
injured 39. 
2001: hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets, two into the World Trade 
Center New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington D.C., and the 
fourth in a field in Shanksville Pennsylvania. Number dead or missing is around 
3,000 and unknown number injured. 
--Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001 
While these attacks are not large in number, they are great in destruction injury killing, 
and spreading the message of hatred for America. Al Qaeda has reached a level of terror 
mastery that is hard to match and even harder to terminate. It is of the utmost importanc 
that those combating the network understand it from th inside out. Just as it ha been 
long in the making, it will take some time to successfully destroy the terrorist group at th 
forefront of Americas list of target . 
Organizational Network 
In their book, Countering the ew Terrorism, expert Arquilla Ronfeldt and 
Zanini (1999) discuss the shift of terrorist groups away from traditional hierarchies to a 
more flexible organizational design. While the notion of organizational structure is not a 
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recent development the overall evolution in the realm of terrorist structure to a more 
decentralized organization has been slowly gaining momentum ince the late 1980's. 
This move toward network designs has been largely facilitated by tbe advanced 
information technologies which allow groups to conspire and coordinate acros long 
distances. Besides the ability to disperse information quickly and reach actors across 
long distances, the effectiveness of a networked organization results from its inherent 
flexibility, adaptiveness and its ability to capitalize on the talents of all members 
(Lipnack & Stamps, 1994). 
Beginning in the 1990's, terrorism experts began to recognize the growing role of 
networked organizations and warned of future outcomes and challenges that would have 
to be met at some time. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) coined the term netwar in 1992 to 
depict the rise of network forms of organization, doctrine and strategy that occur at a 
low-intensity, less military, and more social spectrum. Three main characteristics of a 
netwar include small, dispersed groups, the use of communication technologies, and 
action taking place across long distances. These three requisites produce a dynamic 
relationship in two ways. On the one hand, the dispersed nodes enhance secrecy and 
conspiratorial resilience by decreased communication going through all nodes. However, 
on the other hand, when communication is needed dispersion, far-reaching distance and 
communicative technology provide rapid dissemination to a broad audience. 
Organizational designs vary by groups depending on personalities, operational 
requirements, organizational history, motivations and strategies. Three of the most 
common types of networks include: the chain network the star; and the all-channel 
network (Arquilla Ronfeldt & Zanini 1999 . Of all three the all-channel network has 
AJ Qaeda 49 
been difficult to sustain however, it is gaining strength in the information revolution. A 
wide range of structural details is a ailable to groups as well. For exampl choic 
range from inclusive or exclusive membership; segment d or specialized units; and ell­
defined or blurred boundaries. Hybrids among organizational networks also exist. AI 
Qaeda represents a hybrid network. 
At the time that Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini (1999) wrote Countering the evil 
Terrorism, the authors suggested that "Middle Eastern groups offer some evidence to 
support the claim that terrorists are preparing to wage netwar' (p.57). Two years later III 
the wake of 9/11, that supposition was considered valid. Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini 
state that Al Qaeda has come to the forefront as an acti e terrorist group. AJ Qaeda's 
complex network comprises both a flat hierarchy and decentralized nodes. In the center 
of the organization is Bin Laden and his shura council. The next level includes 
committee heads and operational leaders. Finally, members make up numerous 
autonomous cells. 
Although it has been suggested that bin Laden had little control over operatives 
and logistics and posed more as a figurehead, Gunaratna (2003) states that bin Laden and 
his top leaders had much input into several of the attacks conducted by Al Qaeda 
operatives. Bin Laden urged operatives to create and execute attacks on their own 
whenever possible, but bin Laden also decided which plans would be financed by Al 
Qaeda funds. A significant part of this network is that it has successfully combined its 
network into a wider network that includes other radical Islamic terrorist groups such as 
Egypt's Islamic Group and the Algerian GlA. The creation of the new alliance of 
terrorist organizations was announced in February 1997 as the World Islamic Front Jihad 
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Against Jews and Crusaders (Williams 2001). The purpose of creating a larger umbrella 
network was to focus on the larger overarching goals of re-establishing rule of I lam 
through a united effort and destroying the power of infidels such as the .S. and other 
coalition countries. Most terrorist groups within the alliance still maintain their own 
structure and cooperate only on select attacks. Just like alliances such as NATO and 
ANZUS-alliances between certain Western hemisphere states-these organizations 
have come together to support common initiatives and come to each others aid when 
necessary. 
Figure 2.1 
Ore:anization of the AI Qaeda Network 
Top Officials 
Osarna bin Laden 
Emir of Al Qaeda ~ Abu Basir aI-Yemeni 
Personal aid to bin Laden 
Mohammed Atef 0 
Expected to be the next in line for 
leadership of Al Qaeda 
Ayman al-Zawahiri 
No.2 man of Al Qaeda
Abd al-Aziz aI-Jamal 
--- Personal aid to Zawahiri 
Majlis al Sbura Council 
Mamdouh Mahmud Salimoo AbduLLah Ahmed Abdullah Arras al-Libyoo 
Saif al-Adeloo Abu Ubaidahal Banshiri0 
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*Cont. from previous page 
Financial ommittee omminee I. lamic rudy 
ommitre 
ommuoication 
Committee 
Advice & Reform 
ouocil 
While it is known that Al Qaeda does adhere to a hybrid network form, the researcher 
was unable to recreate an illustration of exact linkages between members because much 
of that infonnation is not available to the public. Instead, Figure 2.1 demonstrates a 
general fonn of how the network is organized. The researcher does include some specific 
members and their place within the organization in Table 2.1 which was gathered from 
information on known Al Qaeda members that are at large captured, or dead. 
Table 2.1 
Known AI Qaeda Members and Placement in Organization 
Financial Committee Military Committee 
Shaikh Saiid *Moharnmed Atef 0
 
Mohammed Jamal Kbalifa *Abu Ubaidahal
 
Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawi *Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah
 
Harnza al-Qatari 0 Abu Musab Zarqawi
 
Ahmad Said AI-Kadr Mahofouz Ould Walid
 
Rarnzi Bin al-Shibhoo Zaid Khayr
 
Mohammed Saleh 0 Khalid Shaikh Mohammedoo
 
Tariq Anwar al-Sayyid Ahmad 0
 
Islamic Study Committee
 Abu Zubaydahoo
 
*Ayrnan al-Zawahiri
 Abu Salah al-Yemeni 0 
*Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah Abu Jafar al-Jaziri 0 
Training Ops.Advice and Reform Council 
*Anas aI-LibycoAhmed Khalifa Ghailani 
Abd aJ-Hadi al-Iraqi co 
Mohammed Omar AbdeI-Rahman 
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Southeast Division Communications Committee
 
Ridwuan Isamuddin Zein-al-Abideen Huss in
 
Gmar al-Farouqoo
 
USS Cole Affiliates 
London Cell Tawfiq Attash Khallad
 
Adel Abdel Baryoo
 Abdurrahman Husain Mohamed al-Saafani 
Ibrahaim Eidrarou Abu al-Rashim al-Nashiri 00 
Khalid al-Fawwaz Abu Ali Harthi 0 
African Embassy Bombing Mfma.tes
 
Khalfan Kbamis Mohamedoo *Shaikh Saiid
 
Ahmed Mohammed Harned Ali Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam
 
Mushim Musa Matawali Atwah Mohammed Saddiq Odehoo
 
*Ibrahaim Eidarousoo Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhalioo
 
Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan
 
Ali Abdelseoud Mohamedoo *Tawfiq Attash Khallad
 
Hijackers of 9/11
 
Mohamed Atta0 Ahmed Alnami0
 
Abdulaziz Alomari0 Saeed Alghamdi0
 
Satam M.A. al-Suqami0 Fayez Rashid Ahmed Hassan0
 
Waleed M. Alshehri0 Wail M. Alshehri0
 
Majed Moqed 0 Mohand Alsherhi0
 
Kbalid Almihdhar0 Ahmed Alghamdi0
 
Salem Alharnzi0 Marwan al-Shehhi 0
 
Nawaf Alhazmi 0 Hani Hanjour0
 
Ziad Samir Jarrah0 Hamza Algharndi0
 
Ahmed Ibrahim al-Haznawi0 Zacarias Moussaouioo
 
Ke)'; Captured members = 00; Dead members = 0; and at large members have symbol. AI 0 member whose 
names are repeated more than once are indicated by ". 
Chapter Summary 
The separation of precipitants and preconditions is made because each term 
carried with it two separate items of research. Precipitants are the events and the 
establishment of ideologies that have occurred over a long period of tinle. in addition. 
the precipitants are the components that supported the creatiQn of the organization itself. 
Pre conditions, on the other hand, are the social forces that supported AI Qaeda in its 
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ability to successfull accomplish the attacks of 9/11. Understanding the precipitants 
allows for a more adequate analysis ofAJ Qaeda s organization. One must first 
determine what the foundation of any item being studied is before the can mo e 
forward. This is exactly the case here. The focus of this chapter was to uncover the 
reasons why the Al Qaeda organization initially started and the grievances that it holds. 
At the end of the chapter, the researcher moved ahead to where the organization is today. 
While only segments of information were available for organizational analysis the 
infonnation gathered allows one to see how the organization has grown into a network 
structure and other descriptive components of that structure (i.e. whether or not members 
are at large, captured, or dead). The following chapter contains methodology for how the 
researcher went about this study, and subsequent chapter focus specifically on Lewin's 
model and the causes and effects of the events of 9/11. 
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Chapter 3
 
Overview of Theory and Model
 
There are a number of ways to approach the study of organizations toda . One 
way is through the open-systems theories. Open-systems theories concentrate on the 
process oforganization, complexity of individual parts and the strong influence of 
environmental factors (Scott, 2000). Social network analysis exists as one of four open­
systems theories, and is useful in explaining the relationships between agents within a 
network (Scott). Since Al Qaeda is organized as a network, social network theory seems 
to be the most appropriate theory for interpreting Ai Qaeda. While the theory explains 
the organizational make-up ofAl Qaeda. it is the theoretical model that serves as the 
backdrop to examine the conditions surrounding 9/11. This research uses Lewin's force 
field analysis serves as a model to explain the broad social conditions that affected the Al 
Qaeda network leading up to 9/l1 and those that affect the organization post 9/11. 
In Lewin's view, thefield of social forces in which the group was located molded 
the behaviors and actions of the group (Lewin, 1951). He argued, that this field is a 
social 'space' that comprises both the group and its surrounding environment. The 
environment of the group is not seen as something purely external to and independent of 
the group. The groups perceived environment is an interconnecting part of the social 
space that also has its effects on the group's behaviors. Broad trends of environmental 
and biographical factors make up the social forces at the macro-level. The meso-level of 
analysis consists of the Al Qaeda organization itself; and the events of 9/11 comprise the 
micro level analysis, for it is this "critical incident' that created an opportunity to see Al 
Qaeda within its true structure. This representation serves not as a categorical process. 
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but describes the dynamic relationship between organization, en ironment and e ents. 
The research conducted here presents a novel approach to studying botb Ai Qaeda and 
future terrorist groups as they coalesce with social conditions. 
To date, the majority of data collected in the field of terrorism has been from data 
sets of separate terrorist organizations in an effort to draw general conclusions about 
patterns of behaviors and actions across rather than within a terrorist group (Enders and 
Sandler, 1993). Largely, terrorism research efforts have been driven by and helpful to 
counterterrorism goals, and are not intended to provide insight into the actions of anyone 
specific terrorist organization. Past studies have combined the attacks and actions from 
many known terrorist groups. In some cases of contemporary terrorist groups, the limited 
number of activities and infonnation prohibit an accurate quantitative study (Bell 1977). 
The research here is concerned with a single terrorist group--Al Qaeda. 
1bis study constitutes a largely qualitative endeavor for practical reasons. 
Accurate tracking of Ai Qaeda did not occur simultaneously to it inception and 
subsequent time line. Certain bits of infonnation were obtained along the way only when 
actions produced by AI Qaeda terrorists spurred interest. The process by which Al Qaeda 
was organizing itself and the conditions that manifested its growing strength went 
unnoticed. The lack of uncovering all information concerning Al Qaeda and the 
misinterpretation of how the organization was operating generated from what information 
was available yielded a false sense of success in restraining Al Qaeda' s terrorist 
activities. It was not until the events of 9/11 exposed the organization more clearly that a 
comparison between a hypothesized assessment of the group and the reality of the 
organization could be made. 
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Under such circumstances research about AI Qaeda leading up to its successful 
execution of the attacks on 9/1] must be conducted in a step-b -step approach. Just as if 
one were building a house, groundwork and laying the foundation must be the [Lrst step. 
The same is true in this case. Ground work and foundation building is much more 
suitable for a qualitative analysis. Specifically the methods utilized prove capable of 
identifying and explaining the dynamic relationships and conditions that exist to form a 
thorough picture. On the opposite side is the immediate response to the organization, 
which can be accurately tracked from its inception and follows parallel to the counter 
response time line. Again, such analysis is best conducted through a qualitative 
methodology, one that will support further analysis as future events unfold. 
Resea.rch Methodology 
A pre and post 9/11 case study of Al Qaeda was conducted using methods of 
analysis designed to interpret the organizational make-up and discern causes of 
organizational change. In looking at this case, it was necessary to use a multi-method 
approach, called triangulation. Triangulation is the use of several methods to achieve a 
broader and more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question (Denzin, 1989). 
Flick (1992) suggests that a combination of multiple methods in a single study is a 
strategy that adds rigor, breadth, and depth to any investigation. Historical narrative 
ethnomethodology, and secondary data analysis are combined in triangulation to prerent 
a thorough, three-dimensional case ofAl Qaeda. 
Part of creating the picture of Al Qaeda is to address the foundations upon which 
the organization was built. Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996 p.644) define historical research in 
education for example "as the process of systematically seafching for data to answer 
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questions about a past phenomenon for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of 
present institutions practices trends and issues in education." The general objectiv is to 
make sense of people's past to und rstand current problems and relationships. Levi­
Strauss (1963) argues that a story unfold paradigmaticalt in teans of oppositions rather 
than linearly in terms of functions. Strauss argument is compatible with Lewin's force 
field analysis. where opposing forces affect the course of action. In an attempt to 
understand the situation, it is necessary to uncover organizational information including 
the oppositions that supported the formation of the network. 
Content analysis was used as a technique to gather historical information about 
AI Qaeda. A traditional methodological problem with content analysis has been the 
inability to seize the context within which a literary text has meaning (Denzi~ 1994). 
However, by picking one event of analysis, the researcher solves this contextual problem. 
Content analysis allowed the researcher to obtain infonnation concerning only the 
emergence and response to 9/11. Articles were selected that specifically dealt with Al 
Qaeda, therefore value was placed on the actual context of the articles rather than 
comparative value between articles. The events of 9/11 created a heightened awareness of 
AI Qaeda. Through historical narrative analysis, a r -creation of the interconnected 
network of actors and leadership structure is achieved. In addition to the network, AI 
Qaeda's history of terrori st activity was a prologue to the attacks of 9/11. Such event 
add to the understanding of the organization and the environment leading up to and 
directly following 9/11. 
Ethnomethodology--the method of studying culture and how social cues are 
selected from a culture and translated into action--is the second component of 
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triangulation. Garfinkel (1967) describes ethnomethodolog as the wa individual or 
groups bring order to or make sense of their social world. The focu is on describing 
how order-eausal ties between moti ations and patterns of beha ior-is constructed by 
the participant (Zimmerman & Weider, 1970). The tenn "the documentary method" was 
coined by Garfmkel (1967) to explain how certain facts are selected from a social 
situation, which seem to conform to a pattern. The documentary method serves as a 
technique to outline how Al Qaeda members chose cues from the culture that led to the 
interpretation of Islam in fundamentally radical views; views not held by the majority of 
Muslims. 
Until the events of9/11. Al Qaeda's network was invisible to the rest of the 
world. When the events of9/11 occurred, it created a momentary visible depiction of the 
organization and the radical beliefs that the members adhere to. It is this picture created 
by the attacks that allows the researcher to gather information and make conclusions 
about the organization and the depth of such radical beliefs and the limits that lslamist 
were willing to go to for their beliefs. The events of 9/11 were a disruption' to the 
current system of understanding radical Islarnists one that initiated new research into 
how Al Qaeda members came to the conclusions they did. On the other end of the 
spectrum are the ideas and effects experienced by U.S. citizens. 91l I also reflected the 
way in which American. citizens interpret their own social and cultural cues and the 
responses enacted. Again, the disruption led to a clearer picture, one that not only caught 
the physical emotions as they were being experienced by the U.S. public, but also one 
that illustrated the invisible undercurrent of collective emotions that effectively created 
change and enacted restraining conditions. Figure I is an illustrative example of the 
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nexus between AI Qaeda and the .S. both before and after 9/11. Each circle is 
numbered in a specific order to represent the dynamic workings of th whole process. 
Starting in the upper left hand corner is the invisible Al Qaeda network before 9/11. 
Once the attacks of9111 occurred, the physical shock and flood of emotions of the U.S. 
public were witnessed. Almost simultaneously the events led to a brief x-ray of the 
internal components ofAI Qaeda and the belief system that endorsed the catastrophic 
events. Finally, out of the events of 9111 it is possible to see how the emotional 
responses of a society work together as a collective unit to support actions of change. 
This is evident through the swift and unanimous support to pass policies and initiate 
military action as restraining forces against terrorism. 
Figure 3.1 
Nexus between AI Qaeda and U.S. Both Before And Mter 9/11 
x-ray like of 
collective emotional 
response of lh 
Events of society 
9/11 
The final element oftriangulation is quantitative secondary data analysis. The 
secondary data analysis was utilized to explain the how Western cultural cues affected 
the views ofAmericans in the wake of9/11. The Washington Post and ABC conducted a 
telephone survey to detennine the effects that the events of9/11 had on people within the 
U.S. Numerous surveys were conducted on different dates including: the day of the 
attacks, two days after the attacks six months later and a year later. The researcher used 
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select questions from the surve taken one year later to identify the extent to which 
people still had emotions about the attacks and the magnitude of those emotions after the 
longest period of time had passed. The researcher operationalI defmed the response of 
the attacks through the question: 'Thinking back to right after the attacks last September 
11 th, at the time did you personally feel frightenedT The researcher conducted a chi 
square test using three variables-gender, class and religion-- to determine whether or 
not significant differences occurred. 
Gender was operationally defined by categories of male and female. Because 
socio-economic status-which commonly measures class-- was not a specific variable 
within the original study, the researcher used demographics of both geographic region 
within the U.S. and whether or not the respondent lived in a large city or rural area 
defmed class. The East and West coasts are the biggest financial centers within the U.S. 
and also have the highest standard of living than regions in the Midwest and South. In 
addition, people living in large cities are tend to be more affluent that those living inn 
rural areas, hence the researcher used these demographic to represent cla s. Finally. 
religion was defined by the presence or non-presence of religious belief. These variables 
were chosen to be acquiescent with variables used by ethnomethodologists when 
studying culture. The researcher used the data sources to determine whether or not the 
culture affected responses by using these three variables. as wel.l as determining the 
extent to which there was a collective emotional response to the events of 9/11. 
Data 
All of the data for this study consisted of secondary data that was collected from 
three different categorical sources. The first type of data came from experts in the field 
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of terrorism and specifically on the Al Qaeda organization. Sources of expertise came in 
the fonn of academic literature think tanks Oklahoma City National Memorial Center 
for the Prevention ofTerrorism and the United Nations. In addition, the researcher also 
used data sources from four government agencies: Central Intelligence Agency Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security. 
Information used from these sources was in the fonn of briefings on the current status of 
the War on Terrorism and decl.assified documents both before and after 9/11. Finally the 
last category of data was in the fonn of current media sources, defmed as newspapers and 
magazines. 
Purposive Sampling 
Purposive Sampling is defined as collecting a sample with a specific purpose in 
mind. Certain characteristics are pre-determined and only those sample groups exhibiting 
those characteristics will be chosen. In this case, reasons for conducting a purposive 
sample included time and efficiency-information gathered from numerous newspapers 
would likely be very similar and redundant. The pre-determined characteristics consisted 
of four criteria: 1) pragmatically the U.S. media is more accessible 2) since the events 
occurred in the U.S., the intention is to filter the infornlation through the eyes and public 
policy views ofAmericans to gain the perspectives of where the events took place, 3) 
only large, elite papers are going to constantly carry and headline international new; 4) 
Since the majority ofmedia outlets are slanted towards one political view or the other a 
mixture ofboth were needed in order to be as objective as possible. Under the above 
criteria, the researcher chose select media sources to draw data from: USA Today, Time 
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Magazine, Los Angeles Times The Economist Washington Post Washington Times, 
The New York Times and EWSWEEK. 
The following two chapters discuss the findings for this study. The fmding were 
divided into two chapters for reasons of organizational parsimony. Chapter 4 includes 
analysis of the propelling forces leading up to the events of9/11. These findings includ 
the necessary and sufficient conditions briefly discussed in chapter 1. In addition, 
chapter 5 analyses involve restraining responses initiated after the attacks of 9/11. 
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Chapter 4 
"September 11 2001 was a wake up call. Before the devastating events we a 
Americans considered ourselves relatively immune to a massive physical attack 
on our homeland. Our victory in the Cold War left us with few significant 
conventional military threats and the world of terrorism seemed more the concern 
of troubled regions like the Middle East tban Middle America. As a Nation we 
were generally unfamiliar with the motivations of terrorists and the deep hatred 
behind their agendas. Furthermore, we underestimated the depth and scope of 
their capabilities and did not fully appreciate the extent to which they would go to 
carry out their destructive acts. The September 11 2001 attacks changed these 
misconceptions" (Department of Homeland Security, 2003 p.5). 
Pre 9/1 I Propelling Forces 
Propelling forces, according the Lewin's force field theory, are actions or 
elements to the environment that drive a change to occur. Using Lewin's theory in the 
context of the 9/11 case study, the propeUing forces serve as interdependent conditions 
t.hat supported AI Qaeda on an optimal track to organize and execute the 9/11 attacks. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the preconditions are not to be confused with precipitants--factors that 
led to the inception ofAl Qaeda--rather they were the factors that propelled AI Qaeda to 
the actions it took on 9/11. This chapter s focus is on the propelling forces that led up to 
the attacks of 9/11, and exhibits fmdings based on the first hypothesis that prior to 9/11 
propelling forces exceeded restraining forces. This is not to suggest that nothing was 
being done before 9/11 to prohibit the abilities of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups 
from building forces, plotting, or doing harm. Quite to the contrary, there were efforts 
being made to deter the use of terrorism both domestically and internationally. However, 
in hindsight of the attacks many have advocated that relevant parties in the United States 
knew that the threat of terrorism was a serious issue for American interests at large but 
did not deem it a serious problem to be faced on U.S. soil. lpe focus of the argument is 
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the extent to which AI Qaeda out performed the United States government and achieved 
at least temporarily, its goal to become the most powerful terrorist group in the world. 
This chapter includes findings on the conditions that were both necessary and 
sufficient in driving Al Qaeda to become an integrated network--both. resilient and 
flexible-that was capable of successfully planning and performing the largest terrorist 
attack on U.S. soil. Following explanation of the terms necessary and sufficient 
conditions, the researcher discusses the necessary conditions of globalization; financial 
assets; strategic leadership; and support oflslamic Jaw as they pertain to AI Qaeda. ext, 
the sufficient condition of true believers is analyzed, followed by the summary of results 
for the propelling conditions. To illustrate Figure 1 highlights the hypothesized dominant 
role of propelling forces over restraining forces before 9/] 1 in adherence to Lewin s 
model. 
Figure 4.1 
Pre 9/11 Conditions 
LEWIN'S FORCE FIELD ANALYSIS 
Propelling Forces include: Restraining Forces include: 
Necessary Conditions Necessary Conditions 
Globalization Protecting the Homeland 
Financial Assets Military Force 
Strategic Leadership Freezing Finances 
Islamic Law Cooperation Among Countries 
Sufficient Condition .. Sufficient Condition 
True Believers Popular Opinion 
According to a definition by Swartz (1997) A condition A is said to be necessary 
for a condition B, if (and only if) the speciousness or non-existence ofA brings about the 
speciousness of B. Just as air is necessary for sustained human life, the necessary 
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conditions examined in this research were obligatory to establish a force in Al Qaeda that 
would create successful attacks. The criteria in determining the necessary conditions for 
AI Qaeda to complete the attacks and subsequently create change were established after a 
review of literature was complete. The research analysis was an original conception by 
the author, and therefore there was no guide for which to follow. Starting with detailed 
requirements of the terrorists needs items were then grouped into larger categories that 
captured similarities in a general marmer. For example, starting the list with numerous 
items the terrorists had to spend money on and then moving to the simpler concept that 
terrorists needed financial support Conducting a content analysis on which categories 
had the most discourse then validated the list of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Finally, verification of the magnitude and value of this research came subsequent to the 
establishment of the criteria set for this research. That certification has come from 
experts in the field of terrorism, such as Gunaratna, Hoffinan and Williams, which have 
acknowledged the importance of each necessary condition through their own research on 
the topic. 
Necessary Conditions 
The four necessary conditions that acted as propelling forces for Al Qaeda and led 
to the subsequent achievement of the attacks on United States soil include: Globalization. 
fmancial assets, strategic leadership, and support for Islamic Law. These conditions were 
interdependent parts of a whole. No one item could have provided the impetus for the 
implementation process. Al Qaeda needed each condition equally. These four conditions 
coupled with the sufficient condition-true believer status-- serve a functional purpose in 
explaining the successful attacks. 
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Globalization 
Globalization serves as an umbrella term to explain so many different features of 
today s world. Like terrorism no definition of globalization can full disclose the nature 
of its existence due to the sheer broadness of the topic. While the debate on globalization 
hinges on "for" or "against" positions, the matter ofwhether or not globalization exists 
needs no debate. Globalization has fundamentally changed the system of the world. 
Mittelman (2000) points to an increase in interconnections a rise of transnational flows 
and a deepening pressure on the world becoming a single place. Global trends of 
deregulation; open borders· and freer movement ofpeople, money, goods, and services 
increasingly affect the world. In this connected world time distance and spatial baniers 
are broken down by advanced technology (Perl 2000). But while globalization is often 
spoken of in terms of cohesion and harmony of an people, the reality is that this is not the 
view of globalization that all people see. In countries with weak infrastructures and 
corrupt governments, globalization has brought pictures of American luxury and 
grandiosity and a reminder of dissimilarity. One consequence of globalization is it 
facilitation for terrorist groups and other international crime to operate in relatively 
unregulated environments (perl). 
The Age of Information Technology 
In the age of information technology, communication flows instantly and without 
a trace; money is transferred around the world in a matter of minutes; and international 
terrorism plots can be orchestrated by cell members in different countries simultaneously. 
Kenneth Lieberthal (2001), former special assistant to the President and senior director of 
Asian affairs, stated that globalization facilitated terrorism due to the creation of porous 
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borders making infonnation and communication technolog mor acces ible and les 
expensive and by allowing the movement of funds to be considerabl easier. SheIJey 
(2001) a professor at American University and director of Transnational Crime and 
Corruption Center (TraCCC) agrees, the ease of communication in this modem era means 
there is less significance on actor s locations than previously. Language barrier as w II 
as, border security are broken down by constant migration of people from one country to 
another. Finding the flaws in the system allowed AI Qaeda terrorists to smuggle people 
and weapons into countries striving to keep them out (Perl, 2000). 
The "Munich Massacre' as it was so named after eleven Israelis were taken 
hostage and then killed by Palestinian terrorists is considered the birthplace ofmodem 
terrorism (Amdur, 2001). Television media brought terrorist exposure to a new level 
during the Munich Olympics. Those terrorists wanting their grievances to reach a large 
audience learned that television was the portal with which to do so. Bin Laden continues 
to use this technique by making strategically timed appearances that reach all ends of the 
world within a day. To Bin Laden, television serves as a medium for gaining support in 
condemning America and its allies, maintain his status of a charismatic leader, and most 
importantly sending symbolic messages to other Al Qaeda members (Johnston, 2003). 
Television is not the only outlet for communication. As the idea of globalization 
has grown, so too has the innovation ofhyper-speed communication and information 
technology. In a market initiated b· the United States but adopted by others information 
technology is continuously being updated and improved upon. The task at hand for the 
last several decades has been to create smaller better, faster and more interesting ways 
of communicating for the greater good of an intimate and mOle globalized world. Before 
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the advent of widespread information technology the pace of international interaction was 
much slower. All actions across borders were completed with twice as much time as in 
the present (Shelley, 2001). Not surprisingly technolog meant to ease the challenge of 
keeping up with the times has also fallen in to the hands of those interested in exploiting 
it for their own purposes. 
Bin Laden's vast fortune has enabled AI Qaeda to obtain some of the most 
advanced technology in the world. After evading missile strikes, it was believed that Bin 
Laden possesses a CODAN radio (Cohen, 2001). The CODAN radio network was set up 
with the help ofUnited States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
United Nations. The network is intended to allow the Afghan president to have contact 
from Kabul with all other areas ofAfghanistan. The CODAN radio sets are advanced 
radio systems enhanced with sophisticated computer digital signals and additional 
handset hardware to make it operate similar to a telephone. The sets can also send voice 
messages, e-mails, and scanned documents (USAID, 2003). Also hidden inside Al 
Qaeda's safe houses are sophisticated satellites cell phones, and computer technology. 
Encryption software used by Al Qaeda to code messages is commercially available 
(Soloway Nordland, & Nadeau, 2002). The use and sophistication of encryption along 
with the introduction of other technology has been increasing exponentially because the 
cells are organized as a large network (Shelley, 200 J). 
Another source widely used to communicate and gather information is the 
Intemet. Bin Laden·'s organization is Internet savvy and there are numerous ways in 
which Al Qaeda exploits the capabilities of the information superhighway (Cohen, 2001). 
Al Qaeda has used the Web to recruit, do fund raising learn" and gather ideas (Sbelle 
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2001). The Web is a vast system of knowledge open to the public. It was discovered 
from captured terrorists that cell member went online to research the chemical 
dispersing of crop dusters (Cohen 2001). The most beneficial wa that the Internet has 
served Al Qaeda is through means of communication. The Internet offer the option of 
anonymity for those seeking to remain hidden. Yahoo email accounts are free so no 
background verification is necessary. A person can make up an email address and 
chan.ge it whenever needed. Al Qaeda members have been known to use Internet cafes 
and places that offer computer time by the hour such as Kinko's (Shelley 2001). The 
Internet also offers less interpersonal communication with other people. Mohamed Atta 
made his reservations on www.americanairlines.com(Cohen.2001).Itis much more 
difficult for a machine to sense the falsity of a situation than it is for a real person. 
One of the most advanced techniques being used by AI Qaeda is something called 
steganography. Steganography-- Greek for hidden writing-is the way to produce secret 
messages. There is both high tech and low-tech ways in which to use stenography. High­
tech methods include messages being transferred into pictures or music files that are so 
small they cannot be seen by the naked eye. The operative in the field is told what to 
look for, clicks on it and is given anything from bank account numbers to instructions on 
how to blow up a nuclear reactor (Cohen 2001). According to terrorists arrested in the 
alleged bombing of the .S. embassy in Paris they were waiting for instructions through 
an online photo (Hedges, 2001). Terrorist experts believe that AI Qaeda may be hiding 
messages within pictures on porn sites because there are so many of them and it would be 
the last place fundamentalist Muslims are expected to go (Cohen, 2001). 
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Low-tech steganograph is much more difficult to uncover. Messages could be 
Sayyed Qutbhidden amongst the mass of unrelated' chatter' on websites (Solowa , 
Nordland, & Nadeau, 2002) or the message could simpl be a photo with messages 
entangled in the landscape. According to Cohen (2001) the crossing of arms could mean 
to hit an East coast target while the color blue could detail the destruction of a West coast 
bridge. Such messages were virtually impossible to catch from the outside because they 
were hiding in plain site. Ibe majority oflntemet providers did not realize that they were 
providing service to terrorist members. The security checks were just not that extensive 
(Cohen). There is evidence to suggest that terrorist members were among the owners of 
some U.S. companies involved in sophisticated computer activity (Hosenball, Hirsh, 
Soloway, & Flynn, 2002). Al Qaeda's technological know-howprovided them an ability 
to reach audiences around the world, maximize effectiveness, and communicate on a 
level unavailable a few decades ago. 
Globalization From Below 
Global terrorism and globalization are closely intertwined according to Mittleman 
(2002), an international relations professor at American University. Mittleman (2002) 
asserts that the similarities between the trans-border phenomena lie in their challenge to 
state sovereignty, reliance on modem technology and worldwide financial networks and 
their nature to feed upon the marginalized. Discourse on the topic of globalization 
reached an all time high in the 1990's. The 1999 protest of the WTO conference in 
Seattle was hailed as a triumph for the "other side' of globalization. Experts have gone 
to great lengths in trying to explain the friction culminating between the two views of 
globalization. The tenn "globalization from below" has become a popular phrase that 
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expresses a historical transformation and a loss in the degree of control at local levels. 
Such effects result in low wages and unemployment impo erished communities 
envirorunental degradation, and other social destruction such as the extinction of rural 
communities. Explained this way, concerns arise as to the ability of a singular system 
that is able to cope with transnational problems. 
Other experts including Friedman (2001) suggest that globalization does not fall 
into categories of above or below but rather beyond. The concept of globalization fTom 
beyond suggests a l.ateral move across states as a syndrome of processes activities and 
ideas (Friedman). States like China have made efforts to fend off the globalization wave 
with little success. Those more sensitive to the effects of globalization have witnessed 
cultural preservation, tradition, and moral and spiritual seriousness have given way to 
trivialization and homogenization. Rather than experiencing globalization as an "equal 
opportunity" the have-nots find no sign of improvement of life. 
Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization used not only the technological sid of 
globalization to their advantage, but also this negative side, which created victims of 
marginalization. Al Qaeda cunningly manipulated the conflicting views of globalization 
into a recruiting opportunity. High unemployment and rises in crime and poverty raise 
the fears of the disenfranchised. Other frustrations such as repressive governments like 
those seen in some Middle Eastern countries only complimented the message that Al 
Qaeda was sending. Al Qaeda thrived on supporting the idea ofMcWorld vs. Jihad. 
Targeted emphasis was put on the concept of the clash of the civilizations; warning 
Muslims of the United States' plan to steam roll any and all cultural differences in the 
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world. Multiple campaigns were spread to these areas in an attempt to recruit men for 
suicide missions, as well as to create overall hatred toward the United tate. 
Al Qaeda strategically used globalization from both a technological and 
motivational aspect. On the one hand AI Qaeda produced vigor and passion in the 
disenchanted out of contempt of globalization; yet on the other hand it benefited from the 
gifts brought about by the technological connectivity of globalization. Al Qaeda was 
extraordinary in playing both ends against the middle. The exploitation of globalization 
facilitated the growth ofmembers and supporters worldwide ready and willing to 
immerse themselves into bin Laden's vision ofa new world order. 
Financial Assets 
The financial network was a critical part of AI Qaeda s organization. The 
fmancial set-up for the 9/11 attacks went unnoticed by security agencies except on one 
occasion. The SunTrust Bank in Florida made a suspicious transaction report to the U.S. 
Treasury s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network after Mohamed Atta received a wire 
transfer of$ 69,985 from the Gulf This report, along with 125 000 others were not 
investigated until after the attacks occurred (William, 200 I). According to William F. 
Wechsler (2001) who served on Clinton's National Security Council, bin Laden rose to 
prominence by building "a fmancial architecture that supported the mujaheddin against 
the Russians" (p. 137). This financial architecture was carried over into the creation of 
Al Qaeda and was at the center of Al Qaeda's ability to gain finances. Al Qaeda relied 
on money to fund terrorists; operations; acquire needed materials' and buy support from 
states, regimes, and other terrorist groups. A contribution of $1 00 million was given to 
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the Taliban when Al Qaeda moved its base of operation to Afghanistan after being forced 
out of Sudan (Williams, 2002). 
Gunaratna (2002), one of the foremost experts on Al Qaeda's organization 
explains, "Intelligence and security services worldwide including the CIA and MI6, have 
never before encountered a global terrorist financial network as sophisticated as Al 
Qaeda's. Comparisons with other such networks reveal that Al Qaeda has built the most 
complex, robust and resilient money-generating and money-moving network yet seen" 
(p.8l). This was a carefully constructed unit that amassed a large fortune as if it were in 
fact a global corporation. Gunaratna (2001) has conducted extensive research on Al 
Qaeda's financial structure. He computed an approximation ofAI Qaeda's annual budget 
by comparing it to the budgets of other terrorist groups with similar financial resources, 
geographic distribution, organizational structure, member count and other factors. The 
annual budget was thought to be under $50 million a year~ of that, $36 million was spent 
on maintaining the 3,000 members in Afghanistan and members abroad. $50 million was 
also thought to be the start-up cost for the organization, which included weapons, offices 
vehicles, houses, training sites, infrastructure, and technology (Gunaratna 2002). 
The finance and business committee was in charge of all financial aspects ofAl 
Qaeda. This committee was headed by Sheikh Muhammad Hussein al-Almadi, an exiled 
Saudi businessman based in Ethiopia. His two main constituents included Zein-al­
Abideen (a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah), a Palestinian located in Afghanistan' and the Karachi­
DAB based, Saudi Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (a.k.a. Mustafa Ahmed) (McCoy & 
Cauchon, 2001; Gunaratna, 2002). Their job was to oversee all funding of terrorists and 
their operations. Mustafa Ahmed was directly involved in f,unding the attacks of 9/11 via 
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Dubai mone exchanges through Citibank in ew York and on to Florida illiam 
2001 ). 
There are five financial security principles included in the training manual, 
Declaration ofJihad Against the Country's Tyrants: 
"funds should be divided between those invested for fmanciai return and the 
balance-operational funds-that should be saved and spent only on operations' 
operational funds should not all be put in one place' only a few oftbe 
organization's members should know the location of its funds; while carrying 
large amounts of money precautions should be taken' and money should be left 
with nonmembers and spent only when needed' (as cited in Gunaratna, 200 I, p. 
8). 
These precautions had to be adhered to by botb the providing and receiving ends of the 
funds. Operational commanders chose those members that were frugal with AI Qaeda's 
funds for tactical missions. The hijackers of 9/11 spent nights in cheap motels rented 
budget cars, and ate in pizza parlors. The total financial costs for AI Qaeda was 
estimated to be $500 000, a very inexpen ive price for the destruction it generated. 
Looked at in a different way the cost of this mission was cheaper than buying some 
apartments in New York City (Carbonara, 2001). In the days leading up to the attacks 
excess money was transferred back to Al Qaeda's fmancial committee. A total of 
$16,300 was deposited into Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi's bank account in Dubai on 
September 11 (Miller, Stone & Mitchell 2002). On the other hand, when it came to 
specific operation costs, frugality was not an issue. Gunaratna (2002) explains that AI 
Qaeda operatives would spend $4500.00 on business class plane tickets in order to be as 
close to the cockpit as possible. 
Four facets exist through which Al Qaeda acquired its funds-eontribution, crime 
investments and legitimate business. Contributions were ~ade up of charity funds and 
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individual donations. According to Gunaratna (2002) Osama bin Laden s own fortune 
which has benefited Al Qaeda totaled only $25 to 30 million rather than higher 
speculations of $300 million. A majority of donations came from wealthy businessmen 
from the Gulf States like Saudi Arabia, United Arabic Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar 
(Simpson, 2003· Gunaratna, 2002· Morgenthau, 2001). One of the most widely known Al 
Qaeda supporters was Khalid bin Mahfouz, a fonner director of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCr) was 
the only institute that closely resembled Al Qaeda's financial network (Gunaratna, 2002· 
Farah, 2002). Pakistanis founded the bank with financing from leaders of the UAE. 
Among the banks many operations were the buying of illegal weapons, laundering 
money, harboring terrorist funds, and allowing the CIA to funnel money to support those 
fighting against the Soviets (Breaking the Bank, 2001). The bank's collapse in 1991 
brought about a large financial scandal; however, none of the banks backers went to jail. 
Many of these people went on to work in otber banks and charities and many were 
identified as supporting bin Laden's terrorist activities. Interestingly, Khalid also has a 
sister married to bin Laden (Farah, 2002). Until 1999, bin Mahfouz was director of 
National Commerce Bank (NCB) in Saudi Arabia (Saudi executives give funds to Osama 
bin Laden, 1999). After pressure from the U.S., Saudi officials put him under house 
arrest after an audit ofhis bank turned up payments to bin Laden. Yet, bin Mahfouz was 
still able to support Al Qaeda through a charity organization. Muwafaq or Blessed 
Relief, was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department (2001) as an Al Qaeda front. 
This was a European based charity organized by the families ofbin Mahfouz, AI-Rajhi, 
and Saleh Kamel (Simpson, 2003). Similar links have continued to be unearthed. Also, 
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on the list of Al Qaeda financial S11pporters was Ghaleb Himmat the Tunisian-born 
executive and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, both of al-Taqwa a Swis -based financial services 
company (Hosenball, 2001). Himmat also served as a board member of the Kuwait-based 
International Islamic Charitable Organization (IlCO) (Huband 2001). 
Other charities have also contributed to Al Qaeda's terrorist activities. Some have 
knowingly been front operations while others were unaware. Documents obtained by the 
Bosnian government found Al Qaeda used charities such as the Muslim World League 
and the Islamic Relief Organization to move money and supphes, and to provide 
logistical support (Simpson, 2003). Al Qaeda accumulated significant sums through the 
infiltration of operatives into charity organizations such as the Kuwait based Mercy 
International in Kenya and Help Africa People. Officials found that neither of the parent 
charities were aware of the terrorist infiltration (Gunaratna 2002). Before 9/11, Islamic 
charities proved to be a convenient system through which to receive funds. The Islamic 
tenet zakat requires every Muslim to contribute to a charitable cause each year. The 
world's richest Muslim nation, Saudi Arabia is also the largest backer of Islamic 
charities. With so many Muslims donating money to a charity it has made it very 
difficult to assess whether or not the donation is legitimate (Gerth & Miller 2002). 
Al Qaeda utilized criminal activity as another means to gain fmancial assets. The 
flagship of criminal activity was credit card fraud, and was used mainly by Algerian 
members based in Europe. Almost $1 million a month was made through the use of 
credit card fraud. A special camp was established to train European members in financial 
crimes such as credit card counterfeiting. Credit card manufacturing machines were 
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purchased and the members were taught how to assess information from the magnetic 
strip in order to replicate credit cards for use (Gunaratna 2002). 
Al Qaeda used money laundering as a mainstay of its operations as well. 
Laundering institutions consist of bank fronts controlled by launderers, non-bank 
financial institutions, and informal financial networks such as hawalas (Weintraub, 
2002). Many banks and businesses in the Gulf were used as fronts. Dubai was the 
fmancial hub for most of the Islamic militant groups largely because it was convenient, 
and they were willing to turn a blind eye (Farah, 2002). At least half of the $500,000 
used for the attacks of9/11 came from Dubai. U.S. banks ranging from Key Bank to 
Chase Manhattan routinely conducted transactions from the U.S. to Dubai without 
realizing they were wiring terrorist funds (William, 2001). AI Qaeda's fmancial 
transactions have been made up largely of gold because it was a currency familiar around 
the world, available around the world, could be converted into cash when needed, and 
exempt from international reporting requirements for financial transactions (Farah 2002). 
This was another reason that Dubai was a haven for terrorist transactions. Dubai has one 
of the world's largest and least regulated gold markets in the world. In July of 1999 and 
January of2000, U.S. officials went to Duabi to ask that these fmanciaJ transactions be 
monitored more closely. The U.S. received little cooperation (Farah). 
Hawalas, or informal banking systems, made up the largest part of AI Qaeda's 
financial transactions. The hawala system allows money to be submitted at an office in 
one place and payment to be handed over in another location without the money having 
to actually be taken to the destination. In some places such as Afghanistan and Somalia 
there were no formal banking systems; therefore, hawalas v.:ere the only way of 
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conducting business. HawaJas also leave behind no traceable paper work making it 
extremely hard for investigators to follow (William 2001). Hand couriers played a part 
in the fmanciaJ system by smuggling money and gold from destination to destination. 
Pakistani authorities estimated that $2 to $3 million a day was hand carried from Karachi 
to Pakistan to Dubai (Farah, 2002). In an Al Qaeda manual found by British forces in 
Afghanistan. there were chapters on how to smuggle gold on smaJl boats and conceal it 
on the body (Farah). 
Perhaps the most disputed topic among experts about Al Qaeda s financial 
network is whether or not Al Qaeda conducted and profited from narcotics. Gunaratna 
(2002) widely disputes the idea that Al Qaeda participated in any part of a drug ring. He 
states that there are no hard facts to support this claim. Others such as Zakaria (2001) 
suggest that from drug trade alone AI Qaeda was able to raise over $1 billion. Williams 
book, Al Qaeda: Brotherhood ofTerror, provides details from an FBI interview with Ali 
Abul Nazzar for his affiliation with Al Qaeda. In the interview Nazzar states that: 
'The emir [bin Laden] controls it. He is the world's largest supplier. Everyone 
knows this. His laboratories in Afghanistan produce between 4 000 and 5 000 
metric tons of heroin a year. How are you going to touch him? He gets richer 
with every drug deal made on every street corner. And heroin as we all know is 
the United States drug of choice. It's ironic isn't it? The emir is fueled by 
Western decadence.' (2002, p. 164). 
Yet in documents released by the U.S. government and the United Nations only indirect 
connections between Al Qaeda and drugs were made. The direct source of the Mghan 
narcotics ring was the Taliban whose involvement in the drug trade has been confmned 
for some time. Reeves, a London journalist and experienced writer on terrorism, suggests 
that by 1999 bin Laden was taking a ten percent cut of the Taliban .s drug trade to 
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produce an income of $1 billion (Reeve 1999). Officials around th world insist that 
terrorism organized crime and the illegal drug trade have become one interrelated 
problem (ShelJey, 2001) so there exists an assumption that Al Qaeda directly took part in 
drug trades however, there is still disagreement. 
Regional fmancial officers were responsible for managing the investments side of 
the network. Two known investment officers were Muhammad Jamal Khalifa and Yazid 
Suffat (Klaidman & Liu, 2002). These regional officers looked for profit turning 
businesses and stocks to invest Al Qaeda funds in order to hide and accumulate more 
money. Known investments include the African diamond trade (Farah 2001), a fishing 
business in Mombasa, hospital equipment in Sweden, Denmark dairy products and paper 
mills in Norway (Jacquard, 2002). 
With the help of Abu FadW al-Makkee, Al Qaeda launched several of its own 
commercial enterprises, AI-Makkee is credited with setting up Zirquani, Laden 
International, Althemar al Mubaraka Quadrat Transportation, Quadrat Construction and 
Bareba Commission. Other AI Qaeda business members expanded this list to include: 
Blessed Fruits; Al Hijra Construction; International al-Ikhlas (sweetmeat manufactmers); 
Bank of Zoological Resources (genes for cattle hybrids)' Kasalla (corn hybrids)' Happ 
Tannery; and other food processing and furniture stores. AI Qaeda also ran import and 
export businesses which included purchasing bikes from Azerbijan; Maz trucks from 
Russia; Zetor tractors from Slovakia; cars from Dubai' fertilizer; sugar; iron; insecticide; 
and machine tools as imports. Exports include ostriches from Kenya; wood from Turkey' 
lemons, olives and raisins from Tajikistan; lapis lazuli from Afghanistan' precious stones 
from Uganda; and camels from Sudan (Jacqard, 2002; Guna,ratna, 2002). 
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The .S. government and other go emment agencies around th world ere 
much aware of Al Qaeda s fmancial structure before 9/11. Acti ities were underwa 
before 9/11 to suppress At Qaeda's fmancial efforts but much evidence exists to suggest 
that it was not a high priority of the U.S. Treasury Department or the " Congress to 
enact such measures. In 2000, Senator Phil Gramm (R.-DC) helped to stall legislation 
aimed at fighting money laundering because he was opposed to issues concerning the 
privacy of the banking industry. Likewise, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill intervened at 
the last hour on a decision being made by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) to examine tax havens (Weintraub, 2002). Effort were also 
hampered by the lack of international support, especially from Canada and Western 
Europe. According to Weintraub (2002), the attacks of 9111 made it incredibly apparent 
that efforts to obstruct financing for terrorist activities prior to 9/11 were inadequate and 
unsuccessful. 
Strategic Leadership 
Leadership Techniques 
Al Qaeda was the creation ofAbdullah Azzaro a theologian who inspired Osama 
bin Laden to help build the organization. Ironically, in the early days those who knew 
both Azzaro and bin Laden found the former to be eloquent and charismatic and the latter 
to be sincere and honest but not a potential leader (Bergen 2001). Despite early critics. 
bin Laden learned enough from his predecessor to be characterized as a charismatic and 
inspirational leader to Al Qaeda members. According to Lewis (2002) Osarna was the 
ideal Islamist; someone whose leadership is charismatic and authoritarian. Bin Laden 
was a popular figure to radicals but also for a wider Muslill). audience because h 
Ai Qaeda 81 
responded with words and actions to the seething resentment that was heating up in 
recent years. Yet Lewis (2002) explains that others in the past had fed upon this same 
frustration and not succeeded where bin Laden did. Three very important aspects that 
made bin Laden unique are: expression of eloquence which has been an admirable quality 
amongst Arabs for centuries, he "vas not a ruler-·rulers were seen in many Arabs eyes as 
corrupt, and bin Laden had by his own choice forsaken all of his riches to live a simple 
life devoted to the divine wishes of Allah. These points, argues Lewis (2002), allowed 
bin Laden to succeed where others had failed. 
Bin Laden was like any successful businessman when it came to maintaining his 
organization. He built a network containing ceHs that spanned the world and was able to 
manipulate the Muslim world into believing that there were only two options: a person 
was to be known as a believer with Al Qaeda, or a non-believer with the U.S. He was 
keen enough to realize that employing the expertise of others into leadership roles would 
increase the success of the organization. This is evident through the placement history of 
some ofAl Qaeda's top ranked officials. Several former Middle Eastern, especially 
Egyptian, Pakistani, and Central Asian police officers and military personnel, as well as 
several former European military, and at least one U.S. military personnel have served in 
top rank leadership positions for Al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2002). Bin Laden listened 
carefully to and took advice from his top officials because he understood the value of 
other people's expertise. Even with a loosely organized network, bin Laden and his 
leadership team maintained direct communication on strategic operations. According to 
Gunaratna (2002), bin Laden reviewed every phase of plans and provided strategic 
leadership for the bombings of the African Embassy and th~ USS Cole. 
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Before Azzaro. and bin Laden split-for disagreem nt on th use of terrorism­
Osama gained an important piece of advice. Azzaro was the one who envisioned a 
multinational organization based on uniting all believers. With the exception ofAum 
Shinrikyo, since 1968, Al Qaeda has been the only terrorist group to be multiethnic 
(Gunaratna, 2002). Bin Laden was credited with bringing together like-minded radical 
groups from Algeria; Egypt; Yemen; Chechnya; Pakistan; the West Bank and Gaza Strip; 
and numerous other countries and also for creating a structure of cooperation between 
them (Gunaratna). Even creating tactical relationships with Sh'ia Muslim groups such as 
Hezbollah and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eealm (LTTE) (Gunaratna, 2002). Almost 
as if taking a lesson from one of the greatest historical titans of evil, bin Laden used 
Hitler's model of concentrating all hatred on a single foe to join far removed groups 
under one banner (Hoffer, 1951). Bin Laden successfully copied this design by 
presenting the United States as enemy number one. Anti-West and anti-Israeli rhetoric 
only fueled the hatred poised at the United States. This was a key tactic to transforming 
local radical groups into one pan-Islamic association. In February 1997, bin Laden 
aJll10unced the creation of new alliance of terrorist organizations as the World Islamic 
Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (Williams 2002). The new organization was 
evidence ofhis accomplishment and symbolic for the even more widespread success of 
recruitment. 
Recruitment 
As Director of External Affairs Abu Zubaydah, the sole Palestinian within bin 
Laden's iJll1er circle, was in charge of recruitment (Bin Laden's Martyrs for the Cause 
2001). AJ Qaeda had one paramount qualification for every member-they must be 
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Muslim. Bin Laden and his constituents do not believe that one can protect Islam and 
Muslims, and defend the goals and secrets without being a believing Muslim (Declaration 
of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants Military Series 2002). Bin Laden dispatched 
thousands of Al Qaeda train.ing camp "graduates to infiltrate other radical groups, 
umversities, mosques, and communities all over the world to gain support for Al Qaeda s 
mission (Gunaratna, 2002). In Germany, Al Qaeda members used amateur videos of 
fighting in Chechnya to win over recruits (Bin Laden's Martyrs for the Cause 2001). 
These efforts attracted a wide range of individuals from middle class 
professionals to petty criminals political firebrands, and economic opportuni ts (Stem, 
2003). AI Qaeda particularly recruited young Muslim men and teenagers who possessed 
nothing but despair. The Middle East was a breeding ground for lslamist radicals due to 
harsh and restrictive governments, frustration from high unemployment rates, and 
poverty. Al Qaeda recruiters lectured the young disenchanted men as to the problems 
created by America through Westernization and spoke of a better life that would come 
after the Western giant was brought to its knees. In other parts of the world recruiters 
targeted ideal prospects by using persuasive tactics that suggested these men "wake up" 
from their "sleep" and return to "Allah, regretting and repenting" (Howlett & Momz, 
2002). Before being admitted as a member, there were fourteen qualifications required: 
knowledge of Islam; ideological commitment; maturity; self-sacrifice; discipline; secrecy 
and concealment of infonnation; good. health; patience' unflappability· intelligence and 
insight· caution and prudence; truthfulness and wisdom; the ability to observe and 
analyze; and the ability to act (Gunaratna, 2002). AI Qaeda's goals and beliefs were 
easily indoctrinated in young disgruntled Muslim men through training. 
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Training 
Unknown thousands have gone through Al Qaeda' s training camps most of 
which went back to other radical groups to spread the knowledge or becom lone olves. 
Only a few thousand were invited to join Al Qaeda. These training camps began with the 
help of and the enlistment of the original mujahidan from the Afghan War with the 
Soviets (Miller. Stone, & Mitchell, 2002). Before his death Abu Hafs al-Misri (A.K.A. 
Muhammad Atef) controlled the military training for AI Qaeda (Bin Laden's Martyrs for 
the Cause, 2001). Primary training camps were located in Mghanistan. Three courses 
were taught in AI Qaeda's training camps: basic, advanced and specialized. Basic 
curriculum included guerrilla warfare and Islamic Law; advanced included learning 
techniques of the use of explosives, assassination techniques and heavy weapons; and 
specialized training included surveillance, counter-surveillance, forging and adapting 
identity documents, and conducting maritime and vehicle suicide attacks (Gunaratna, 
2002). The most extensive information regarding Al Qaeda's training comes from actual 
manuals obtained by government officials. Secret service police in Belgium recovered the 
first copy of the manual in 1997. That same year the CIA received a copy from the secret 
service of Jordan (Gunaratna 2002). 
The most widely used manual Encyclopedia of the Mghan Jihad a multi-volume 
7,000 page manual. The fIrst ten volumes include tactics; security intelligence' 
handguns; first aid; explosives; grenades and mines' tanks· manufacturing of arms and 
explosives; topography and land surveys; and weapons. An eleventh chapter was added 
later which includes chemical and biological warfare and is only given to select members. 
The Encyclopedia was modeled off of British and U.S. military manuals especially the 
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American F-M (Field Manual) (Guanaratna, 2002). The manual was written so that 
people who are not well educated can understand. The Enc clopedia goes into great 
specifics covering urban non-urban mountain and jungle terrains. Volumes are broken 
down even further for example, a section on tactics entitled "The effect of desert 
conditions on operations" is sub-divided to include sections on: advance attack defense, 
withdrawal, movement and transport, shortage of water, and supplies and maintenance 
(Islamic Radicalism: the financial and European network of Osarna bin Laden, p.l; as 
cited in Gunaratna, 2002). The manual also moves up in scale from tiny objects to how 
to bomb buildings, statues, and bridges, and then to how to shoot down aircrafts carrying 
Stinger missiles. 
The Declaration of Jihad against the Country s Tyrants, Military Series is another 
manual used in Al Qaeda's training. An experienced instructor of the Islamic Group of 
Egypt between 1993 and 1994 wrote this manual. The eighteen chapters in this manual 
inelude: general introduction; necessary qualifications and characteristic of the 
organizations members; counterfeit currency and forged documents' organization of 
military bases, apartments and other places; concealment, means of communication and 
transportation; training' weapons; measures related to buying and transporting them; 
member safety; security plans; definition of special operations; and espionage. 
Religious training included Islamic Law; Islamic history and contemporary 
Islamic policy' how to preserve one's faith when interacting with non-believers; Islamic 
jurisprudence; how to wage jihad; the history of the Prophet Muhammad' and other 
information on Islam to be used to defend one's beliefs (Gunaratna 2002). Parts of the 
Koran had to be memorized. 
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While a great deal ofAl Qaeda' training was dedicated to pby ical and 
intelligence skills Ai Qaeda put great empbasis on th p cbological side of training. 
This training was the most potent force bin Laden conducted (Bin Laden s Martyrs for 
the Cause 2001). Members endured interrogation and torture in order to be ready for 
what awaited them if they were caught. Still the main rea on for the psychological 
programming was to create reliable members who would commit to action once called 
upon. Mental preparedness was critical when it came to executing strategically planned 
operations such as that of 9111. Martyrdom was distinguisbed as the ultimate sacrifice to 
Allah' a sacrifice that would be rewarded in the after life. 
Every tactical and strategic piece of education became routine from intensive 
training; every idea and belief provided by bin Laden and the Koran' and every actiorr­
from communication to plotting a terrorist attack-breathed life by the dreams and goals 
of the group. Al Qaeda did not leave out the smallest detail. 
Support of Islamic Law 
One of the goals of Al Qaeda was to argue that Islamic Law was the only divinely 
entitled rule of the land; a structure that was taken away from Muslims when the British 
and French powers forced secularism on tbe Middle East. The people of the Middle East 
divided themselves into for and against sides of secularism. Those in favor of a ecular 
state insist that Islam and nationalism can coexist together. Opponent to a secular state 
argue that secularism gradually develops anti-religious tendencies, erosion of morality, 
and rampant corruption. The suggest that Islamic states or Khilafah state as it used to 
be known adhere only to Islamic Law. (Engineer, 2000) Al Qaeda encouraged those 
who oppose a secular state by focusing in on the oited States as the root of evil. Ai 
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Qaeda claimed that the United States number one goal was to be the onl superpower and 
have complete and total domination of the world well into th future. Corrupt and power 
hungry non-believers who had embraced secularism, claimed AI Qaeda, constructed this 
goal. 
To gain support of Muslims allover the world, Al Qaeda assigned a high priority 
to special operations in the belief that they boosted Islamic morale (Gunaratna, 2002). By 
constantly referring to Allah in writing and in speeches, bin Laden expressed that the 
actions Al Qaeda was taking were the divine wish of Allah to humiliate the non-believers 
of the West. Al Qaeda's leadership members and followers truly believed that the 
were creating a new Islamic Universal Order (Gunaratna, 2002). They wanted to rebuild 
the empire that once belonged to the Middle East. Al Qaeda was impressing on Muslims 
that the way in which they rose to the most powerful nation in history was through the 
Khilafah, the Islamic ruling system (Lintner, 2002). In an article by Farah (2001) there 
was evidence that Arabs were more and more hifting away from secular nationalism in 
recent years and a growing number of Islamic activist were embracing the teachings of 
Islam. Muslims began challenging the Westernized thought of daily lives and affairs. 
Al Qaeda s reiteration of past events fueled the flame of the new Islamic 
revivalism. Middle Easterners were reminded of incidents such as the U. S. abandonment 
after the Soviet-Afghan War, the .S.'s strong support for Israel the stationing of troops 
in Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf War. All of these events left a bad taste in the mouths of 
many Arabs and Al Qaeda knew how to play into Arabs frustrations. This was evident 
in. bin Laden's 1998 Declaration of Jihad against the .S. where he expressed: 
"For more than seven years the United States is occupying the lands ofIslam in 
the holiest of its territories Arabia plundering'its riches, overwhelming its rulers 
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humiliating it people threatening its neighbors and using its bases in the 
peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic 
peoples ....Despite the immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people at the 
hands of the Crusader-Jewish alliance and in spite of the appalling number of 
dead, exceeding a million the Americans nevertheless in spite of all this are 
trying once more to repeat this dreadful slaughter. It seems that the long blockade 
following after a fierce war, the dismembennent and the destruction are not 
enough for them. So they come again today to destroy what remains of this people 
and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.... While the purposes of the Americans 
in these wars are religious and economic they also serve the petty state of the 
Jews, to divert attention from their occupation of Jerusalem and their killing of 
Muslims in it " (Lewis, 1998 p. 14). 
Al Qaeda made an art out oftargeting the United States and insisting that no good could 
come from such a ruthless, corrupt, egocentric state bent on dominating the world. 
Through globalization, past events and most importantly Islam Al Qaeda wove a 
convincing argument that getting back to an Islamic ruling system was the only path of 
the future and all Muslim should unite to see this vision to the finish. 
Sufficient Condition 
The sufficient condition is a critical component within the factors that both propel 
and restrain forces surrounding the attacks of 9/11. To use an analogy, if the necessary 
conditions were TNT, then the sufficient condition would be the fu e. In other words 
necessary conditions--globalization financial assets, leadership techniques, and support 
for Islamic Law-were the building blocks through which Al Qaeda increased its 
strength. moved forward, and facilitated the attacks against the U.S.; but "true believer' 
status-- the sufficient condition-- was imperative to actually completing the mission. 
Without members who were willing to give their lives to the greater cause, Al Qaeda 
would not have successfully accomplished its goal of killing so many people and 
ultimately becoming the agent ofchange for American security. 
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True Believer Status 
In 1951, far before the creation of Al Qaeda Eric Hoffer wrote the book True 
Believer. Hoffer centered his true believer research on associates involved in mass 
movements. Hoffers examples of true believers include people involved in the French 
Revolution Lenin and the Bolsheviks and Hitler's azi anny. Conclusion made by 
Hoffer in his true believer research can be extended to Al Qaeda's terrorist group. The 
true believers can be divided into two groups: leaders and followers. 
Leaders 
Although first inclination would suggest that all leaders qualify as having true 
believer status this is not necessarily the case. There are leaders equipped with the 
necessary skill that may be driven more by power than by a true belief. True believing 
leaders include the originators of the belief and those, which can carry that belief to an 
audience of supporters. Hoffer (1951) describes the leaders as ' men of words". 
Differentiation between the true believer leader and other leader manifests in the use of 
spoken and written words. In the life cycle of a movement Hoffer suggests that the 
creation usually takes the talents and temperament of a fanatic, but fmal con olidation 
results in the work of a typical man. Clerics scholars and philosopher whose high 
intellect produces eloquent words commonly fill these positions. 
Analysis within Islamic fundamentalism provides a similar leadership pattern. In 
1929, Hassan al-Banna-a schoolteacher--organized the Muslim Brotherhood to oppose 
Islamic Reformation. AI-Banna relayed his vision of a return to the original form and 
spirit of Islam. Sayyid Qutb was also considered one of the most influential Islamists in 
recent history. The so-called '<father of modern Islamic fundamentalism' , was a top 
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member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb 1964 dre a great following after he wrote 
Simpost on the Road maintaining that all Chri tians and Je s were destined for Hell. 
Both were exceptional motivators through their use of words et in two different a s. 
al-Banna assembled the group through his revivalist dreams and the goal of forging a 
guerilla anny (Williams 2002). Sayyid Qutb displayed the characteristics of the tyJical 
man of words by writing influential pieces that transmitted the message as a long-term 
goal for Islamists (Williams). 
Bin Laden serves as an example ofthe typical man who has gained a common 
bond with his followers because of his modest lifestyle. His messages are conducted 
with a calm and quiet tone that exudes both patience and strength. The man ofwords 
seeks to undermine established institutions discredit those in power, and weaken 
prevailing beliefs (Hoffer, 1951). Bin Laden's fatwa statements in 1996 and 1998 exhibit 
such messages. Although bin Laden is neither a cleric, scholar nor philosopher, he 
surrounds himself with all three types. 
Those who create a vision and movement, and those who see that vision to it 
fullest potential characterize true believing leaders. True believing leaders differ from 
the followers for even though they are just as resolute in the end goal, they find it 
necessary not to engage in fatalistic actions unless a last resort for the good of the 
organization. Bin Laden has seen only limited amount of battle himself. His gift of 
words demands that his duty be to inspire the masses rather than risk his life in a singular 
event. 
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Followers 
The followers are the self-sacrificing member of the group. The 19 hijackers 
who took their own lives as well as thousands of others on 9/11 fit the criteria of true 
believers. True believers possess some potent doctrine~ have faith in an infallible leader 
and a faith in the future which creates an omnipotent environment. Extravagant hope and 
faith in the future alone can generate the most reckless daring. 
Hoffer describes this faith in the future as a "millennial component." Relaying 
the idea of faith in the future was a crucial point for Al Qaeda to get across to its true 
believers. This impression was left through several writings that the members were 
expected to read. Miller Stone, & Mitchell (2002) give a vivid detail of how the 19 
hijackers might have tempered their fears the night before the attacks occurred. The 
authors write about a five-page manual written specifically for final prayer, cleansing, 
and to rid oneself of lingering fears. Direct quotes taken from the manual analyzed by 
Miller, Stone, and Mitchell. include: "Remember that anything that happens to you could 
never be avoided and what did not happen to you could never have happened to you" 
(p.312). The manual reminded these suicide terrorists that women of paradise awaited 
them in the next life. Anticipation that fears would resurface up to the very end the 
manual reminded the hijackers that the only fear they should accept is the fear in Allah. 
Quoted form the Koran, "Fear them not but fear Me, if you are believers" (p. 312). It is 
the responsibility of the leaders of the organization to kindle this extravagant hope. 
For Al Qaeda, the true believers were essentiaL Bin Laden and his cohorts were 
keenly aware of this' members angled propaganda and focused recruitment on finding 
those susceptible to becoming "true believers'. The Middle East was a prime location for 
Al Qaeda 92 
discovering such characters. Hoffer describes those people who have an innernlost 
craving for a new life· a rebirth of sorts as the ultimate candidates for this true believer 
status. This craving is the key to a reckless giving of oneself. One factor that promotes 
self-sacrifice is the discontent for the present state of life. Most radicals and reactionaries 
loathe the present and invite change for the future. Hoffer explains that those who fear 
the future tend to cling to the present, while faith in the future renders change accessible. 
The second crucial factor for self-sacrifice is the desire of what is missing. People are 
less willing to die for what they have than what is wished for. According to Ibn Haibban 
the ideal mujahid is the one who strives against himself (Jihad Fixation 2001). When 
one hates himself and his position in life he is weD-minded to give himself to beyond his 
physical being (Caillet, 1944). To ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must be stripped of 
his individual identity and distinctness. 
For Al Qaeda members, they were assimilated into a collective body of ideology 
and faith. This commitment freed its members from conceptual problems. They ar one 
for Allah; the faith became a process through which the individual ceases to be himself 
and becomes part of something eternal. The holy writ was presented as the one and only 
truth. A true believer must not base his conclusions on personal experience or 
observations, but should seek the absolute truth with the heart rather than the mind. In 
the Shariah, jihad comprises the supreme personal sacrifice in order to raise the word of 
Allah to aid his fight (Jihad Fixation, 2001). 
No other group has invested so much time into programming its fighters for death. 
Instructors are dispatched to the West to indoctrinate new members. Psychological 
training is considered far more important than battlefield or terrorist-eombat training 
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when it comes to executing the mission (Gunaratna 2002). Al Qaeda deliberatel 
emphasizes the role of these true believers. The word "suicide" is replaced with 
"martyrdom' ~ which is assigned the highest authority. In Islamic usage the term 
"martyrdom" is nonnally interpreted to mean death in a jihad and the reward is eternal 
bliss~ whi.ch is described in some detail in early religious texts. Suicide is another matter. 
Classical Islam in all its different fonns and versions has never permitted suicide. This is 
seen as a mortal sin, and brings eternal punishment in the form of the unending repetition 
of the act by which the suicide killed himself (Lewis, 2001). Al Qaeda found a loop­
hole for making self-sacrificing killing machines by maintaining that killing and dying 
for Allah are the ultimate sacrifices that any Muslim willing to take on such a mission 
will be rewarded. On a tactical level, the willingness of its fighters to die enabled Al 
Qaeda to drive fear into the enemy. The 9/11 hijackers military training was little 
compared to their psychological conditioning. These men were picked because the true 
believer mindset that existed within each of them was considered an operational priority. 
Weaknesses of the Restraining Forces 
The relationship between the opposing forces is a give and take process. As long 
as each side is continuously pushing and pulling the tension stays relatively balanced. 
Yet, in those instances when one side is clearly dominant over the threshold is crossed 
and change has occurred. The imbalance between the two forces is a product of both the 
dominating propelling forces and the weakness of the restraining forces. As in the case 
presented here, restraining forces are not altogether non-existent. Instead, restraining 
forces did exist but were not sufficiently kept in check with the level ofpower the 
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propelling forces were emitting. The following detail the weaknes es exercised the 
restraining forces. 
After the shock of the attacks wore off, citizens at an levels of society began 
questions as to how this could have happened, and wh the government had no prior 
warning of such an attack. Investigation into pre-9lll intelligence gathered by the FBI 
CIA, and even the NSA determined that there were agency failures-both physical and 
systemic-that left the agencies open to weaknesses as witnessed on 9/11. Robert 
Mueller, FBI Director; George Tenet, CIA Director and to a lesser degree General 
Michael Hayden, NSA Chief, came under intense criticism after an 800 pag inquiry 
conducted jointly by the Senate Select Committee and the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence uncovered evidence of missed clues and botched 
) opportunities. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham, D-Fla. stated" 
There were lapses, in my judgment, by all three agencies" (Diamond & Kiely, 2002, p. 
7). Pre-91l1, there was information readily available that suggested a terrorist attack on 
U.S. soil was a very likely possibility in the coming future. In 1999 and 2000, three 
commissions issued reports detailing information about the new threat that terrorism 
posed and the immediate action needed to counter it. All three reports concluded that the 
openness of the U.S. and the inefficiencies of the government bureaucracies posed 
serious vulnerabilities. Such warnings were unheeded for at least three reasons. 
First the international terrorism units within the major agencies lacked the needed 
manpower and technical support. Staff translator shortages made it difficult to decipher 
all of the "chatter" being recorded (Diamond & Kiely 2002). On 91l 0, intercepts were 
received from Al Qaeda operatives boasting in Arabic "The match begins tomorrow" and 
Ai Qaeda 95 
"Tomorrow is Zero Hour' , but the intercepts were not translated until 9/12 (Diamond & 
Kiely, 2002). The Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) in ew York City had been culled 
down to a handful of people and requests for more agents were alway denied with the 
only explanation being that there were more pressing matters in other divisions that 
needed the manpower (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell 200). Likewise at the CIA there was a 
shortage of agents on hand to tackle international terrorism a growing problem that 
started in the early 1990 s. As the Cold War thawed, the government believed that the 
threat against the U.S. was thawing as well. In 1993,80 percent of seasoned agents were 
forced into early retirement while the majority of new agents were based at U.S. 
headquarters rather than overseas posts (Waller, 1993). Many disagreed with the 
administration's choice. Noel Koch, the Pentagon's top counterterrorism specialist in the 
Reagan administration, argued ten years ago that in order to fight terrorism operatives 
have to be overseas and by relieving the seasoned operatives with this experience the 
institutional memory wi.lI be erased (Waller). But Koch and others who opposed the 
reduction did not win in the end. Intelligence agencies became understaffed and 
overworked which led to many oversights. 
Reuel Marc Gerecht (2001), a fonner Near East Division operative, criticized the 
CIA for its lack of detail and arrogance in handling operatives abroad. Gerecht stated 
that even back during the Soviet-Afghan War there was never a team of Afghan experts 
developed, and that an operative with some Afghan language proficiency did not arrive 
until 1987 close to the war's ending. Even in July 2001, when this article came out 
Gerecht claimed that the CIA had no truly qualified operative that coul.d speak an Arabic 
language. Gerecht also added that when Robert Baer a Middle East case officer for 20 
Al Qaeda 96 
years suggested in the 1990 s, that the CIA developed cadres of operati es specializing 
in one or two countries and gathered intelligence in Afghanistan and neighboring 
countries the response of the CIA was that the Cold War was over, Afghanistan was too 
far away, and radical Islam was an abstract idea (Gerecht). 
The second reason warnings were unheeded involved a lack of cooperation 
between the agencies. When CIA and FBI analysts had to work at the other agency it 
was referred to as a "hostage exchange program" (Diamond, 2002). One of the biggest 
examples of the failure of communication that the joint inquiry highlighted was the 
knowledge the CIA had of Nawaq Alharnzi and Khalid Al- Midhar two suspected Al 
Qaeda members who later became hijackers in the 9/11 attacks. The CIA knew these 
men were in the U.S. and did not share the information with the FBI (Joint Inquiry into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 
11,2002). Another example was the knowledge the INS had about two ofthe 9/11 
hijackers entering into the country. Again the FBI was never given this knowledge 
(Diamond & Kiely, 2002). Further, the State Department charges that the CIA and FBI 
never issued one list that could be used to identify potential terrorist entering the 
country. After the attacks occurred, the blame game was under way between the different 
agencies emphasizing the weakness critical to the success of the Homeland ecurity plan. 
Representative Jane Hannan D- Calif., suggested that the biggest obstacle to overcome 
in reorganizing the agencies to be more succinct is the turf problem (Diamond & Kiely). 
Finally, there were clear and obvious oversights and missed opportunities that 
intelligence agencies missed. From 1998 to the summer of 2001, intelligence reports 
indicated that there was a steady stream of information being gathered to suggest the 
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possibility of terrorist attacks within the U.S. During the summer of2001 some in the 
intelligence community described the increase in information as unprecedented. The 
NSA reported thirty-three communications by terrorists describing an imminent attack in 
2001 that would occur with little or no warning. Warnings were issued by various 
intelligence agencies, yet no specificity as time or place was ever irrlicated' therefore, 
Senior U.S. government officials never had a sense of urgency. Agencies sent out 
numerous non-specific warnings while never bringing all of the information together to 
be analyzed collaboratively. In addition, some infonnation never received follow up 
(Joint Inquiry, 2002). 
The FBI was aware of communication between the hijackers and individuals the 
FBI had been watching, but the communications were not deemed terrorist-related. On 
July 10,2001, an agent from the Phoenix field office sent an electronic communication to 
agents in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU), the Usama Bin Laden Unit (VBLD), 
and the International Terrorism Squad that expressed concern about a coordinated plan 
by Bin Laden to send students to the U.S. for aviation training. The agent suggested that 
all flight schools in the U.S. be checked. This communication wa never responded to by 
any of the individuals to whom it was sent (Joint Inquiry, 2002). One of the most 
publicized of these incidents was the way in which the FBI headquarters handled the 
arrest of Zacarias Moussouai. After a Minnesota flight school instructor called 
authorities about the suspicious behavior, Mousouai was detained. The field agents in 
Minnesota asked for permission to gather information off of Mousouai's computer and 
were denied access from superiors because it was felt that there was not probable cause 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Miller, Stone & Mitchell, 2002' 
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Joint Inquiry, 2002). It was not until after 9/11 that an connection between Mousouai 
and the hijackers were made. 
Regardless of the repeated warnings by experts that a terrorist attack in the U.S. 
may likely occur, possibly by a suicide hijacking no specific evidence existed of the 9/1 I 
attacks found by the Joint inquiry. However the point of failure is that the infoID1ation 
was never considered for its collective significance. If these agencies had shared 
infonnation and looked at all of the information within their scope as a whole, the 
connections may have been made. The ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, suggested that a variety of intelligence 
could have forewarned the U.S. of the attacks. "If brought together to a central place 
with great analytic ability, these would have provided more than an outline of the coming 
attacks", he stated (Diamond & Kiely, 2002 p.6). 
The FBI and CIA, as wen as other agencies, have admitted to failures 
prior to the attacks. The attacks of 9/11 woke up the government and shed light on the 
holes present in the current security net. Such failures coupled with the success oftbe 
terrorists plan created a mandatory need to reorganize and strengthen the intelligence 
agencies. Protecting the homeland and stopping the terrorist became the focu of 
security agencies. Success could not be assured by the out-of-date and fallible system 
that had been in place. Each agency made it their mission to reinvest in international 
terrorism, overhaul old technology and commit to inter-agency cooperation. 
Chapter Summary 
Al Qaeda s pre-attack stages built up over several years. One of Osarna sold 
associates Omar Abdel Hakim, stated: "Osama represents the method" (Holy War on the 
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World 2001, p. 20). Bin Laden stood at the center ofthe organizational monstrosity. bin 
Laden's commitment funds, religious devotion and determination created the weaving 
of the terrorist network. But it was the construction of the interdependent forces that 
enabled Al Qaeda to transfonn itself from just another terrorist group to the archetype for 
all terrorist groups to follow. The past has been written. Al Qaeda will always be known 
as the international terrorist group that committed the shocking attack on U.S. soil and 
woke the superpower up from its long and isolated sleep. The U.S. did little in stopping 
the creation of Al Qaeda's network. Warnings went unnoticed and unheeded. The 
efforts being administered to deter terrorism versus the efforts taken by Al Qaeda in 
support of terrorism proved unbalanced. The defrning moment was cataclysmic events 
of September 11, 2001, knovm as the "threshold point"., in which it was revealed that Ai 
Qaeda's interdependent conditions proved more powerful propellants than the deterrents 
responsible for keeping terrorism forces at bay. 
Chapter 5 discusses the results in the framework of post-9/Il. According to 
Lewin's model once a threshold point is met restraining forces will be enacted to counter 
the dominance of the propelling forces. A variety of actions were chosen by the U.S. 
government to eliminate terrorism. The reason for a multi-front approach stemmed from 
Al Qaeda's use of a number ofmethods (ie. propelling forces) to reach its status as a 
globally infiltrated, powerful terrorist group. Al Qaeda did not use only a financial 
design to create its vast network of cells around the world. Instead, AI Qaeda exploited 
components from globalization, the financial industry, effective leadership and 
organization strategies, the cultural and religious ideologies of the Muslim people, and 
their psyches. Therefore, the U.S. government needed to strike back at each component 
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that Al Qaeda was using if it was to b a successful campaign against terrorism. Through 
the collection of information gathered on actions that have transpired after 9/iI, the 
researcher argues that such restraining forces have been initiated and are currently 
working to decrease the power that the propelling forces had generated before the attacks 
occurred. 
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Chapter 5 
September 11,2001 
8:46 AM Plane crashes into north towe·r of the World Trade Center 
9:03 AM Plane crashes into south tower of the World Trade Center 
9:17 AM The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shuts down all New York 
City area airports. 
9:21 AM The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) halt all flights atU.S. 
airports. It is the fIrst time in history that air traffic has been halted 
nationwide. 
9:38 AM Plane crashes into the Pentagon. Evacuation begins immediately. 
9:45 AM The White House Evacuates. 
10:05 AM The south tower of the World Trade Center collapses. 
10:10 AM A portion of the Pentagon collapses. 
10:10 AM Plane crashes in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. 
10:22 AM The State and Justice Departments as well as the World Bank are 
evacuated. 
10:28 AM The World Trade Center s north tower collapses. 
10:45 AM All Federal buildings in Washingto~ D.C. are evacuated. 
1:44 PM Five warships and two aircraft carriers are ordered to leave the U.S. Naval 
Station in Norfolk, Virginia to protect the East Coast. 
4:10 PM Building 7 of the World Trade Center collapses. 
-U.S. Department of State, 2002 
The events of September 11, 2001 will forever be regarded as the "critical 
incident" that changed the way the United tates understood and dealt with terrorism. 
Metaphorically, the critical incident refers to the point in time in which the tides change. 
In Lewin's force fIeld analysis, the change in direction signifies th emergence of 
restraining forces within the model once a certain threshold has been crossed. Al 
Qaeda's pre-9fl1 propelling forces were not necessarily unstoppable, but were allowed to 
continue until a critical incident-the attacks of 9/11--demonstrated that such an 
imbalance between the opposing sides existed that restraining forces had to be mobilized 
to shift the power once again. In this model, the restraining forces constituted a multi­
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pronged approach initiated b the nited State after being attacked b Al Qaeda 
terrorists. 
Post 9/11 Restraining Forces 
Following the attacks the U.S. government put into place a plan of action to 
combat terrorism that would draw upon five different but simultaneously utilized fronts: 
homeland security actions, financial actions diplomatic actions, military actions and 
investigative actions. The government's concept of a multi-front approach is a structural 
example ofLewin's restraining forces. To counter the social conditions that had enabled 
AI Qaeda to reach the critical incident, opposing conditions had to be enacted. Figure 1 
demonstrates the hypothesized post 9/11 conditions in which the balance of forces have 
shifted and restraining conditions now outweigh the propelling forces. 
Figure 5.1 
Post 9/11 Conditions 
Post 9/11 Conditions 
LEWIN'S FORCE FIELD ANALYSIS 
Propelling Forces include: Restraining Forces include: 
Necessary Conditions Necessary Condition 
Globalization 
Financial Assets + 
Protecting the Homeland 
.......1---- Military Force 
Strategic Leadership' Freezing Finances 
Islamic Law .­ ~ Cooperation Among Countries 
Sufficient Conditions ufficient Condition 
True Believers Po ular 0 inion 
The necessary and sufficient conditions that make up the restraining forces are 
dynamically pieced together to. on. the one hand, explain the web of defense the U.S. is 
using to regain the upper hand on terrorism and on the other, to demonstrate another the 
interconnectedness of the propelling and restraining forces. The .S. government aimed 
to tear down the financial stability that Al Qaeda had built up over the past decade. The 
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restraining forces used to do this were the legislative action taken to freeze the accounts 
of Al Qaeda and AI Qaeda supporters, and the cooperative efforts of countries in a united 
effort to combat terrorism. The exploitation of globalization in its endeavor to destroy 
the U.S. included both the technological capabilities and the frustrations of marginalized 
people. To counter this exploitation, coalition forces have joined together to trace the use 
of technology and to send a message to the citizens oftbe world condenming the acts of 
terrorism. The backlash of human emotion has also helped to curb the ability of Al 
Qaeda to recruit frustrated young Muslims. The strategic leadership of Al Qaeda has 
been met with a new organizational structure of government agencies. Now int lligence 
sharing among U.S. agencies as well as with agencies in other countries allows 
infonnation to be spread rapidly to take out terrorist cells all over the world. 
Finally, the true believer status has been restrained first by military action. 
Operation Enduring Freedom exhibited the power that the U.S. was willing to use to deter 
terrorism. For some Al Qaeda terrorists this served as a wake-up call from the illusion 
that Al Qaeda had been feeding them. The U.S. was not the paper tiger that Al Qaeda 
had insisted it was. Still many have remained loyal. The coalition remains strong and 
united to continue to flush out the faithful terrorists detennined to see Al Qaeda s mission 
carried through. A detailed look at the connections between the forces, unveils a network 
structure. Rather than being linear in nature the structure of a network allows not only a 
multi-pronged level of attack, but also a reinforced structure because more than one 
restraining force can be a deterrent for a propelling force. It is also important to note that 
these conditions were not overnight manifestations of items never used before, but rather 
mechanisms that had low priority until it was proven absolutely necessary by the attacks 
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of 9/11. For more than fifty years government supported intelligence organizations have 
operated with the mission of protecting the U.S. from harm. Unfortunately these 
agencies have also carried weaknesses detected and exploited by AI Qaeda members. 
The reasons for this are complicated but the failure to hone in on and correct these 
internal problems were obviously catastrophic. 
Necessary Conditions 
Protecting the Homeland 
The United States came to terms with the idea of being a high-profile target in the 
wake of the attacks. No longer able to deem terrorism as a peripheral threat the United 
States had to face the enemy head on (Woods, 2003). The Federal government defines 
homeland security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 
U.S., reduce Americas vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover 
from attacks that do occur" (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, p.2). 
Departments and agencies immediately took step to strengthen and secure the homeland 
(Strengthening Homeland Security Since 9/11, 2003). Following the attacks multiple 
national strategies were created to serve as guidelines for dealing with terrorism issues. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security was a document created in July 2002, that 
emphasized the prevention of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. This strategy compliments the 
National Security Strategy of the United States which was set forth to guarantee the 
sovereignty and independence of the United States. As mutually supportive documents, 
both provide the principles with which the executive branch and other departments and 
agencies follow. 
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Listed under the above two headings are other guideline that pertain to specific 
areas. These guidelines include: 
•	 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism defines the war plan against 
international terrorism; the ational Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction coordinates efforts to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass 
destruction. 
•	 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace outlines initiatives to secure
 
infonnation technology.
 
•	 The National J'v1oney Laundering Strategy provides the aims for cutting off the 
flow of illegal money to fund terrorist and criminal activity. 
•	 The National Defense Strategy details priorities for our most powerful security 
instrument. 
•	 The National Drug Control Strategy aims to combat drug smuggling and 
consumption (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002). 
Each document serves a preparatory purpose by setting up a "how to proceed' 
plan for various sectors in the case that an attack should occur. In addition to the 
national strategy guidelines, the government engineered an anti-terrorism framework. 
"Defense-in depth" is the phrase used to describe the United States framework to 
defend America and deter terrorism. The model boast four concentric rings of defense: 
the outermost ring consists of diplomatic military, and intelligence organizations 
operating overseas with a goal of pre-empting attacks on U.S. soil; the next ring includes 
organizations such as the Customs Service, immigration and Naturalization Service, and 
the u.S .. Coast Guard-- newly installed under the Depan:n:ent of Homeland Security-to 
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protect the borders and flow of migration in and out of the .S.; the third ring includes 
Federal, state, and local law enforcement 'first responder that operate within the U.S. 
to reduce vulnerability to perilous situations; and the innermost circle includes the private 
sector and Federal agencies that playa critical role in safeguarding the ke physical 
infrastructures (Perl 2003). 
The attacks left many government officials as well as American citizens 
wondering why America was attacked without warning. After the Joint Inquiry revealed 
weaknesses and the agencies were publicly criticized, strengthening through 
reorganization ensued. President Bush also created a new Homeland Security 
Department (DHS) that would serve as the agency responsible for overseeing the 
protection and preparedness of the U.S. infrastructure. The following information details 
how the U.S. has upgraded and reorganized its agencies to ensure a seamless web of 
defense. 
The Network 
The U.S. anti-terrorism defense consists of departments and agencie working as 
nodes in a connected network. Sawyer (2003), an expert in defense policies and a 
researcher for the Journal of Homeland Security, states that the U.S. agencies must not 
only create the "dots' -collection of data-but also connect the dots by sharing and 
creating the knowledge centered around the' dots". The PATRlOT Act of 2001, was a 
central piece oflegislative action to accomplish exactly what Sawyer described. The four 
tenets of the PATRIOT Act include: facilitating the sharing ofinforrnation and 
cooperation among government agencies; allowing investigators to use tools in a pre­
emptive manner against suspected terrorists; update new laws to reflect new threats' and 
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intensify the punishment for those who commit terrorist crime (Department of Justice 
2001). The PATRIOT Act supported the actions the intelligence community needed to 
diminish and deny terrorist activity. Re-emphasizing anti-terrorism divisions 
reorganizing agencies, upgrading technology sharing infonnation between agencies, and 
having a wider range ofpre-emptive power were objectives the government intended to 
attain in order to build a network-- much like that of Al Qaeda's-that would be more 
resourceful and prevention oriented. The National Security Council (NSC) advises the 
President on national security issues and foreign policy. 
Within this framework is the Counterterrorism Security which is composed of 
representatives from the Departments of State Defense, Justice Homeland Security and 
the CIA and FBI. These departments both collectively and independently work to combat 
terrorism. The Department of State is responsible for all U.S. Government efforts to 
combat terrorism overseas. The Department of Defense is responsible for all military 
operations and works closely with the CIA on covert operations. The Departm nt of 
Justice is the lead agency for all law enforcement and criminal matters related to 
terrorism both domestically and internationally. Efforts to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from terrorist attacks within the .S. is the job of the Department of Homeland 
Security. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the capabilities for both domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement and is housed under the Department of Defense. 
Finally, the Central Intelligence Agency is an independent agency that conducts research 
develops and deploys high-level technology for intelligence purposes, and analyzes 
intelligence infonnation. In 2003, the President created the ne Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center to physically house staff from the DHS FBI, and CIA, as well a 
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work with the other departments as needed. This Center will integrate and analyze all 
terrorist threat-related information collected in the U.S. and over ea . The following 
paragraphs details what each of the network component ha e done to strengthen 
homeland security and diminish the presence of terrorists around the world. 
Department of State 
Through its Counterterrorism Office, the Department of State seeks to gain 
support from foreign countries to combat terrorism around the world. The Office offers 
programs to enhance the capabilities of countries to fight terrorism. The 
Counterterrorism Policy Workshop provides a line of communication between U.S. and 
foreign officials to produce concrete improvements in terror prevention capabilities. The 
Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) has been deployed to over 20 countries in the 
last decade to help timely responses to terrorist attacks. Top Officials (TOPOFF) assist 
in the preparation of top U.S. officials to deal with and respond to incidents of terrorism 
or weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) helps 
countries strengthen border security and stop terrorists before th y can act 
(Counterterrorism Assistance, Capacity Building and Training, 2003). 
Department of Defense 
The role of the Department of Defense in the war on terrorism include executing 
military strikes overseas and maintaining weapons defense for the homeland security. 
Components of the Department that are utilized in the war on terrorism are the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and Defense Intelligence Agenc (DlA). The SA is 
responsible for protecting .S. information systems and producing foreign intelligence. 
Since 9/11 the SA has increased the number of translators to analyze information in 
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other languages (The ationa! ecurity Agency is the arion' cryptologic organization 
2003). DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence. The Agenc 
supports combat missions by providing military intelligence to military planning and 
operations officials. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency provides logistical 
information to military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. and they also collect imagery 
intelligence. 
Department of Justice 
The Department of Justice is responsible for overseeing and coordinating law 
enforcement agencies and in bringing criminals to justice. The Department has brought 
charges against a number of suspected terrorists including the current suspect to be on 
trial Zacarias Mousouai. The Department of Justice also works with international 
governments on extradition issues (Department of Justice). In December 2002 an 
agreement between U.S. and EUROPOL-European law enforcement organization-- that 
enable the exchange of data on terrorists between law enforcement. The U.S. and 
European Union state members also signed the Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance 
Agreements in June 2003. This agreement gives police and prosecutors on both sides of 
the Atlantic new tools to combat terrorism (Counterterrorism Cooperation Fact heet). 
Department ofHomeland Security 
The Department of Homeland Security wa officially established on January 24, 
2003, but the plans had been in the works shortly after the attacks. On ovember 25, 
2002, the President Signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002. This Act consolidated 22 
disparate separate federal agencies, offices and research centers into the Department of 
Homeland Security (perl. 2003). The Department is comprised offive major divisions: 
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Border & Transportation Security' Emergenc) Preparednes & Respon e' cience & 
Technology; lnfonnation Analysis & Infrastructure Protection; and Management. 
The Department of Homeland Security released a detailed list of initiatives that 
have occurred since 9/11. DHS orchestrated and launched Operation Liberty Shield, a 
comprehensive national plan that initiated involvement from multiple agencies and 
departments. Priorities of Operation Liberty Shield include: increased security at borders: 
stronger transportation protections; ongoing measures to disrupt threats against our 
nation' greater protections for critical infrastructure and key assets' increased public 
health preparedness; and federal response resources positioned and ready. The 
Department also takes the lead role in issuing warnings, threat advisories and 
recommended response measures for American safety agencies and citizens. A study 
conducted by the Terrorism Research Center reviewed the actions taken by the U.S. 
govemment--post 9/11--to determine whether or not proper steps were in place to deter 
terrorist attacks. According to the report, one of the most important steps being pursued 
was a higher alert on the nation's air land and sea borders ( trengthening Homeland 
Security Since 9/11,2003). 
Border security initiatives include new tamper resistant visas an enhanced 
lookout system, and requiring almost all applicant to have face-to-face interviews. A 
50% increase in Border Patrol Agents has brought the total to 10 000. A larger agent 
pool has enabled increased examinations and round-the-clock staffing at remote 
crossings. The Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) was developed to provide a computer 
database system that allows quick identity reference of potential terrorists entering or 
leaving a country to border control officials in several different countries. The U.S. 
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signed the Smart: Border Declaration with Canada in 2001 and th U.S.-Mexican Border 
Partnership with Mexico in 2002. Both document enhance joint law enforcement for 
increasing security and protecting borders. The DHS also began operating the Student 
and Exchange Visitor Infonnation System (SEVIS) which tracks foreign students who 
come to the U.S. by making sure they are actually enrolled and attending classes. 
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection-housed in DHS-launched the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) to enhance port security. Forty-six of the world's 
major ports have already or are in negotiations to support CSI. Mobile x-ray units are 
used to detect radiation and scan containers on high-interest vessels entering the U.S. 
Port security patrols have increased to 124,000 since 9/11, which is the largest 
commitment to port security since World War II. The Maritime Transportation Security 
Act of 2002 allows the Coast Guard to require stricter security assessments of ports, 
vessels and facilities. 
The DHS has suspended the Transit Without Visa program (TWQV) as one of the 
ways to cut off access ofterrorists to board airplanes bound for the U.S. Over 48000 
Federal screeners have received training on baggage inspection, which will continue to be 
given to all employees. To alleviate safety concerns aboard plane thousands of Federal 
Air Marshals have been added and are flying on commercial flights more frequently 
cockpit doors have been hardened to prevent a hostile takeover, and pilots who have been 
through the appropriate training have been armed with guns. 
The DHS is also overseeing enhancements in the areas of infrastructure, 
cyberspace protection, and biological and chemical warfare detection. Protecting the 
infrastructure entails securing the physical and cyber-based systems that are vital to 
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national security, economic security and public health and safety. By commurucating 
with the private sector regularly vulnerability assessment tools have been developed and 
many vulnerabilities have been identified. The DHS seeks to eliminate these weaknesse 
and deter terrorist attacks against soft targets. 
In June 2003, the National Cyber Security Division (NC D) was created under 
DHS. Within this division is the Cyber Security Tracking Analysis and Response Center 
that is responsible for examining cyber security incidents and neutralizing damage. 
Recent events dealt with b NCSD include the worms and viruses on the Internet, and 
technical experts responded by developing solutions to terminate the problems. Through 
the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC), NCSD officials provide 
Federal agencies assistance during any critical computer event to reduce the impact and 
damage of the event. The dependence on computer technology today has created another 
target for terrorists. The U.s. has enlisted the assistance of computer experts to diminish 
the threat of a cyberspace attack and to be prepared when destructive incidents occur. 
The Administration also wants to eliminate the threat of an attack by chemical or 
biological weapons. The DRS and other agencies such as the Department ofHealtb and 
Human Services (HHS) are focused on detection, response and research and 
development. After 9111 the National Institute of Health's (NIH) civilian biodefense 
research budget increased from $100 million to $].5 billion. By 2004, the budget will 
increase another $1.6 billion. This money is intended to fund Project BioShield research 
that will develop new countermeasures and permit distribution of treatments quickly in 
times of crisis. The funding will also go to development of new drugs and vaccines to 
fight against threats such as anthrax smallpox and Ebola. So far, 490,000 soldiers and 
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support personnel have been given vaccine against smallpox. The U.S. ha enough 
smallpox vaccine to immunize every person in the U.S. if an attack wer to occur. The 
goals of the DHS are centered on shielding the country and its citizens. By taking actions 
to alleviate weaknesses and predict future terrorist attack scenarios, the DHS continues to 
strengthen the homeland immune system. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
The main concerns of the FBI dramatically changed after the attacks. As of 
September 10,2001, there were 535 international terrorism agents located around the 
world and 82 at the FBI headquarters. On September 12,2001, 7,000 FBI agents were 
reassigned from other areas of the organization (Mueller, 2003). In addition to 
cooperative initiatives that have taken place between intelligence agencies, intra-agency 
coordination has increased. Within the U.S. two important task forces have been 
established. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) consist oflaw enforcement 
officers, FBI agents, and other federal agents who work together to investigate and deter 
terrorism (Federal Bureau of Investigation). This task force was created in 1980, but as 
Miller, Stone, and Mitchell (2002) describe the JTTF was slowly withering away prior to 
the attacks. Even after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing the task force struggled 
with a small number of agents. The number of people involved doubled after 9/l ] . 
Today a total of 66 JTTF's operate nationwide with 2,300 personnel (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation). In October 2001 the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) 
was created under the direction ofPresident Bush. Representatives of the FBI, 
Immigration and Naturalization Servlce the Customs Service and other federal agencies 
combine their expertise to prevent terrorist suspects from entering the .S. In January 
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2003, the FTTIF had identified 0 er 200 terrorist susp ct (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation). 
In the two years since 9/11, the FBI has substantiall progressed it efforts in 
terrorism especially in intelligence and infonnation technology. Mueller (2003) stated in 
a speech presented at an ACL conference that "critical to preventing terrorism attacks is 
improving our intelligence capabilities so that we can increase the most important aspect 
of terrorist intelligence information-its predictive value' (p.2). The number of strategic 
analysts has quadrupled to 700 nationwid . They have hired ne\ "report officers"­
highly skilled in collecting intelligence information and transmitting it into the hands of 
those who need it-to man the new Intelligence Reports Offices (Bush to Create Terrorist 
Threat Integration Center 2003). The Counterterrorism Watch Center is a 24-7 global 
command center for gathering and managing all domestic and foreign terrorism threats. 
The FBI has responded to over 3,000 terrorist threats since 9/11 through the Center. 
Keeping the flow of communication open between th diffi rent unit is not only a 
physical mandate but also a technological one a well. Implementation of a revolutionary 
new data management system has made it possible to shar information instantly with the 
CIA, Department of Homeland ecurity, and other agencies when deemed nece ary 
(Bush to Create Terrorist Threat Integration Center). At 591 sites in the U.S. the FBI has 
deployed a new trilogy network to replace the outdated technology. This new network 
has increased bandwidth which helps agents communicate faster, displays three layers of 
security and will be installing new applications such as the Virtual Case File by 2004 
(Federal Bureau oflnvestigation 2003). 
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Reorganizing and implementation of new technolog reinforce the infrastructure 
ofan organization, yet in the case of homeland security actual deterrence acti ity 
determines the degree to which the improvement efforts are successful. The FBI has 
several items that can be noted as successes against terrorism. Over 260 individuals have 
been charged as a result of terrorist investigations. Terrorist cells in the U.S. have been 
disrupted through FBI investigative work and detention. Six U.S. citizens from Buffalo, 
NY pled guilty to providing materials to AI. Qaeda members and training in Al Qaeda 
camps. Earnest James Ujaama was arrested in Seattle and eventually pled guilty to 
providing material support to the Taliban. In Portland another seven people were 
detained for engaging in a conspiracy to join the fight against coalition forces in 
Afghanistan and supporting the Taliban and AI Qaeda. Two Detroit individuals were 
convicted of supporting Islamic extremists plotting attacks in the U.S., Jordan, and 
Turkey. Individuals who have supported other terrorist groups such as Hizballab have 
been arrested and detained by the FBI in North Carolina, Florida and Virginia (Progress 
Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 2003). In total over 140 convictions and guilty 
pleas have been obtained from efforts displayed by the FBI in cooperation with other 
agencies. Although the intelligence community admits that they are stiU putting the 
puzzle together and much is still to be uncovered at this point the successes outweigh the 
failures. 
Central Intelligence Agency 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) went through its own adjustments in light 
of the attacks. Counterterrorism has been a priority of the CIA for many year . In the 
mid-1980s a series of high-profile terrorist attacks galvanized US policymakers to take 
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the offensive against international terrorism. A task force chaired b then Vice President 
George Bush was fonned in 1986 to address the problem of international terrorism. The 
task force concluded that US Government agencie collected information on terrorism, 
but did not aggressively operate to disrupt terrorist activities. As a result of these 
findings, then Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, created the DCI 
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and directed it to preempt disrupt. and defeat terrorists. 
Yet the ability of Al Qaeda to accomplish its successful attack on American soil suggests 
that the CTC failed to see its objectives all of the way through. Only speculations can be 
made as to the reason of this failure. Politics and bureaucracy red tape may have played a 
part, as well as, a lack of appropriations within the international terrorism operations. 
Since 9/11 the "wall" between the CIA, FBI, and other departments such as the 
Department ofDefense crumbled and cooperation has ensued. Within days of the attacks 
President Bush signed a classified "finding" authorizing the CIA to take all measures in 
pursuing and eliminating Al Qaeda leadership threats. This included alleviating the tight 
constraints on such covert tactics as targeted killings (Cloud, 2002). The CIA has 
doubled the size of the Counterterrorism center and quadrupled the manpower engaged in 
counterterrorism analysis (Bush to Create Terrorist Threat Integration Center 2003). To 
correct the problems within the agency, millions of dollars were spent and hundreds of 
employees were hired or reassigned to the anti-terrorism effort. Some of the new 
terrorism agents were officers drawn out of retirement that had more operational skills 
than rookie agents. Agents were deployed to posts abroad by the fourth week in 
September 2001, with 100 men sent to Afghanistan ahead of the U.S. Special Forces 
(Cloud 2002). In addition, a new seven-member headquarters unit was created under the 
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name of Counterterrorism- pecialOperations. This team was put in charge of the agents 
in Afghanistan. The CIA also helped advise arm and bring together disparate anti­
Taliban militias that were utilized in bringing about the change of power in Afghanistan. 
The CIA has continued to disrupt terrorist plans expand the insight of terrorist 
organizations, and work on bridging the relationships between the .. and foreign 
partners. The CIA has helped law enforcement agents in a number of other countries to 
hunt down suspected Al Qaeda terrorists. The changes at the CIA constitute the largest 
and most rapid reorganization plan in its 55-year history. 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
President Bush created the new intelligence center to ensure effective and smooth 
flow of communication between organizations dealing with the terrorism threat. The 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center began operating on May 1 2003. The Center has one 
central location where all foreign and domestic terrorist intelligence is collected and 
assessed (U.S. Department of State, 2003). The DCI s Counterterrorist Center, the FBI's 
Counterterrorism Division, Department ofHomeland Security and when appropriate, 
elements of the Department of Defense generate and share information to combat 
terrorism. Specific goals of the TIIC include optimized u e of experti e and capabilities 
to conduct threat analysis; create a structure that en ures information sharing among 
agencies; assimilate terrorist threat information to create a comprehensive threat picture· 
and the duty of providing threat assessments to the national leader hip. TTIC se ks to 
"fuse' the efforts of all counterterrorism efforts. 
The investigation and intelligence is only one of the fronts with which the U.S. is 
eliminating terrorism, and the new priority emphasis and reorganization has made this 
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anti-terrorism front a success. Before the creation of DHS man ofthese divisions did 
not exist to research develop, or implement defenses in areas critical to homeland 
security. Maintaining intelligence around the world had reached an all time low and in 
fighting between the FBI, CIA and military intelligence crippled the ability to effectively 
uncover terrorist plots. Although ideas about how terrorists might attack were voiced. 
countermeasures were also diluted by the illusion that a catastrophic terrorist attack 
would never occur on U.S. soil. 9/1 I tested current security measures of the U.S. and 
inspired new views about terrorism in the U.S. 
Militanr Operations 
The military front of the war on terrorism commenced on October 7, 2001, under 
the heading Operation Enduring Freedom. Although the White House knew that this war 
would not be a war that was easily fought or won with militaristic weapons immediate 
goals of the U.S. called upon assistance from the military. The military enlisted a strategy 
called the 4D strategy: Defeat Deny Diminish and Defend. The main component was 
reduction of the terrorists' scope and capability by isolating and localizing their activities. 
In order to do this training facilities and base of operation had to be determined, as well 
as, identifying potential terrorists (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003). 
Afghanistan was the targeted location for military action because it was the base of 
operations for Al Qaeda. After the U.S. government in 1996 pressured udan, Bin Laden 
sought a country that had a weak central government where his terrorist business could 
flourish. Bin Laden found Afghanistan and the Taliban regime-which controlled close 
to 80 percent of the state-to be the perfect destination (Gunaratna 2003). The Taliban 
emerged as the strongest faction of the Muslim Afghan mujahedeen rebels and gained 
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control of Afghanistan in 1996. The extreme interpretation of Islamic law led to the 
destruction of Afghanistan culture, starvation and repression of the society and attracted 
widespread criticism. Afghanistan became a terrorist sponsored state with Al Qaeda 
members burrowed throughout the country (Gunaratna). On September 20 2001, 
President Bush gave a list of demands to the Taliban that included turning over all Al 
Qaeda leaders and supporting members to the U.S., release all unjustly imprisoned 
foreign nationals. close all Al Qaeda training camps, and allow the U.S. access to these 
training camps (Bush 2001). Anything less than immediate compliance with these 
demands was considered an act of siding with the terrorists, which came to fruition on 
October 7, 2001. Strategic military operations were led by General Tommy Franks with 
a goal to destroy the Al Qaeda network and bases inside Afghanistan and remove the 
illegitimate Taliban regime from power (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 
2003). Evidence of the international coalition was visible during Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Coordination of staging, basing and over-flight rights were examples of 
international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. 
By the middle of March 2002 the Taliban were no longer in power the Al Qaeda 
network in Afghanistan had been eliminated, and humanitarian aid was being given to the 
citizens of Afghanistan. Valuable information was also collected during the raids on Al 
Qaeda's bases. Intelligence was gathered on the plans membership structure intentions 
of the terrorist group, and first hand investigations into the capabilities of the production 
of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons (Pike, n.d.). Operation Warrior Sweep 
commenced in July of2003 with the help of the Afghan ational Army. This operation 
was aimed at blocking positions to intercept any anti-coalition or anti-government forces 
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that may have been traveling in the Ayubkhel valley in the southeast part of the country 
(Pike). Also in August and September of2003 Operation Mountain Viper was executed 
to drive Taliban forces out of their remote hiding in the mountains of Afghanistan. 
*Once Afghanistan was on its way to stability the U.S. government turned its 
attention towards Saddam Hussein s regime in Iraq. On March 19 2003 selected 
military strikes were initiated against the Iraqi regime under the title Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Bush 2003). Much dissention surrounded the United States' decision to 
engage in the dismantlement of the Iraqi regime. Even though President Bush and other 
government officials argued vehemently that taking Saddam out of power was the next 
progression in the war on terrorism, other countries and even coalition members did not 
see it that way. Documented on one of the pages from the White House website lists ten 
reasons why liberating Iraq supported the war on terrorism. Among the reasons listed is 
the termination of a state sponsor of terrorism, removal of a tyrant that is a security threat 
to the U.S. and the world, and destruction ofpossible links between Saddam and Al 
Qaeda (Results in Iraq: 100 Days Toward Security and Freedom, 2003). Twenty-seven 
countries have been counted as coalition allies in the Iraqi War with the closest ally being 
Great Britain. Victories for Operation Iraqi Freedom include removing Hussein from 
power shutting down the Salman Pak training camp where members of many terrorist 
groups trained, and killing or capturing forty-two of fifty-five of the most wanted 
criminals of Saddam's regime-including both of his sons Uday and Qusay (Pike, n.d.). 
The military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq were carried out by the U.S. 
and coalition forces as one of the fronts to the war on terrorism. The short-tenn goals of 
these military strikes have been considered successes by the U.S. government because a 
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majority of the goals-dismantling repressive terrorism supporting regimes eliminating 
states that sponsor terrorism and tearing down the bases and training camps that provide 
terrorists with knowledge and security-have been witnessed (Pike n.d.). The long-tenn 
successes are more difficult to judge. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq has stable 
governments in place and terrorist attacks against U.S. and coalition forces continue to 
occur in an attempt to sustain instability within the countries. In addition continued 
military efforts of the U.S. have come under fire from governments concerned that the 
U.S. is more concerned with its unilateral well being than it is in truly being a part of a 
global community. It is uncertain whether or not more military campaigns will persist 
into the future. Regardless of the actions taken in the future the U.S. military defense is a 
mainstay as a viable option to use if deemed necessary by officials responsible for the 
safety of America. 
Freezing Financial Assets 
One of the first actions taken after 9/1 1 was to shut off the supply ofmoney that 
enabled terrorists to plan and execute their attacks. ince 9111 $34.2 million in th U.S. 
and $70.5 million overseas have been blocked from terrorist hands. On September 24, 
2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 which empowered the U.S. Treasury 
Department to fast-forward efforts to starve the terrorists of their financial structure. Th 
Order allows the Treasury Department to target those institutions and individuals that 
financially support terrorism by freezing U.S. assets and blocking U.S. transaction of 
terrorists. In addition, the Executive Order expanded the coverage of existing orders 
from terrorism specifically in the Middle East to global terrorism and included the 
targeting of those "associated with" designated terrorist groups. The U.S. government has 
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designated 36 terrorist organizations to have their fmancial assets frozen and transactions 
blocked. In addition th Foreign Assets Offic has r leased a Ii t of _500 name -both 
institutions and individuals-that have been blocked (Gunaratna 2003). 
Before 9/11, economic deterrence tools used by the .S. came in the fonn of 
restrictions and sanctions. Restrictions included foreign assistance, technology transfers, 
foreign exchange and capital transactions, and economic access. anctions included 
embargos, foreign aid suspensions, restrictions on aircraft and ship traffic and abrogation 
ofa friendship (Perl, 2003). Although somewhat successful these actions were created 
to be used against states and not terrorist groups. ew strategies were imperative to fight 
the new enemy. The Executive Order has been accompanied by other strategies to 
suppress terrorist financing. New money laundering legislation was put into effect to 
give authorities the ability to investigate sources of foreign deposits that may stem from 
corruption, prohibits U.S. banks from dealing with foreign shell banks that do not adhere 
to regulated banking standards adds forfeiture provisions for currency being muggled 
into or out of the U.S., and gives the authority to monitor U.S. activities of Hawalas 
(Weintraub 2002). Several agencies-- both old and new-- have been working together to 
confront the financial side of terrorism. On eptember 14 200 1, th .S. government 
created Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTAT). The task force is a multi-
agency effort to detect terrorist funding and freeze assets before future attacks are able to 
occur. In October 2001, the Treasury Department's Undersecretary Jimm Gurule 
announced the goals of Operation Green Quest, an initiative led by .. Customs 
Service. This operation was responsible for bringing the full spectrum of the 
government's expertise to eliminate the money trail of terrorists. Another important 
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aspect of Operation Green Quest. is to identify possible future terrorist funding. The 
Operation serves as the investigative arm that support the new Foreign Terrorist Asset 
Tracking Center and the long established Office of Foreign Asset Control. One notable 
tool used in Operation Green Quest is the Financial Crimes Enforcement etwork 
(FinCEN). which is used to collect financial data under the Bank Secrecy Act (US 
Customs Service, 2001). 
With money transactions occurring globally at the push of a button, the U.S. must 
rely on the help of other countries to successfully achieve its financial freezing goals. 
The U.S. received overwhelming support for the financial war on terrorism from 208 
countries and jurisdictions around the world. A total of 167 countries have issued orders 
freezing terrorist assets while others have asked the U.S. for help in rooting out terrorist 
funding. The U.S. has even enlisted the support from Liechtenstein and the United 
Arabic Emirates, both strong supporters of banking privacy (Gunaratna 2003). The 
largest international effort in the financial war on terrorism is the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF). Although it was created in 1989 the FATF has adopted forty changes-
eight of which deal directly with terrorist financing--since 9/11 that has enhanced the 
ability to deter money laundering. The task force, made up of thirty-three member 
countries, is a "policy-making body" that generates needed political will to create 
legislation and refonns to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The 
missions of the task force are reviewed on a five-year basis with the next review to be in 
2004 (New Anti-Money Laundering Standards Released, 2003). 
Not all countries are fully supportive of the progressive efforts made by the U.S. 
and others. The FATF has listed the current non-cooperative countries and territories as 
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Cook Islands Egypt Guatemala- Indone ia anmar auru eria, Philippines and 
Ukraine. The non-cooperati e designation wa gi· en to countrie that do not implement 
anti-money laundering systems (FATF). Collaboration between the FATF and other 
international organizations such as the United ations and the World Bank. r inforce and 
encourage all countries to adopt the eight new recommendations to deter terrorist 
financing. The U.S. will continue to persuade countrie that do not support the deterrence 
of terrorists, but still the overwhelming majority of countries support financial efforts to 
cease terrorist funding. 
Cooperation Among Countries 
According to the Tation Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) the .S. was 
prepared to adopt old alliances and create new partnerships with states that were willing; 
assist and support weak states that asked for help: persuade states that are hesitant; and 
compel states that are unwilling to take the steps to needed to fight terrorism. As one 
nation combating terrorism there is still the ability of the enemy to hide operate, and 
plan. The U.S., although a global superpower, cannot police th globe or trample on the 
laws established in other countries. A civilized world with sovereign nations does not 
allow such actions to occur. But as one world cooperating together to combat terrorism 
there is nowhere for the enemy to safely hide, nowhere to set up training camps or to 
easily wire funds to those plotting an attack. When a terrorist organization is forced to 
stay on the run it becomes very difficult to set up the elaborate plans that take years to 
create. The .S. recognized that while it would do everything in its power to protect itself 
from another terrorist attack of this caliber it was essential to have the cooperation of 
countries to fully accomplish this goal. 
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United Nations 
The United ations is a pillar in the global community that encourages 
cooperative initiatives and standards for the stabibty of the world. The primary goal of 
the United Nations Security Council's is to maintain international peace and security. 
When the attacks of9/11 occurred, the Security Council established Resolution 1373. 
which insisted that all states deter terrorism by eliminating its ability to operate 
internationally. Under the Resolution, the Counterterrorism Committee was established 
to raise the level of global counterterrorism capability, cooperation, and effectiveness 
(UN Action Against Terrorism, 2003). On January 16 2002, U. . Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1390, which obligated its members to freeze funds of all associated 
with the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Perl, 2003). 
NATO and ANZUS 
The nineteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
unanimously invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its 52-year 
history. Article V claims that the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
(Bennett, 2001). The members ofNATO, which include: Belgium' Canada; Czecb 
RepUblic; Denmark; France; Germany; Greece' Hungary; Iceland; Italy; Luxembourg; 
Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal' Spain; Turkey; United Kingdom; and the United 
States. agreed that maintaining a united front would send a message to the terrorists that 
their actions would not be tolerated (NATO, 2003). Each member was ready to assist by 
all means necessary. Also. under Article V of the Security Treaty between Australia 
New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS), Australia and New Zealand 
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also voiced their united front with th .S. in response t the terrorist act Australia 
Commits Forces to Anti-Terrorism Coalition, 2001). 
OAS 
The Organization of American States (OA ) Representative, Roger Francisco 
Noriega. stated on September 19 2001, "By in oking th Rio Treaty in particular we 
recognize--and send a strong message to the terrorists--that in our democratic 
hemisphere, an attack against one is an attack against all. We also recognize our 
inescapable obligation and immutable political will to contribute to the common defense 
against threats to peace and security of the Americas"(p.l). The treaties set into action by 
the respective organizations was the first successful step in building the coalition of the 
willing to combat terrorism, and these were not the only states ready to fight terrorism. 
Coalition of the Willing 
Within hours of the attacks, multiple countries expressed their support and 
condolences over the effects of the attack. When President Bush made his peech to the 
nation, he boldly stated that countries either stand with the U.S. or they stand with the 
terrorist enemy. The first objectives of the coalition were to stop Osarna bin Laden and 
the AI Qaeda terrorist network and to terminate the power of the Taliban regime which 
provided safe housing for terrorists in Afghanistan (Campaign Against Terrorism: 
Coalition Update 2003). The military front was underwa immediately following the 
attacks and constituted the most visible evidence of the united coalition among countries. 
In the first few weeks after the attacks, some 70 nation had pledged military assistance 
in the war on terrorism. On October 17,2001 a detailed report was conducted for 
members of Congress examining all of the countries that vowed to support the .S. and 
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the assistance each country was willing to gi e in th fight again t terrorism (Hildreth 
Gerleman & Stevens, 2001). Pledges b countries resonated in the form of armed 
forces; military equipment· access to naval ports, airspace airports and internal 
transportation routes' pennission of basing land, air, and sea forces' and border security 
around Afghanistan to prevent Al Qaeda members to flee to other countries. An update of 
the coalition reported in January 2002, that a total of 136 nations had offered some kind 
of military assistance (Campaign Against Terrorism: Coalition Update). 
Located next to the U.S. Central Command headquarters at MacDill Air Force 
base in Tampa, Florida, there is an international "coalition village' which stations 
military contingents for 43 countries that assist in various military operations. By March 
2002, 17 coalition forces had deployed more than l7 000 troops in or around Afghanistan 
since October 2001 (Pike, 2003). In addition, the largest international naval task force 
since World War II was assembled with forty American ships and sixty allied ships to 
patro] the waters of the Indian Ocean (Pike). Thes forces came from Canada, Britain 
Australia, Japan Bahrain and the Netherlands. A total of 89 countries granted over-flight 
authority, and 23 countries agreed to host U.S. forces involved in offenses. One 
important offering came from the Gulf Cooperation Council-made up of Bahrain 
Kuwait Oman, Qatar Saudi Arabia and the United Arabic Emirates-which tated that 
it supported the U.S. and could use established base in the area. Although not considered 
part of the coalition, Iran said it would comply with the U.S. request to rescue all .S. 
military in the area if needed and close off its border with Afghanistan (Hildreth. 
Gerleman, & Stevens 200 I). 
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Financial cooperation has occurred in the form of freezing asset in countries 
around the world and imposing tougher legislation to deter t rrorism financing. The 
could only do so much to block the flow of terrorist money and freeze as ets that belong 
to terrorist organizations. Cooperation from countries that are guided by their own 
financial regulations was essential to making a noticeable dent to the tune of$133 million 
(Campaign Against Terrorism: Coalition Update 2003 . In addition to the joint effort of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) countries are taking it upon themselves to pass 
legislative acts and enhance detection of terrorism funding. In Germany alone, 0 er 200 
bank accounts have been frozen totaling $4 million in terrorist funds. Mexico is in the 
process of drafting new amendments to its Federal Penal Code' Turkey already has 
comprehensive legislation to combat terrorism' and The people's Bank of China has set 
up an anti-money laundering task force to ensure that no money laundering takes place 
within the Chinese banking system (Campaign Against Terrorism: Coalition Update). A 
number of organizations and task forces are working towards a conn ct d goal. everal 
examples from different continents include: Asia/Pacific Group on Mon y Laundering 
(APG); Europol; East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (E AAMLG)' 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFI UD); and 
The Egmont Group of Financiallntelligence Units (New Anti-Money Laundering 
Standards Released. 2003). Prohibiting terrorist to easily accumulate and transfer 
money within the banking system is a difficult but effective initiative that is being met by 
countries all over the world. 
Another area in which the coalition of countries is very critical is the collection 01 
intelligence and investigative actions. Members of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups 
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leno the are not sa£ in cOlIDtrie that renOlIDce terrori m and aim at bringing th rn to 
justice. Since the terror threat i global in nature it call for cooperation of countries to 
communicate information rele ant to preventativ measures and the capture of terrorists. 
Since 9/11, over 3,000 AI Qeada suspects have been detained in 90 countries 
(Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America 2003). uccess has come through 
the maintained cooperation and dedication of the global war on terrorism. Secrecy is the 
nature of intelligence infonnation; therefore, much of the evidence of intelligence 
cooperation is transmitted through information of key captured Al Qaeda members in 
different nations. 
In Pakistan, over 500 extremists have been arrested. Top members of AI Qaeda 
such as Zubair, Rarnzi Binalshibh, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, and Khallad Ba'Attash 
were high profile captures by Pakistani authorities (Progress Report on the Global War 
on Terrorism, 2003). The infonnation sharing between the U.. and Saudi Arabia has 
increased significantly according to the White Hou ; however public infonnation has 
been limited at the request of the Saudi Royal family. The information known is that 
after the attacks on Riyadh in May 2003 Saudi Arabia broadly increased their security 
forces to put several Al Qaeda ringleaders and facilitators out of busines including Abu 
Bakr al-Azdi (Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism 2003). Harnbali--who 
was captured by Thai police with the help of CIA officials-- ingapore Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and others in Southeast Asia have taken local Al Qaeda terrorist and Al 
Qaeda members traveling through the area into custody. In France, Ahmed Laidouini-a 
liaison between AI Qaeda cells--was arrested; Italian officials discovered evidence of a 
bomb plot at the .S. Embassy in 2002' Spain arrested eleven citizens with ties to AI 
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Qaeda in November 2001' the United Kingdom charged Sulayman Balal Zainulabidin, 
Yasser AI-Siri, and Sheik Abdullah el-Faisal in terrorist related actions' and Germany, 
which has maintained a strong working relationship with the CIA and FBI for many years 
has strengthened that relationship even more by increasing the number of liaisons 
between the organizations in each country (Progress Report on the Global War on 
Terrorism, 2003). 
The coalition of nations is the centerpiece for successfully preventing the 
proliferation of terrorism in the future. As President Bush made clear this war will not 
be won in one defining moment. The coalition ofnations must stay committed to 
capturing terrorists where they hide, creating state legislation and bilateral agreements 
that will freeze t,errorist funds, increase severity of punishment for those guilty ofterrorist 
activity, and fully prepared to take military action if terrorists strike. The evidence of 
coope.rative coalition action has been witnessed repeatedly since 9111. More and more 
multilateral initiatives have been put in place. At the 2003 G-8 ummit in Evian leaders 
established a Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) to expand and coordinate training 
and assistance for countries with the will to combat terrori m (progress Report on the 
Global War on Terrorism, 2003). The Department of State's Counterterrorism Office 
continues to coordinate all U.S. Government efforts to improve counterterrorism 
cooperation with foreign governments (U.S. Department of State). The coalition of 
countries that has amassed has set its sight on combating terrorism on a global scale and 
deterring states from, in any way, supporting international terrorist group to ensure 
peace in the world for the future. 
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Sufficient Condition 
The sufficient condition-again the one condition that can "make or break the 
efforts to combat terrorism-is the collective emotional response experienced after 9/11. 
It is the aftennath of that event. For example when a disruption occurs, such as the 
events of 9/11, human emotions explode and become entangled with the event itself. 
That contagion of emotions explodes both internally and externally. The collectivity of 
that society resonates. It resonates in proportion to the scale of that event. The larger the 
event; the greater the impact. Durkheim described this as "collective conscience". 
Individuals are confronted with such overwhelming and consistent force that the 
collective conscience and the individual conscience are identical (Elwell 2001). In the 
case of 9/11 we can see the best example. When a society has been affected in a similar 
way the similarity of their emotions will resonate. When a society has been affected in a 
similar way the similarity of their emotions will resonate. 
The results of such emotions are a response of action or support for action, henc 
the idea of the collective emotional response. After the attacks of9/11 ther was a 
collective emotional response. It was felt not only in the U.S., but also throughout the 
world. Immediately after and the days to follow 9/11 an outpouring of not only 
government support but also citizen support came from countries allover the world. 
They too had felt the same anger, sadness and fears that .S. citizens were feeling about 
the attacks. Our vulnerability as people is universal. People connect at the point of 
impact and hurt. It was this collective emotional response that initiated involvement frOJ 
so many countTies to help in any way possible. The attacks presented an opportunity for 
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new alliances to be formed becau e in times of crisis, hen the collective motional 
responses are felt, people feel the need to do something about it. 
The notion of a collecti emotional respon e to th attack of 9/11 was nowhere 
greater than in the U.S. The society was caught off guard b the idea of terrorist attacks 
occurring on U.S. soil. It is the emotional response of the .. that make up the 
sufficient restraining condition. This model explains much about that event and the 
events to follow right up until today. It explains foreign policy and collective actions 
taken. In fact that collective emotional response is the undercurrent for the policies and 
actions taken b the U.S. against terrorism. In other words under normal circum tances 
support for policies and actions implemented by the U.S. government officials are met 
with wide variations of opinions and ideas. 
Most commonly such initiatives tend to be split upon party lines of democrat or 
republican. However, in times of serious disruptions such differences are put aside and 
people let their emotions of the situation drive the support of actions for th greater good 
of the society. After 9/11 the collective emotional response of U.S. citizens"fesulted in 
overwhelming support for actions that included: military action in Afghanistan to 
dismantle the Taliban and hunt down Al Qaeda members; new legislative initiatives such 
as the PATRlOT Act, the Homeland Security Act and other legislative acts to freeze 
terrorist money' funding for reorganization of intelligence agencie and more manpower. 
These examples cannot be overstated. The actions taken by the U.S. to restrain the 
propelling forces of terrorism would not have been a great or as unanimously agreed 
upon if there were not a collective emotional response created by the public that was 
experienced due to the events of 9/11. 
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Popular Opinion 
The research question is this: how do we know? Ho do kno that these 
collective emotions are driving policy? What better wa than to conduct public opinion 
polls. They can reveal much about the assumptions of these ideas. And so that is what 
this researcher did. Data allowed for the evaluation of these assumptions empirically .. 
Thus several secondary quantitative analyses were conducted toe aluate whether or not 
there was a significant collective response to the attacks of9/11. These are known as 
public opinion polls. Polls are commonly used to evaluate what people think:, what they 
do, and what they want. Since ours is pluralistic society, polls vary as do their opinions. 
There are demographic and political differences in response to critical issues. This 
technique has become a science. The results of samples can be generalized to whole 
regions and populations. And that is the case with what follows in this thesis. ABC 
contracted with a polling agency to measure the impact of .9/11. They wanted to know 
what people felt. Thus these pollsters conducted telephone polls several time after the 
events. The early polls contained general information about the event and how angry 
people were about this atrocity. One such poll was taken one year after the event. Up 
then the questions had become rather sophisticated and detailed. This one poll is the one 
that this researcher chose to analyze because it contained several critical variables that 
might measure emotional contagion. Thus the analysis for this thesis came from a 
telephone survey poll conducted one year after the attacks occurred. The first part of this 
data analysis focuses on the cultural and demographic differences of the society affected 
by the 9/11 incidents. The second half of the analyses identifies the emotional effects and 
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the magnitude of these effects that the attacks had on the U.S. public as a collective 
society. 
Just as researchers use ethnomethodology insights and techniques to examine the 
culture or the ethos in field studies, so too did this researcher. Similar approaches and 
research strategies were used to evaluate the patterns of interaction that were embedded 
into the Al Qaeda organization. The researcher went a step further and applied the same 
techniques then to what the public felt about these events and what policies they wanted. 
The U.S. collective response was examined empirically using critical variables and 
demographics to isolate who felt what and how deeply they felt. What they believed and 
how strongly they believed it. 
That sounds simple enough. But this poll contains hundreds of data sets and 
literally thousands of pieces of infonnation, Here is where the research of ethno 
methodologists became useful. After conducting years of research on various "cultures" 
of groups, the researcher suggest a strategy to follow. For example, Holstein and 
Grubi um (1997) suggest that the three variables of gender class, and religion are central 
to the understanding of a culture. Taking this cue from ethnomethodology and those who 
conduct qualitative research in this tradition, the researcher focused on gender class, and 
religion. These variable choices became those that initially guided the exploratory 
direction that the researcher would take. These would be those factors that would open 
the door and provide insights into exactly how people responded at the moment of 
impact. These were the variables utilized in the analysis of collective emotional 
response. 
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To operationall define the dependent variable--the response of9/l1-the 
researcher used one question from the survey: Thinking back to right after the attacks 
last September 1I1h, at the time did you personally feel Frightened?" After conducting a 
Chi-Square analysis, results indicated that the variable of gender exhibited a maximized 
difference in response. Descriptive statistics on the response and gender measures appear 
in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 
G er response t 0 tb f fF .end e emo IOn 0 rI!!1bt 
08 Thinking back to right 
attacks I.ast September 11th, 
time did you personally 
Frightened 
Ver Somewh Not Total 
0921. RESPONDENTS Male Count 44 75 107 226 
SEX % within 0921. 
19.5 33.2 47.3 100.0RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Tolal 90 15.3 21.8 460 
Fema.le Count 145 71 49 265 
% within 0921. 54.7 26.8 18.5 100.0RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 29.S 14.5 10.0 54.0 
Total Count 169 146 156 491 
% within 0921. 
38.5 29.7 31.8 100.0RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 38.5 29.7 31.8 100.0 
Chi-square = 83.778 
dF =5 
P. value = .000. 
The respondent's sex appears on the left hand side of the table followed by responses of 
very frightened, somewhat frightened, or not frightened on the right. Out of a total of 226 
males, 19.5 percent felt very frightened, 33.2 percent felt somewhat frightened and 47.3 
percent were not frightened. The female s had an opposite response in the ordinal 
sequence. The number ofwomen polled totaled 265, from which 54.7 percent felt very 
frightened, 26.8 percent were somewhat, and 18.5 percent were not frightened. The data 
analysis concluded that women significantly exhibited the emotion of fright more than 
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men. According to ethnomethodologist , the difference in gender respons is an effect of 
a normative pattern within a panicular culture. It is the ideal that drive people within 
that culture. For instance, while it is an accepted response for women to respond with 
fear to a crisis, men tend to exhibit higher responses of anger. 
The researcher extended the analysis to include modes of elaboration by 
controlling for confounding variables. In other words, did the difference in gender 
response remain constant when other demographic variables were analyzed? The first 
variable was class. Because the original survey did not ask specific questions that dealt 
with socio-economic status, which is a commonly used item to determine class, the 
researcher used two different variables to represent class. The first was region ofthe U.S. 
The East and West coasts tend to be larger financial centers and have higher standards of 
living than those who live in the Midwest and South regions. Therefore, differences in 
class were assumed between the coastal regions and midlands. The researcher compared 
the different regions in the U.S. to see if there was any difference in the way men and 
women responded through the emotion of fear. Table 5.2 examines the responses in the 
East--elose to the attacks-and the South, which was more distant from the actual 
attacks to illustrate two extremes of region. 
The top table shows the responses of men and women in the East as compared to 
the bottom half, which contains the Reponses of men and women in the South. The one 
difference found within regions was on the scale of "not frightened". A percent was 26.8 
ofllie women polled in the South were not frightened after the attacks as compared to 
only 8.1 percent that were not frightened in the East. The second variable analyzed as 
part of the class distribution was between rural and urban areas. Again, the researcher 
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chose this as a factor of class because generally speaking larger urban areas tend to be 
more affluent than rural areas. Descriptive statistics appear in Table 5.3 to compare 
differences between urban and rural areas. The top table represents gender response from 
large cities and the bottom from rural areas. Analysis of the female response on the scale 
of "'not frightened" was slightly higher in rural areas than in large cities. 
Table 5.2 
Gender response WI'th'lD re!!10n 
0.8 Thinking back to right 
attacks last September 11th, 
time did you personally 
FriahtenedREGION 
very ~omewnat Not Total 
Male Count 8 14 20 42Censdiv = 1,2 (East) 
% within 0921. 19.0% 33.3% 47.6% 100.0% 
. 0921. RESPONDENTs RESPONDENTS SEX 
SEX % of Total 10.1% 17.7% 25.3% 53.2% 
Female Count 23 11 3 37 
62.2% 29.7% 8.1% 100.0%~E'1JW8N'6ftJi:'S SEX 
% of Total 29.1% 13.9% 46.8%3.8% 
Total Count 31 25 23 79 
% within 0921. 39.2% 31.6% 29.1% 100,0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 39.2% 31.6% 29.1% 100.0% 
0.8 Thinking back to right 
attacks last September 11 th, 
time did you personally 
FrightenedREGION 
very ~omewnat Not Total 
Male Count 20 32 34 86Censdiv = 5,6,7 (South) 
% within 0921. 23.3% 37.2% 39.5% 100.0% 
0921. RESPONDENTs RESPONDENTS SEX 
SEX % of Total 10.9% 17.5% 18.6% 47.0% 
Female Count 51 20 26 97 
% within 0921. 52.6% 20.6% 26.8% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 27.9% 10.9% 14.2% 53.0% 
Total Count 71 52 60 183 
% within 0921. 38.8% 28.4% 32.8% 100.0%RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 38.8% 28.4% 32.8% 100.0% 
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The researcher also used level of education as a. confounding ariable to 
determine whether the difference in ma.le and female responses showed any differences. 
Table 5.3 
Cross tabulation for 2:ender reSDonse between lan!e city and rural area 
08 Thinking bad< to right 
attacks last September 11th, 
time did you personally 
0.913 Would you describe the 
areas in which you live as... very 
Frightened 
::>omewnat Not Total 
Large city Male Count 
% within 0921. 
11 
22.0% 
18 
36.0% 
21 
42.0% 
50 
100.0% 
0921. RESPONDENTS RESPONDENTS SEX , 
SEX % of Total 10.1% 16.5% 19.3% 45.9% 
Female Count 35 15 9 59 
% within 0921. 59.3% 25.4% 15.3% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 32.1% 13.8% 8.3% 54.1% 
Total Count 46 33 30 109 
% within 0921. 42.2% 30.3% 27.5% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
, 
% of Tolal 42.2% 30.3% 27.5% 100.0% 
0.8 Thinking bad< to right 
attacks last September 11th, 
time did you personally 
0.913 Would you describe the Frightened
areas in which you live as... very ::iomewnat Not Total 
Male Count 4 18 16 38Rural area 
% within 0921. 10.5% 47.4% 42.1% 100.0% 
0921. RESPONDENTS RESPONDENTS SEX 
SEX % of Total 4.4% 19.8% 17.6% 41.8% 
Female Count 28 11 14 53 
- % within 0921. 52.8% 20.8% 26.4% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 30.8% 12.1% 15.4% 58.2% 
Total Count 32 29 30 91 
% within 0921. 35.2% 31.9% 33.0% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
%ofTotal 35.2% 31.9% 33.0% 100.0% 
There were three scales for level of education: less than high school; graduated 
high school; and some college. There were no differences in responses either within the 
female population or between males and females. The level 9f education had no bearing 
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on the extent to which both genders exhibited fear. Finall ,analysis of religiosity was 
used as a variable against response. Table 5.4 details the findings of descriptive statistics. 
Table 5.4 
Gender response and religiosity 
0.8 Thinking back to right 
attacks last September 11th, 
DEM 15. Would you describe time did you personally yourself as a religious person, or Frightened
not a religious person? 
very ~omewnat Not TOlal 
Male Count 12 18 29 59Very religious 
% within 0921. 20.3% 30.5% 49.2% 100.0% 
0921. RESPONDENTS RESPONDENTS SEX 
SEX % of Total 7.5% 11.3% 18.1% 36.9% 
Female Count 51 29 21 101 
% within 0921. 50.5% 28.7% 20.8% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 31.9% 18.1% 13.1% 63.1% 
Total Count 63 47 50 160 
% within 0921. 39.4% 29.4% 31.3% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 39.4% 29.4% 31.3% 100.0% 
0.8 Thinking back to right 
attacks last September 11th, DEM 15. Would you describe time did you personally yourself as a religious person, or Frightened
not a religious person? 
very ::iomewnal Not Total 
Not religious Male Count 
% within 0921. 
9 
14.3% 
25 
39.7% 
29 
46.0% 
63 
100.0% 
0921. RESPONDENTS RESPONDENTS SEX 
SEX % of Total 8.9% 24.8% 28.7% 62.4% 
Female Count 17 8 13 38 
% within 0921. 
, 
44.7% 21.1% 34.2% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Tolal 16.8% 7.9% 12.9% 37.6% 
Total Count 26 33 42 101 
% within 0921. 25.7% 32.7% 41.6% 100.0% 
RESPONDENTS SEX 
% of Total 25.7% 32.7% 41.6% 100.0% 
A total of 34.2 percent of not religious females responded that they were not 
frightened from the attacks as compared to 20.8 percent of religious females who 
responded that they were not frightened. These are revealing statistics. 
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The results suggest that females that were either not a close in proximity of the 
attacks, not living in larger cities that resemble where the attacks occurred or that were 
not as religious were less likely to exhibit the response of fright than other women. 
Nevertheless, the modes of elaboration analysis concluded that there was still a difference 
between gender responses. The emotion of fright was always higher in females than in 
males. The specific data analysis between gender responses to the emotion of fear was 
conducted to demonstrate cultural differences. By focusing on the variable suggested b 
Holstein and Grubium, the analysis was acquiescent of ethnomethodological or cultural 
studies, for it exhibited the way in which the two genders emotionally respond to a major 
disruption in society. 
Although cultural differences were identified through the emotion of fear 
response, this does not lessen the extent to which the society was collectively affected or 
the impact of support created for action. Specifi.c survey questions were selected to 
illustrate the magnitude of the effects that the 9111 attacks had on the U.S. society as a 
whole. Table 5.5 identifies specific questions and descriptive statistics to illustrate the 
level of society impacted by the attacks of 9/11. 
Question 49 points to the significance of the event. \\Then people are asked to 
remember certain dates, the amount of people who remember details of actions that 
occurred during an event results in the magnitude of the event. For instance if the 
questions were asked: "Do you remember what you were doing when you heard about the 
biggest earthquake in San Francisco?" The amount of people who could answer that 
question would be much smaller because the event did not hold the amount of 
significance to people all over the U.S. as did the events of9111. Both were dangerous 
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events that took man Ii es and both were centralized to specific area within the .S. 
however, 9/11 resulted in a much greater collective response than did the earthquake. 
Out of a total of 1011 people polled in the survey 973--or 96.2 percent--remembered 
exactly what they were doing when they heard about the attacks. Thi soows that the 
attacks of9/l1 were effectively imprinted into the minds of the .S. public. 
Table 5.5 
Q.49 Do you remember specifically where you were and what you were 
doing when you first heard about. the September 11th 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 973 96.2 96.2 96.2 
No 38 3.8 3.8 100.0 
Total 1011 100.0 100.0 
Q.12a Do you feel that the events of last September 11th have or have not changed 
the United States? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Yes, changed 474 46.9 93.7 93.7 
No, not changed 30 3.0 6.0 99.7 
Don't know 2 .2 3 100.0 
Total 505 50.0 100.0 
Missing System 506 50.0 
Total 1011 100.0 
Q.12b Do you feel that the events of last September 11th have changed the United 
States, or have not changed the United 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Yes,changed 465 46.0 92.0 92.0 
No, not changed 39 3.9 7.7 99.7 
Don't know 2 .2 .3 100.0 
Total 506 50.0 100.0 
Missing System I 505 50.0 
Total 1011 100.0 
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Q.13 Do you think it's a long-term change or short term? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Long term 731 72.3 77.9 77.9 
Short term 196 19.3 20.8 98.7 
Don't know 12 1.2 1.3 100.0 
Total 939 i 92.8 100.0 
Missing System 72 7.2 
Total 1011 100.0 
Q.14 Do you think it's a big change, or not so big? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Big change 740 73.2 78.8 78.8 
Not so big change 192 19.0 20.5 99.3 
Don't know 7 .6 .7 100.0 
Total 939 92.8 100.0 
Missing System 72 7.2 
Total 1011 100.0 
Q.15 Do you think it's a change for the better, or a change fO.r the worse? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Better 587 58.1 63.1 63.1 
Worse 303 29.9 32.5 95.6 
Don't know 41 4.1 4.4 100.0 
Total 931 92.1 100.0 
Missing System 80 7.9 
Total 1011 100.0 
Questions 12a and 12b are almost the exact question but were divided up between 
the two halves of the 1011 people polled. When asked whether or not the events of9/11 
had changed the U.S. or had not changed the U.S., responders answered in three ways: 
yes, no, or don't know. On question 12a a total of 46.9 percent answered yes and on 
question 12b a total of 46 percent answered yes. The sum of those percentages is 92.9 
percent of the 1011 people polled believed that the events did change the U.S. Finally 
questions 13, 14, and 15 focus on both the direction of change'and its magnitude. Polling 
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statistics indicate that 72.3 percent belie ed that the change would be long-term 73.2 
believed that it was a big change, and 58.1 percent believed it was a change for the better. 
Change is a word that represents action-mentally or physically. Change can 
occur through ideologies and through deed which is what was exhibited after the attacks 
of 9111. People's attitudes and beliefs about terrorism and about safety changed almost 
spontaneously. In addition, change of policies and ways of handling terrorists also 
changed. The intention of displaying these questions was to show that a collective 
emotional response resulting from the attacks of 9/11 did occur. 
The policies and procedures enacted after the attacks were made possible by this 
undercurrent of collective emotional response, hence the reason it is the sufficient 
condition. The collective emotional response was the igniter for all other action. When a 
society grapples with the effects ofa major disruption such as 9/11, the result will be 
markedly unique from other policy and procedure action for it will be swift and resolute. 
Weaknesses of the Propelling forces 
In Chapter 4 the weaknesses of restraining forces were discussed. Here, just a in 
Chapter 4, it is important to understand where the propelling forces lie in relation to the 
restraining forces. Propelling forces still exist as Al Qaeda is still trying to conduct 
terrorist attacks and recruit new terrorists. Yet the limitations of these propelling forces 
are evident. Al Qaeda no longer has a base of operations where it can. set up training 
camps or facilitate the exploration of biological and chemical weapons. Although 
globalization remains a viable force, the attacks of 9/1] created the opportunity for 
understanding what checks need to be put in place so terrorist find it more difficult to 
exploit globalization. Examples of checks that have been put in place are those such as 
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monitoring banking transaction more diligentJ , reinforcing Internet ecurities 
monitoring messages in cyberspace creating more multilateral cooperation between 
countries, making better efforts to understand cultural differences and alleviate 
degenerative problems. The relationship between the dominating propelling forces and 
the weak restraining forces discussed in Chapter four are dynamically different after the 
critical incident has occurred. Pre 9111, the propelling forces were gaining power while 
the restraining forces were doing little in the way of keeping them in check. However, on 
the other side of the equation, the propelling forces are weaker not by choice but by force. 
Therefore, the restraining forces must remain in a dominant position or the propelling 
forces will again attempt to gain power. 
Chapter Summary 
Military operations, financial sanctions homeland defense initiatives and the 
cooperation among countries are all necessary conditions that are playing a critical and 
effective part in restraining AI Qaeda. In April 2003, the Department of State released the 
annual Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 Report (2003), which detailed statistical 
analyses in the fight against terrorism. The report indicated that worldwide deaths 
occurring from terrorist activity had decreased from 3,295 in 2001 to 725 in 2002; 
worldwide terror incidents declined 44 percent from 355 in 2001 to 199 in 2002' and 
anti-U.S. attacks declined 65 percent from 219 to 77 (Patterns, 2003). Although this 
report comes early in the war against terrorism it can be a tool to monitor success or 
failure. Continued patterns of decline in the coming years will provide a stronger rate of 
success. 
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The .S. government successfull mapped out a multi-front plan not om for 
immediate retaliatory measures but also to establish a long-term pre-empti e strategy that 
would prove destructive to the proliferated tactics that Al Qaeda s network had 
accomplished over the last decade. Deterrence objectives determined what measures 
would be taken to restrain the forces of Al Qaeda. For instance, once the U.S. had given 
the Taliban regi.me a deadline to relinquish the harboring of terrorists and they did not 
comply, one U.S. objective was to forcefully go into Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda 
training camps, seize Al Qaeda members, and to remove the Taliban regime from power 
in Afghanistan. In order to accomplish this initiative, the only option was to use mili ary 
force. As more and more information began to unfold as to the vast and complicated 
nature of the enemy and in light of the new fourth generation warfare, the U.S. realized 
that military operations alone would not deter an organization that had embedded itself 
deep into the communities of democratic nations allover the world. It was clear that 
financing had to play an important part in the attacks. A high profile, orchestrated attack 
coupled with prior intelligence of bin Laden and Al Qaeda s wealth made it clear that 
another objective would aim at freezing the terrorists out of business. Money plays a 
huge part in any organization; even a terrorist organization. Immediately financial 
sanctions were increased through legislative action to freeze the assets and block 
transactions that keep terrorists in business. 
As the shock of what happened resonated all over the U.S. there was also 
confusion and fear. Unknowing of what the future had in store, the first and foremost 
priority was to protect the citizens of the United States. As .S. battleships and ATO 
AWACS planes guarded the east coast, the illusion of a nation too powerful and secure to 
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fall victim to such destruction crumbled. A lack of confidence in the intelligence 
organizations responsible for preventing attack on .S. soil began to gro . The 
objective on the home front was to build a homeland security that would finall bridge 
the gap of communication between intelligence organizations, and would never again 
allow the nation to be a victim of terrorism. 
The cooperation among nations, not only at the outset of the atta.cks and 
Operation Enduring Freedom but also as a constant entity in the war on terrorism, will 
always be a crucial condition to restraining terrorist forces. As powerful as each of the 
necessary conditions were and still remain to be, the global coalition is a needed 
condition that continues to work together and send a message to terrorists as a united 
front that terrorism, will not be tolerated, and that peace, not terrorism will guide the 
future of the world. 
Such actions carried out by the U.S. and other countries in the war on terrorism 
will remain the result of the coIlective emotional response generated fonn the public. 
Democracies are made up of the people within them and the action or inaction they are 
willing to take to elimina.te the threat of terrorism. The immediate response of the 
collective emotions ofthe U.S. society as well as the societies of other countries was 
evident through the support of military action and other deterring polices enacted after 
the successful terrorist attacks of 9/1 ] . 
The final chapter contains the summary and conclusion of this research. The 
researcher discusses the findings and implications of this study, as well as limitations and 
suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
The focus of this research was an examination of both AI Qaeda and the causes of 
the attacks of9/11, and the effects and consequences of those attacks. Another way of 
looking at this study is that of the processes of cause and effect and the factors 
surrounding those actions. The events of9/11 pennitted the unique ability to examine 
two different points ofhumanity and the social conditions from which each draw upon. 
Al Qaeda's organization exists in the world as a relatively invisible network of cells 
plotting and carrying out missions of terror. The attacks of 9/11 acted in a way as an x-
ray machine does in that the organization was made visible for a brief but crucial point. 
The x-ray could then be used as a guide to understanding the make-up of the organization 
and the social conditions that enabled the organization to successfully accomplish the 
terrorist mission on U.S. soil. Likewise, the x-ray analogy can be used to describe the 
other side. It displayed a picture of the collective emotional response--also invi ible until 
a disruption occurs--and how this response resulted in action against the attacks. 
At the onset, the researcher proposed three hypotheses for this thesis. The first 
hypothesis stated that prior to 9/11, the propelling forces exceeded restraining forces. 
The researcher used social network theory as predictive tool to analyze AI Qaeda's 
flexible and resilient network. Understanding the make-up of Al Qaeda and the 
precipitating factors that led to the inception of Al Qaeda was pertinent to deciphering the 
social conditions of the propelling forces. Through the use ofhistorical narrative 
analysis, the researcher traced the five necessary and sufficient propelling conditions 
from the creation of the network up to the attacks. It was through this analysis that the 
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unbalanced framework began to unfold. The interdependent social and biographical 
conditions of globalization; fmancial stability; strategic leadership' support ofIslamic 
law; and true believer status were explained through information and documented 
actions. In addition, evidence of the weakness of the restraining forces pre 9/11 was 
included to reference the dominance of the propelling forces even further. 
The second hypothesis suggested that after 9/11, restraining forces exceeded 
propelling forces. Through the evaluation of actions taken by the U.S. and the global 
coalition of forces, the restraining forces were enacted to drive back the propelling forces. 
The researcher used quantitative analysis to explain the collective emotional response 
that produced restraining forces strong enough to successfully hinder the dominance of 
the propelling forces. The conditions of protecting the homeland military action, 
freezing finances, cooperation among countries were ignited by the collective emotional 
response felt after the attacks of9/11, and have resulted in the destruction ofAI Qaeda's 
bases and training camps, millions of dollars of frozen money and assets of both Al 
Qaeda members and supporters, the captures of numerous cell members and top official 
within the terrorist group, and the decreased ability of Al Qaeda members to hide plot, 
and plan out terror missions. 
Finally, the last hypothesis of this study stated that both necessary and sufficient 
conditions were required for propelling and restraining forces to be effective. The 
researcher made the case for this hypothesis by examining how each of the necessary and 
restraining forces worked together as interdependent parts of a whole. If each component 
of the propelling forces is looked at individually, for instance the fmancial stability of AI 
Qaeda, all that can be explained from that one element is that financial backing was an 
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essential part of accomplishing the attacks of 9/11. However it could nol be stated that 
the fmancial stability of the organization by itself could have created the succes that the 
attacks of 9/11 produced. The other necessary conditions were equally important in the 
success of the attacks. However, the distinction was also made between necessary and 
sufficient conditions, for there was an unequal balance between these two factors. 
Whereas necessary conditions served as equal parts to the picture, the sufficient 
conditions made up the item that served as the most important piece of the puzzle. 
Again, the sufficient condition could not be a stand-alone component to successful 
attacks; however, it did hold a significance not matched by the other components. As 
explained in Chapter 5, the sufficient condition--collective emotional response of U.S. 
citizens-was an overarching component to the other actions. It was the resolve of the 
people to support quick and effective action against terrorism that enabled the restraining 
forces to be dominating forces. 
The researcher used the force field analysis model created by Lewin to explain the 
dynamic relationship of social forces, their identities as systems of action or inaction, and 
to ultimately make conclusions about the hypotheses presented. Not only were the 
conditions of the propelling and restraining force identified but the research went one 
step further to detennine what flagship factors pushed action on both sides of the 
equation over the edge. It is important to note that Lewin s force field model is not a 
static model. The conditions within the framework exist dynamically. In other words, 
the opposing forces are in a constant state of tension-pushing and pulling. When one 
side is not keeping up with the actions of the other, it allows the threshold point to be 
surpassed as in the case of9/11. Graph 6.1 illustrates the dynamic state of Lewin's model 
Al Qaeda 150 
in which the term' differential conditions' is used to explain that as the ar on terrorism 
continues to evolve conditions on both sides ma be deleted or added as deemed 
necessary. These conditions will continue to shift depending on the force by which they 
are propelled or restrained. 
Figure 6.1 
Differential Conditions 
Differential Conditions 
LEWIN'S FORCE FIELD ANALYSIS 
Propelling Forces include: 
Necessary Conditions 1-: 
Restraining Forces include: 
Necessary Conditions 
DiffeJlential 
Globalization 
Conditions 
Protecting the Homeland 
Financial Stability Military Force 
Strategic Leadership 
Islamic Law 
Sufficient Conditions • 
Freezing Finances 
Cooperation Among Countries 
Sufficient Condition 
True Believers Popular Opinion 
The triangulation approach to the methods of this thesis created the thoroughness 
and depth needed to effectively construct the emersion of multiple ideas into one picture. 
Historical narrative analysis was utilized to reconstruct the actions of the terrorist group 
leading up to the attacks and to trace the restraining forces enacted post 9/11. 
Ethncmethodology was applied to examine the culture and social cues for which Al 
Qaeda was founded upon and continued to apply to its organization. And the secondary 
quantitative data analysis was conducted to understand the imprint that the attacks left on 
a collective society and. the reactions exhibited form those effects. 
The significance of this research is to add a new framework for exarnining 
terrorism--one that synthesizes organization, actions and social conditions. It will be a 
continuous battle to stay one step ahead of or at the very least, in stride with the evolving 
nature of terrorism. If this does not occur, a repeat of the magnitude of the attacks of 
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9/11 will be a result. 1n order to successfull meet the challenges of the ne· threat of 
terrorism, experts and analysts must be able to think and act in the same ways as the 
terrorist groups. That is, they must be structured in an organizational network, they must 
understand the significance of the social conditions surrounding terrorist situations they 
must attempt to predict actions that will be taken by terrorist groups and fmd resolutions 
to such actions. This thesis provides a framework for which to start this type of 
organizational and strategic approach to eliminating the terrorist threat. 
Limitations of Study 
Terrorism studies commonly look at data across different terrorist groups because 
it is difficult to gather data on one specific group. Much of the research conducted stems 
from actions that have already occurred where researchers use these ex-post facto actions 
to look for patterns of similarity to explain concepts of terrorism. The same is true for 
research about Al Qaeda. To date, minimal empirical research has been conducted on 
this dynamic terrorist network. But research conducted on Al Qaeda is conflicted by the 
fact that the organization is the centerpiece of a still recent and catastrophic event in U. 
history. Pertinent information about Al Qaeda remains classified by government 
agencies for security reasons as they continuously learn more about the network. Most of 
the available information about Al Qaeda comes from the same sources used in this 
thesis. While bin Laden has given interviews to a few reporters, this was before the 
attacks of 9/11 changed the environment with which this organization operated in. 
Therefore, the research resulted in qualitative data acquired from government information 
that has been declassified, experts in the field of terrorism whom have the ability to 
collect more difficult to find information, and from media sources. 
Al Qaeda 152 
The stud of Al Qaeda has a second limitation. Military strategist have 
identified the new combatant environment that of fourth generation warfare. The threat 
of terrorism is something that can be researched within the confines of a controlled 
experimental laboratory. This is an issue that takes place and must be researched within 
the parameters of the real world. Besides the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent war on 
terrorism still being recent and in recent events this new fourth generation warfare 
environment makes it almost impossible to quantifiably measure the difference between 
the number of terrorists being captured to the number ofnew terrorists entering the fight. 
There are no visible armies to destroy and there will not be a definitive moment of one 
side surrendering to the other as in wars past. Much of the research and strategy used to 
understand and eliminate the terrorist enemy will be rely upon hypotheses produced from 
unfolding information as it becomes available. 
Future Research 
This thesis represents research about a terrorist group about which there is still 
much to be understood. In add.ition. the approach to this study is somewhat novel. 
Lewin's force field model has not been applied to the study of terrorist groups before and 
the use oftrianguIation is a relatively new approach within qualitative analysis. These 
ideas are fitting being that the study of Al Qaeda through the events of9/1] and the 
subsequent analysis of restraining actions post 9/11 are stilI rather new themselves. 
Therefore, future studies of Al Qaeda and the actions surrounding 9111 should attempt to 
uncover more definitive answ.ers as the resulting war on terrorism moves forward. More 
information about Al Qaeda will continue to be discovered which could result in more 
detailed research. Also adding new elements of the war on terrorism, such as Operation 
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Iraqi Freedom to monitor the whether or not restraining conditions such a th 
cooperation among countries will be necessary. 
In addition, more original participant data could be utilized to determine whether 
or not the collective emotional response does remain steadfast in the coming years. 
Using first hand data will allow future researchers to control for specific variables that the 
researcher was not able to control for using secondary data. 
Conclusion 
This study focused on the events of 9/11 and the Al Qaeda terrorist network 
responsible for them. However, the phenomenon of terrorism should not be exclusive to 
Al Qaeda. The new threat of fourth generation warfare and the organizational network 
make-up will continue to spread to other terrorist groups with their own grievances. 
While Al Qaeda is at the top of the list of terrorist groups to eliminate, it is important to 
take the war on terrorism for what it is-terrorism as a whole. The war on terrorism is: as 
President Bush has stated, going to be a long war. In fact, explaining it as a war may 
produce an incorrect assumption of the issue. The attacks of 9/11 changed the world 
forever. Terrorism is not new; yet in 2001 it was the situation that the world found itself 
in that was new. Not only did the catastrophic event take place on U.S. soil-a country 
regarded as one of the greatest superpowers for several decades-but also, it was an 
event that was not isolated to one country or one landmass within the world. The society 
of today is a globally connected society, one in which although the distances ofland 
remain, cultures ideas, communication, economics, and so forth have become so close 
and connected that it changed the way in which catastrophic events are absorbed by 
people. For this reason the war on terrorism is not so much a war as it i a new \.~.:ay of 
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Life. Terrorism will continue to be one of the man element that e ist in thi world. 
Therefore it is the people who are unwilling to live in a world of fear that will be 
responsible for hindering terrorism at every opportunity. 
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